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Eyewitness identification research is focused on investigating the factors that affect the 
eyewitnesses’ ability to accurately identify the perpetrator from a lineup. A lineup consists 
of the police suspect and several other individuals who resemble the perpetrator, but are 
known to be innocent (called fillers). Several decades of research continue to have a 
growing impact on criminal justice systems throughout the world, most notably in the US, 
by informing public policy and informing the court (i.e. judges and jurors) through expert 
testimony. Efforts to shape public policy have been directed at improving fundamental 
aspects of the identification process with the goal to implement procedures that maximize 
discriminability – the ability to distinguish innocent from guilty suspects. Yet, poor 
measures of discriminability have resulted in many US jurisdictions implementing 
substandard procedures that may actually reduce discriminability. In court, factors that 
reduce discriminability are believed by many experts to reduce the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification – the accuracy of a suspect identification admitted as evidence 
in court. However, discriminability and reliability are two separate measures of 
eyewitness identification “accuracy.” That is, an eyewitness may have poor 
discriminability, but may nonetheless make a reliable identification from a lineup. To 
critically assess this issue, I have re-examined several eyewitness memory phenomena 
including the sequential superiority effect (Chapter 3), the verbal overshadowing effect 
(Chapter 4), and the weapon focus effect (Chapter 5) using two analytic techniques 
recently introduced to the eyewitness identification field that measure discriminability and 
the reliability of a suspect identification: receiver operating characteristic analysis and 
confidence-accuracy characteristic analysis, respectively. Together, this research 
highlights the importance of distinguishing between discriminability and reliability. 
Appreciating this distinction can help inform policymakers of procedures that boost 
discriminability and can help inform the court of the reliability of a suspect identification.  
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The Basic Identification Procedure 
In criminal investigations police commonly administer a lineup procedure to an 
eyewitness of a crime in order to identify the perpetrator or exclude an innocent person 
who is suspected by police. A lineup consists of a police suspect who is either guilty or 
innocent and several other individuals who match the general description of the 
perpetrator but are known to be innocent (called fillers or foils). The eyewitness may 
identify a lineup member or identify no one, resulting in six possible decision outcomes. 
Each of these six possible outcomes is presented in Table 1. There are two possible correct 
responses: 1) a correct identification (correct ID), and 2) a correct rejection. Successfully 
identifying the perpetrator from a perpetrator-present lineup (also known as a target-
present lineup) is known as a correct ID. Rejecting the lineup when the perpetrator is not 
in the lineup (i.e., from a perpetrator-absent lineup, also known as a target-absent lineup) 
is known as a correct rejection. There are three possible incorrect responses: 1) a false ID, 
2) a miss, and 3) a filler ID. A false ID occurs when the eyewitness identifies the innocent 
suspect from a perpetrator-absent lineup. A miss occurs when the eyewitness fails to 
identify the perpetrator from a perpetrator-present lineup (incorrectly rejecting the lineup 
instead). The eyewitness may also identify a filler from a perpetrator-present or 
perpetrator-absent lineup, but because fillers are known to be innocent, they are not at risk 
of wrongful conviction. However, false IDs place the innocent suspect at risk of wrongful 
investigation and possible conviction and a miss may result in a guilty suspect going free. 
Thus, false IDs and misses are the two errors that are of great practical importance because 
both of these errors may result in harm.  
Table 1 
The six decision outcomes of a lineup. 
 Suspect ID No ID Filler ID 
Perpetrator-Present Correct ID Miss Filler ID 
Perpetrator-Absent False ID Correct Rejection Filler ID 
A RE-EXAMINATION OF EYEWITNESS MEMORY PHENOMENA  
14 
 
Consequences of a False ID 
Perhaps the most well-known and well-documented example of a false ID is the 
case of Jennifer Thompson. In July 1984, Thompson was raped in her apartment. Later 
that night, police apprehended Ronald Cotton, a young man that fit Thompson’s 
description of the perpetrator. Thompson first identified Cotton out of a photo lineup. 
Later, Thompson stated that she was fairly sure Cotton was the perpetrator but admitted 
that the task was very difficult as all of the lineup members matched her description. 
During the live lineup several days later, Thompson vacillated between choosing Cotton 
and one other individual, and over time, she identified Cotton with even more certainty. 
At the trial, Thompson emphatically declared Cotton as her rapist. "I was absolutely, 
positively, without-a-doubt certain he was the man who raped me when I got on that 
witness stand and testified against him,” Thompson recalls, “and nobody was going to tell 
me any different” (Hansen, 2001). Thompson’s absolute certainty in court persuaded 
jurors to convict Cotton, who was subsequently sentenced to life plus 50 years in prison. 
After serving nearly 11 years, DNA evidence established Cotton’s innocence (Thompson-
Cannino, Cotton, & Torneo, 2009).  
Consequences of a Miss 
A photograph of the notorious serial killer, Ted Bundy, was presented to an 
eyewitness who had seen Bundy kidnap two women in broad daylight (Kendall, 1981). 
After browsing through a series of photographs that included a photo of Bundy and several 
other fillers, the eyewitness failed to identify Bundy as the perpetrator. Within the 
following years, Bundy had killed several more women before his final arrest.  
Standard Eyewitness Identification Experiment 
False IDs place innocent suspects at risk of wrongful investigation and possible 
conviction. A miss may remove suspicion from a perpetrator who is a threat to public 
safety. Because false IDs and misses may result in harm, it is critical that both types of 
errors are reduced (Ebbesen & Flowe, 2002; Mickes, Flowe, & Wixted, 2012). Of course, 
in a police-constructed lineup it is unknown whether or not the police suspect is guilty and 
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so, it is difficult to determine whether a false ID or a miss has occurred. However, in the 
laboratory, we can manipulate guilt. That is, experimenters assign guilt or innocence to a 
suspect. In the typical eyewitness memory experiment, participants take on the role of an 
eyewitness by watching a video of a mock crime and attempting to identify the perpetrator 
from a perpetrator-present or perpetrator-absent lineup. The number of correctly identified 
perpetrators divided by the number of perpetrator-present lineups is known as the correct 
ID rate and the number of innocent suspects falsely identified divided by the number of 
perpetrator-absent lineups is known as the false ID rate. By simulating the eyewitness 
identification procedure in a controlled laboratory (where guilt and innocence can be 
definitively established), researchers are able to elucidate the factors that reduce the rates 
of false IDs and misses. This research can then help inform the criminal justice system.  
Eyewitness identification researchers have been able to inform the criminal justice 
system largely through two streams: as eyewitness experts in the courts of law and as 
consultants to policymakers. As eyewitness experts in the courts of law, triers of fact (i.e. 
judges and jurors) can become informed of the multitude of factors that affect the 
reliability of suspect IDs. By consulting with policymakers, police procedures that reduce 
the rates of false IDs and misses can be implemented.  
Assisting the Criminal Justice System: Experts in Court 
Eyewitness researchers have, for quite some time, sought to assist and improve 
upon the criminal justice system. In the early 1900s, Munsterberg (1908) was convinced 
that eyewitness testimony often contained errors and that psychological science was best 
equipped to inform the court of these errors. Attorneys and legal scholars refuted this 
suggestion by criticizing the lack of practical solutions psychological science could 
provide (e.g. Moore, 1907, Wigmore, 1909). Several decades later however, during the 
mid-1970s, psychological researchers began to demonstrate the fallibility of eyewitness 
memory (e.g. Loftus & Palmer, 1974) and soon after, defense attorneys began to call on 
eyewitness researchers in court to challenge or, on occasion, strengthen key testimony 
(Egeth, 1993).  
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Should Eyewitness Experts Testify? 
Some eyewitness identification researchers questioned whether the results from 
the laboratory were generalizable to the “real world” (Yuille & Cutshall, 1986), whether 
there was adequate scientific foundation for such testimony (Konecni & Ebbesen, 1986), 
or if averaged data across a group of participants taking on the role of eyewitnesses in a 
laboratory could be applied to an actual eyewitness identification from a single case 
(Memon, Mastroberardino, & Fraser, 2008; Wells et al., 2000). There was also concern 
for the potential of expert testimony to invade the province of the jury (i.e. the power of 
the jury to decide on the facts). Critics preferred traditional safeguards such as cross-
examination of the eyewitness or the use of judicial instructions as an aid to jury decision-
making instead (Penrod & Cutler, 1989). Despite these concerns, many psychological 
researchers (e.g. Kassin, Ellseworth, & Smith, 1989; Leippe, 1995; Loftus, 1983), lawyers 
(Frazzini, 1981; Stein, 1981; Woocher, 1977), and judges (Bazelon, 1980; Weinstein, 
1981) defended its use in court as a tool to improve jury decision-making. Since the mid-
1980s, appellate courts have been more receptive to admitting eyewitness expert 
testimony (e.g. People v. McDonald, 1984; State v. Chapple, 1983; State v. Moon, 1986) 
and, consequently, many courts throughout the United States have become increasingly 
open to such testimony (Wells et al., 2000).  
Eyewitness Expert in Court 
Prior to criminal trials, eyewitness experts have helped attorneys examine 
eyewitness evidence and have helped attorneys present the eyewitness evidence to the 
trier of fact (e.g. Loftus & Ketchum, 1992). During criminal trials, eyewitness experts 
have provided testimony in court to help the trier of fact recognize when an error in 
testimony has likely occurred (Constandi, 2013; Costanzo, Krauss, & Pezdek, 2007; 
Kassin et al., 1989; 2001; Leippe, 1995; Loftus, 1983). When a suspect ID has been 
admitted as evidence in court, eyewitness experts have sought to provide a context or 
framework for evaluating the reliability of suspect IDs and have refrained from 
commenting on the reliability of the particular suspect ID of the case (doing so would 
invade the province of the jury) (Costanzo et al., 2007; Monohan & Walker, 1988).  
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Measuring the Reliability of a Suspect Identification 
The reliability of a suspect ID admitted as evidence in court is determined by its 
probative value. Probative value is a legal term that represents the extent to which a piece 
of evidence makes a proposition more or less likely to be true (Kaye, 1986). For instance, 
a suspect ID may make the proposition “the suspect is the perpetrator” more likely to be 
true. In this sense, the suspect ID is probative of guilt (from here on the term ‘probative 
value’ is shorthand for the probative value of guilt). The probative value of a suspect ID 
can be measured in a variety of ways. The most common measures of probative value 
derive closely from Bayes’ Theorem (e.g. Bayes, 1763; Davis & Follette, 2002; Kaye & 
Koehler, 2003; Wells & Lindsay, 1980). Bayesian statistics have been argued to be well 
suited for a broad range of legal reasoning (e.g. Feinberg & Finklestein, 1996) and have 
been put to use to measure the probative value of legal evidence in a number of actual 
court cases (Finkelstein, 1978; Finkelstein & Fairley, 1970; Fienberg & Kadane, 1983; 
Goodman 1999; Marshall and Wise 1975; Satake & Amato 1999). However, another way 
to measure the reliability of a suspect ID is by conducting confidence-accuracy 
characteristic (CAC) analysis (Mickes, 2015). In fact, the results from CAC analysis may 
be more informative to triers of fact. Both methods are discussed in detail below.  
Bayesian Statistics Approach 
During a criminal trial, the suspect’s guilt or innocence often cannot be definitively 
established. Because of this, a principal goal of the adjudicative process is to determine 
the probability of guilt, which can be denoted as P(G). This is referred to as the prior 
probability and is the probability of guilt prior to considering the suspect ID (Wells, 2003; 
Clark, 2012). In laboratory experiments, the prior probability is calculated by computing 
the proportion of lineups that contain the perpetrator (also referred to as the guilty suspect 
base rate). It is typically the case that half of the lineups contain the perpetrator and half 
of the lineups contain the innocent suspect meaning that P(G) is typically set to .50 (i.e. 
there is a 50% chance the suspect is guilty before knowing whether the participant 
identified the suspect). However, P(G) in the real world likely varies across police 
jurisdictions, investigators, and criminal cases (Clark, 2012). For instance, P(G) will be 
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quite high for a suspect whose DNA was collected from a crime scene (i.e. there is a high 
probability that the suspect is guilty), whereas P(G) will be much lower for a suspect who 
was arrested due to an anonymous tip (i.e. there is a low probability that the suspect is 
guilty). If an eyewitness identifies a suspect, then the trier of fact must update their belief 
in P(G). This is done by determining the probability of guilt given a suspect ID, denoted 
as P(G|ID). This is referred to as the posterior probability (Bayes, 1763).  
Difference Measures of Probative Value 
Friedman (1986) proposed that the greater the difference between the prior and the 
posterior probability, the greater the probative value of the evidence. This can be stated 
mathematically as:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑃(𝐺|𝐼𝐷) − 𝑃(𝐺)   (1) 
This measure of probative value was directly motivated by the wording of the US Federal 
Rule of Evidence 401 which, at the time, defined relevant evidence as having “any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Equation 
1 can be considered as a mathematical restatement of rule 401. It indicates that a suspect 
ID has probative value if the posterior probability differs from the prior probability. If the 
suspect ID is unreliable, perhaps because the eyewitness is nearly blind, then the 
difference between the posterior and prior probability will be small. Whereas, if the 
suspect ID is reliable, then the posterior probability should be larger than the prior 
probability. It is ultimately up to the trier of fact to determine whether the suspect ID is 
reliable enough to warrant conviction. Although this measure satisfies rule 401, it is 
difficult to determine the probative value of suspect IDs using this measure because P(G) 
in real lineups is unknown (Ellman & Kaye, 1979; Aitken, 1995; Wells, 2003; Wixted & 
Mickes, 2012). Even if there was a way to accurately estimate P(G), many lawyers assume 
that estimating P(G) is within the province of the jury and should not be considered in 
court by forensic experts (Fenton & Neil, 2011).  
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Ratio Measures of Probative Value: The Diagnosticity Ratio 
In eyewitness identification experiments, probative value is often calculated as a 
ratio of the correct ID rate to the false ID rate, commonly referred to as the diagnosticity 
ratio (DR) or the positive likelihood ratio (Kaye, 1986; Wells & Lindsay, 1980; Wells & 




     (2) 
The interpretation of the DR is straightforward: if, for example, the correct ID rate equals 
0.8 and the false ID rate equals 0.2, the DR equals 4.0 (i.e. 0.8 / 0.2 = 4.0), meaning that 
a suspect ID is four times more likely when the suspect is guilty than when the suspect is 
innocent. As this ratio grows, it signals that a suspect ID is increasingly likely to occur 
when the suspect is guilty than when the suspect is innocent. If the ratio equals 1.0, the 
suspect ID has no probative value. If the ratio is less than 1.0, then a false ID is more likely 
than a correct ID. In this case, the suspect ID is probative of innocence rather than guilt. 
Because P(G) in real lineups remains unknown, the fact that the DR can provide a measure 
of probative value irrespective of P(G) is, in part, why eyewitness researchers (Wells & 
Lindsay, 1980) and other organizations such as the Royal Statistical Society (Puch-Solis, 
Roberts, Pope, & Aitken, 2012) have advocated its use in court. 
Confidence and Accuracy Approach 
Courts are often confronted with a situation where an eyewitness has identified the 
suspect with some degree of confidence (e.g. the eyewitness is 90% confident the suspect 
is the perpetrator) and there is very little or no other evidence available to help determine 
a verdict. It is estimated that each year in the US roughly 77,000 individuals become 
suspects in these types of cases (Goldstein, Chance, & Schneller, 1989). How can 
experimental studies of eyewitness identification help courts assess the probative value of 
suspect IDs made with some degree of confidence?  
One way to try to help the court would be to compute the DR from laboratory 
experiments (Wells & Lindsay, 1980). It is possible to compute the DR across degrees of 
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confidence (e.g. Brewer & Wells, 2006; Lindsay & Wells, 1985), but the question triers of 
fact have about a testifying eyewitness who has identified a suspect is: How accurate are 
suspect IDs given the level of confidence expressed by an eyewitness? Two analyses aim 
to answer this question by measuring the relationship between confidence and accuracy. 
Calibration Analysis 
Although results from early experimental studies have been interpreted to mean 
that eyewitness confidence is an unreliable indicator of suspect ID accuracy, confidence 
collected at the time of the initial suspect ID is, in fact, a strong predictor of suspect ID 
accuracy (Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015). This confidence-
accuracy (CA) relationship is typically strong for eyewitnesses who make a suspect ID in 
the laboratory (Horry, Palmer, & Brewer, 2012; Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010) 
and in the field (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Wixted, Mickes, Dunn, Clark, & Wells, 2016). 
Juslin, Olsson, and Winman (1996) measured the CA relationship by conducting 
calibration analysis. This approach measures accuracy for each level of confidence as:   
𝐴 =
# 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝐷𝑠
(# 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝐷𝑠   +   # 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐷𝑠  +  # 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝐼𝐷𝑠)
   (3) 
, where A is the accuracy of eyewitness IDs. This equation counts the number of correct 
IDs and divides that number by the total number of IDs (i.e. by adding the number of 
correct IDs, false IDs, and filler IDs) for a particular level of confidence. For example, 




     (4) 
Calibration analysis measures how well eyewitnesses can calibrate their subjective 
confidence in their identification decision with their objective accuracy in those 
identifications. An eyewitness is said to be “over-confident” if their confidence exceeds 
their accuracy and “under-confident” if their accuracy exceeds their confidence. Perfect 
calibration occurs when an eyewitness’s reported confidence matches their accuracy. For 
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example, if an eyewitness is 70% confident that the suspect is the perpetrator, perfect 
calibration would mean that the eyewitness is correct 70% of the time.  
Confidence-Accuracy Characteristic Analysis 
Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) analysis measures the CA relationship 
in a similar way that is more informative to the trier of fact (see Chapter 2 for more details; 
Mickes, 2015). A CAC analysis plots suspect ID accuracy across levels of confidence. 
Suspect ID accuracy, denoted as A, is calculated as: 
𝐴 =
# 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝐷𝑠
(# 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝐷𝑠   +   # 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐷𝑠)
   (5) 
, where A equals the number of correct IDs divided by the total number of suspect IDs (i.e. 
by adding the number of correct and false IDs). Crucially, filler IDs are not included in 
this measurement because triers of fact are mainly concerned with the accuracy for 
suspects. Of course, the number of correct and false IDs obtained in an experiment might 
fluctuate depending on the number of times the perpetrator is present in the lineup. That 
is, suspect ID accuracy might fluctuate depending on P(G). A low P(G) could yield few 
correct IDs and possibly many false IDs (because the perpetrator is rarely present in the 
lineup), whereas a high P(G) could yield many correct IDs and few false IDs (because the 
perpetrator is often present in the lineup). Thus, it is important to consider how suspect ID 
accuracy varies across a range of P(G) values.  
The results from a recent police department field study (Wixted et al., 2016) 
estimate suspect ID accuracy to be roughly 97% for actual eyewitnesses who were highly 
confident at the time of their initial identification from a lineup. Remarkably, this estimate 
did not vary significantly across P(G) values .25, .50, and .75. These results are very 
similar to the results often found in the laboratory. Wixted, Read, Lindsay, & Columbia 
(2016) reanalyzed data from several eyewitness identification experiments which had 
P(G) values .50 or .75. Across these studies, suspect ID accuracy was roughly 97% when 
participants were 90 – 100% confident. Together, these results make it clear that a suspect 
identified by an eyewitness with high confidence has a high likelihood of being the person 
A RE-EXAMINATION OF EYEWITNESS MEMORY PHENOMENA  
22 
 
who actually committed the crime (i.e., a high likelihood of being guilty), and this is true 
when the prior probability is as high as .75 and when the prior probability is as low as .25.  
The Diagnosticity Ratio or Confidence-Accuracy Characteristic Analysis  
Both the DR and CAC analysis effectively capture the probative value of suspect 
IDs, but when courts need to know the accuracy of suspect IDs made with a particular 
level of confidence (as is often the case in the US), CAC analysis seems generally 
preferable (Mickes, 2015). To demonstrate this point, consider the case Jackson v. Fogg 
(1978). In June 1970, an armed man entered a diner in Queens County, New York and 
announced, “This is a stickup.” Hearing these words, customers and staff members 
attempted to quickly find cover. The gunman then fired a single shot, mortally wounding 
the bartender. New York police detectives investigating the shooting were unable to locate 
any tangible evidence pertaining to the identity of the perpetrator, but four eyewitnesses 
identified Edmond Jackson who had been brought to the police station on an unrelated 
issue. At trial, no other evidence was brought forth connecting Jackson to the crime and 
the jury found Jackson guilty. He was sentenced to 20 years to life in prison. Several years 
later, the conviction was reversed in part because each of the four eyewitnesses had seen 
the perpetrator for only a few seconds and, thus, did not have a good opportunity to view 
the perpetrator’s face.  
Are these Suspect IDs less Reliable? 
The court in this case is concerned with whether the suspect IDs were less reliable 
because the perpetrator’s face was shown for just a short amount of time. When examining 
the effect of exposure duration on eyewitness reliability, and when confidence ratings are 
recorded, one can easily plot CACs and DRs. Take, for example, data from experiment 1 
in Palmer, Brewer, Weber, and Nagesh (2013). Participants viewed a perpetrator for 5 
(short exposure) or 90 seconds (long exposure) before attempting to identify the 
perpetrator from a perpetrator-present or perpetrator-absent lineup. During the lineup, 
participants indicated how confident they were in their identification decision using an 11-
point confidence scale (ranging from 0% = just guessing to 100% = absolutely certain).  




Figure 1. The reliability of a suspect ID can be measured using the DR or by measuring 
the CA relationship. Figure 1A plots the relationship between confidence and suspect ID 
accuracy, whereas Figure 1B plots the relationship between confidence and the ln DR. The 
bars are the standard error for each level of confidence. 
Figure 1A plots the CACs for short (5 seconds) and long (90 seconds) exposure 
conditions. Figure 1B plots the natural log (ln) of the DR across each level of confidence 
for short and long exposure conditions. Note that the ln DR is conceptually similar to the 
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traditional DR (i.e. the higher values correspond to greater probative value). First, both 
figures clearly show that a suspect identified by an eyewitness with high confidence, as 
opposed to low confidence, is more likely to be the person who actually committed the 
crime. As Palmer et al. state, “In all conditions, the accuracy and informativeness [i.e. 
probative value] of positive identifications increased with confidence, especially toward 
the upper end of the confidence scale” (p. 62-63). Second, the experimental manipulation 
of exposure duration had no meaningful effect on the probative value of suspect IDs. Both 
figures show no significant differences between short and long exposure duration on the 
reliability of suspect IDs across medium (70-80%) and high (90-100%) levels of 
confidence. Based on these results, the fact that the four eyewitnesses only saw the 
perpetrator’s face for a few seconds does not indicate that their suspect IDs were less 
reliable.  
Yet, CAC analysis makes this point more clearly. For suspect IDs made with high 
confidence, for example, suspect ID accuracy is 98% for both short and long exposure 
conditions. This means that participants who saw the perpetrator for only a few seconds 
and confidently identified the suspect from a lineup are no more likely to make a false ID 
than participants who saw the perpetrator for a longer duration. In both conditions, there 
is a 98% chance of a correct ID and just a 2% chance of a false ID. The ln DR calculated 
from the same dataset for suspect IDs made with 90-100% confidence is 3.74 for the long 
exposure condition and 3.29 for the short exposure condition. This is not a statistically 
significant difference, which is informative to the trier of fact, but because the ln DR is 
not a measure of proportion correct (i.e. is not a measure of accuracy), triers of fact are 
not privy to the error rate. Thus, when measuring the reliability of suspect IDs, CAC 
analysis seems more informative to the trier of fact than the DR.  
Assisting the Criminal Justice System: Consultants to Policymakers 
In the early-1970s eyewitness researchers began to provide expert testimony in 
court with the aim of spotting mistakes in eyewitness testimony. Several years later, in the 
late-1970s, eyewitness researchers aimed to prevent eyewitness errors from occurring in 
the first place (Wells, 1978). This new perspective held that some variables, known as 
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system variables, affect eyewitness memory and are under the control of the criminal 
justice system, whereas other variables, known as estimator variables, affect eyewitness 
memory, but are beyond the control of the criminal justice system. Thus, ways of 
interviewing an eyewitness (e.g. by using the Cognitive Interview; Fisher & Geiselman, 
1992) and ways of collecting identification evidence (e.g. by using the sequential lineup 
procedure; Lindsay & Wells, 1985) are system variables because the criminal justice 
system controls these procedures. Factors that are beyond the control of the criminal 
justice system that may affect eyewitness memory are estimator variables. Laboratory 
experiments indicate that the amount of time the perpetrator was in view (e.g. Memon, 
Hope, & Bull, 2003), the distinctiveness of the perpetrator’s face (e.g. Light et al. 1979), 
and the presence of a weapon (i.e. by drawing attention away from the perpetrator’s face; 
Loftus et al., 1987; Steblay, 1992) may impact eyewitness memory. Each of these factors 
are estimator variables because the criminal justice system can, at best, estimate the extent 
to which these factors affect eyewitness memory.  
The value of distinguishing between system and estimator variables is that it 
clearly separates variables that can be reformed by the criminal justice system (i.e. system 
variables) from variables that cannot be reformed (i.e. estimator variables). That is, 
although estimator variables may be manipulated in laboratory experiments, they are 
uncontrollable in actual criminal situations (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987). Whereas, 
if current police procedures are substandard, system variable research can inform 
policymakers of alternative procedures to help improve eyewitness memory.  
Review of System Variable Research 
Research on system variables increased in the following decades and several 
reforms were introduced (Gronlund, Mickes, Wixted, & Clark, 2015); but simply having 
a strong research base was not sufficient for policymakers to take notice and adopt these 
reforms (Wells et al., 2000). Eyewitness researchers put some pressure on policymakers 
to adopt these reforms by scrutinizing faulty police procedures in court. In the US, courts 
could dismiss eyewitness evidence if it was collected under biased or risky circumstances, 
but the courts have been reluctant to do this. The courts have instead preferred to let the 
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trier of fact evaluate the reliability of the eyewitness evidence even if it was collected 
under extremely biased circumstances (Loftus & Doyle, 1997). The catalyst for reform 
has been the staggering number of wrongfully convicted individuals originally convicted 
due to false IDs and later exonerated based on DNA evidence. 
The Innocence Project, whose mission it is to lobby on behalf of wrongfully 
convicted individuals, has helped release 349 innocent suspects (as of 07/02/2017) 
through the use of DNA testing. Of those, roughly 72% were convicted either solely or in 
large-part due to false IDs (Innocence Project, 2017). These DNA-based exonerations 
encouraged U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno to order a panel to discuss and develop 
national guidelines on the appropriate methods for collecting eyewitness identification 
evidence (Wells et al., 2000). In October 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice released a 
document entitled Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement (Technical 
Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999), which established a host of guidelines 
that aimed to improve eyewitness memory (Gronlund et al., 2015). The reforms focused 
on improving fundamental aspects of the identification procedure such as the wording of 
pre-lineup instructions, the selection of fillers, and the way lineups are constructed (Clark, 
2012).  
Misuse of the Diagnosticity Ratio 
Although heralded as a “successful application of eyewitness research”, “from the 
lab to the police station” (Wells et al., 2000), many of the reforms have either failed to 
improve eyewitness memory or have made it worse (Gronlund et al., 2015). This 
undesirable consequence occurred in large part because the wrong statistic – the DR – was 
used as the basis for many of the recommended reforms (Gronlund et al., 2015). Crucially, 
the sequential lineup procedure was included in the guidelines as a recommended method 
for constructing a lineup almost entirely on the basis that the DR was higher for the 
sequential lineup procedure than the traditionally used simultaneous lineup procedure 
(Steblay et al., 2001). The better lineup procedure was thought to be the one that resulted 
in more reliable (more probative) suspect IDs (as indicated by the DR). To illustrate why 
the DR should not have been used as the basis for these policy recommendations, the 
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debate between the traditional simultaneous lineup procedure and its recommended 
replacement, the sequential lineup procedure, will be discussed. The point of this 
discussion is to show that the DR should not serve as the basis for policy recommendations 
when the goal is to decrease the number of false IDs and misses.   
Simultaneous vs. Sequential Lineups 
The simultaneous lineup procedure is the most commonly constructed lineup in 
the United States (Police Executive Research Forum, 2013). The lineup consists of six 
photos presented simultaneously to the eyewitness in a 3 X 2 matrix. The eyewitness views 
all of the six photos and either chooses an individual from the lineup as the perpetrator or 
rejects the entire lineup in the event the perpetrator is absent. In attempts to improve the 
lineup, Lindsay & Wells (1985) developed the sequential lineup procedure. The sequential 
lineup procedure consists of photos of individuals presented one at a time (i.e. in sequence) 
to an eyewitness. For each photo, the eyewitness declares whether the individual in the 
photo is or is not the perpetrator. In the laboratory, researchers recommend terminating 
the procedure after making an identification, but, in practice, the procedure typically 
terminates after the eyewitness has seen all of the lineup members. 
Researchers determine the performance of a lineup procedure by measuring the 
correct ID rate and false ID rate. When comparing two lineup procedures such as 
procedure A and procedure B, for example, procedure A is the superior procedure if 
procedure A yields a lower false ID rate and higher (or at least the same) correct ID rate. 
Alternatively, procedure A may yield a higher correct ID rate and lower (or at least the 
same) false ID rate and be the superior procedure. However, when comparing 
simultaneous and sequential lineups, a more ambiguous outcome arises (Clark, 2012). 
Meta-analyses show that the sequential lineup procedure often yields a lower false ID rate 
and a slightly lower correct ID rate than the simultaneous lineup procedure (Steblay, 
Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001; Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 2011). Note that with this 
pattern, superiority cannot be determined simply by comparing the overall correct and 
false ID rates from the two procedures (Mickes et al., 2012). Yet, the sequential lineup 
procedure was still deemed the superior procedure (Steblay et al., 2011). 
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Sequential Superiority Effect 
Eyewitness identification researchers argue that the sequential lineup procedure is 
superior largely because it yields a higher DR (Steblay et al., 2011; although see Gronlund, 
Carlson, Dailey, & Goodsell, 2009). If the sequential procedure, despite having a lower 
correct ID rate and lower false ID rate, has a higher DR, then the decrease in false ID rate 
is proportionally greater than the corresponding decrease in correct ID rate. In other words, 
some researchers claim that the benefits gained by using the sequential procedure (the 
large decrease in false ID rate) outweigh the negatives (the slight decrease in correct ID 
rate). For this reason, the sequential procedure has been dubbed the “superior procedure” 
(Steblay, et al. 2011). Based on this logic, the sequential procedure was included in the 
national guidelines (Technical Working Group, 1999) and approximately 30% of 
jurisdictions throughout the US have since switched to the sequential procedure (Police 
Executive Research Forum, 2013).  
Discriminability 
However, the procedure that maximizes discriminability – the ability to distinguish 
perpetrators from innocent suspects – is the superior procedure (Mickes et al., 2012). The 
highest level of discriminability occurs when perpetrators are always identified and 
innocent suspects are never identified (i.e. correct ID rate = 1.0, false ID rate = 0.0). The 
lowest level of discriminability occurs when perpetrators are identified as often as 
innocent suspects (i.e. correct ID rate = false ID rate). A recent US National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) committee commissioned to assess the current state of eyewitness 
identification research concluded that “there should be no debate about the value of greater 
discriminability – to promote a lineup that yields less discriminability would be akin to 
advocating that the lineup be performed in dim instead of bright light” (National Research 
Council, 2014, p. 80). Thus, the lineup procedure that yields greater discriminability is the 
superior procedure.  




Can the DR, a measure of probative value for suspect IDs (e.g. Wells & Lindsay, 
1980), measure discriminability? No. This is because the DR conflates discriminability 
with the eyewitness’ likelihood to choose, or not choose, a member from the lineup, 
commonly referred to as response bias (Wixted & Mickes, 2012). Eyewitnesses may be 
more or less likely to choose someone from the lineup (i.e. more or less biased to choose), 
but may be equally proficient at discriminating perpetrators from innocent suspects (i.e. 
have the same discriminability). Because the DR cannot properly separate measurements 
of response bias from measurements of discriminability, the DR cannot determine whether 
the sequential procedure increases discriminability or simply increases response bias. 
Some have argued that the reason the DR is higher for the sequential procedure is precisely 
because the sequential procedure induces conservative responding (e.g. Gronlund et al., 
2009; Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, & Maclin, 2005; Mickes et al., 2012). For this reason 
the NAS committee has advocated the use of other methods of measuring discriminability 
instead of the DR. One such method endorsed by the committee is receiver operating 
(ROC) analysis which the committee concluded as, “…a positive and promising step, with 
numerous advantages” (National Research Council, 2014, p. 59). The main advantage 
being that differences in discriminability and response bias are apparent in ROC curves 
(Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Wixted & Mickes, 2012; Gronlund, 
Wixted, & Mickes 2014; National Research Council, 2014).  
Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis  
A comparison between the overall correct and false ID rates for the simultaneous 
and sequential lineup procedure has repeatedly been the basis for determining lineup 
superiority, often calculated in the form of a DR (e.g. Steblay et al., 2001; 2011). However, 
in order to determine which procedure yields greater discriminability, the correct and false 
ID rates for identifications made with increasingly conservative responding must be 
compared as well. These correct and false ID rates can be obtained from instruction 
biasing conditions (e.g. Mickes et al., in submission) or can be obtained, more 
conveniently, by collecting confidence in the identification decision (e.g. Seale-Carlisle & 
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Mickes, 2016). ROC analysis plots the correct and false ID rate for each level of 
confidence, from highly confident identifications (i.e. very conservative identifications) 
to identifications made with lower confidence (i.e. increasingly liberal identifications). 
This is how ROC plots have typically been constructed in the eyewitness identification 
field (e.g. Mickes et al., 2012) and confidence-based ROC analysis is typical in the fields 
of experimental psychology and radiology (Wixted & Mickes, 2012). By using confidence 
judgments to construct the entire ROC, the comparison between the simultaneous and 
sequential lineup procedure can be made on the basis of the family of correct and false ID 
rates, rather than on the basis of a single, overall correct and false ID rate.  
Figure 2 shows the overall correct and false ID rate for the simultaneous lineup 
and the overall correct and false ID rate for the sequential lineup. This data is taken from 
Table 3 of the meta-analysis reported by Steblay et al. (2011). It is clear that the sequential 
lineup yields a lower correct ID rate and a lower false ID rate than the simultaneous lineup. 
However, once the family of correct and false ID rates has been plotted (so that the entire 
ROC is constructed for the simultaneous and sequential lineup procedures), three patterns 
may emerge (Mickes et al., 2012). First, the points may fall on the same ROC (Figure 2A), 
in which case the data would show that the two lineup procedures yield the same 
discriminability, and the sequential lineup procedure simply induces more conservative 
responding (Ebbesen & Flowe, 2002; Gronlund et al., 2009; Meissner et al., 2005). Second, 
the sequential lineup ROC may fall above the simultaneous lineup ROC (Figure 2B). This 
pattern would indicate that the sequential lineup procedure yields greater discriminability 
and is, in fact, the superior procedure – for any given false ID rate, the sequential lineup 
would yield a higher correct ID rate. A third possibility is that the simultaneous lineup 
ROC falls above the sequential lineup ROC (Figure 2C). This pattern would indicate the 
exact opposite of the “sequential superiority” claim as the data would show the 
simultaneous lineup procedure to be superior.  




Figure 2. The data points in this figure are from Table 3 of the meta-analysis reported by 
Steblay et al. (2011). Three hypothetical ROC curves are shown in this figure. If there is 
no significant difference in discriminability between simultaneous and sequential lineups, 
then there should be one ROC as shown in Figure 2A. If the sequential lineup yields 
greater discriminability, then the sequential lineup ROC should be higher than the 
simultaneous ROC, as shown in Figure 2B. If the simultaneous lineup yields greater 
discriminability, then the simultaneous lineup ROC should be higher than the sequential 
lineup ROC, as shown in Figure 2C. This point has been expressed in Mickes et al. (2012). 
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Simultaneous vs. Sequential Lineups 
Mickes et al. (2012) conducted ROC analysis to determine whether the sequential 
procedure yields greater discriminability than the simultaneous procedure. They had 
participants study a video of a mock crime and attempt to identify the perpetrator from 
either a 6-person simultaneous lineup or a 6-person sequential lineup. In order to construct 
the ROC, they had participants report their confidence in their identification decision 
using an eleven point confidence rating scale (0% = just guessing to 100% = absolutely 
certain). The correct and false ID rate for each level of confidence, from highly confident 
identifications (i.e. very conservative identifications) to identification decisions made with 
lower confidence (i.e. increasingly liberal identifications), were plotted in ROC space (see 
Figure 3). Note that the x-axis, ranging from 0 – .08, is much shorter than the y-axis, 
ranging from 0 – .80, because the false ID rates were estimated by dividing the number of 
filler IDs by the size of the lineup, which produces very small false ID rates (see Chapter 
2 for further discussion).  
Mickes et al. (2012) found that 1) the simultaneous lineup yields a higher ROC 
curve and, thus, greater discriminability than the sequential lineup and 2) the sequential 
lineup induces more conservative responding than the simultaneous lineup. This result has, 
thus far, been replicated by four independent laboratories (e.g. Anderson, Carlson, Carlson, 
& Gronlund, 2014; Carlson & Carlson, 2014; Dobolyi & Dodson, 2013; Gronlund et al., 
2012) and data from two field studies provide converging evidence (Amendola & Wixted, 
2014; Wixted et al., 2016). Thus, when ROC analysis is conducted, the superior procedure 
is the simultaneous procedure rather than the sequential procedure. Police jurisdictions 
that have switched to the sequential procedure have, in fact, made it harder for 
eyewitnesses to discriminate the guilty suspect from the innocent suspect. When the goal 
is to increase eyewitnesses’ ability to discriminate the innocent suspect from the guilty 
suspect, policymakers should adopt the procedure that yields the greatest ROC rather than 
the procedure that yields the greatest DR. 




Figure 3. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for simultaneous and sequential 
lineup procedures in Experiment 1a of Mickes, Flowe & Wixted (2012). The dashed line 
represents chance performance.  
Signal-Detection Theory  
Why is discriminability higher for the simultaneous lineup? Because theories of 
discriminability in the domain of eyewitness identification were nonexistent, Wixted and 
Mickes (2014) extended a signal-detection-based model that has served as a theoretical 
bedrock for recognition decisions since the 1950s (Egan, 1958), and applied it to 
eyewitness identifications from police-constructed lineups. This model is composed of 
two parts: a general signal-detection based model of eyewitness identification and a 
specific diagnostic feature-detection hypothesis which predicts greater discriminability 
for the simultaneous lineup. The basic tenants of signal-detection theory and its 
application as a model of recognition memory are first reviewed in order to discuss the 
specifics of the diagnostic feature-detection hypothesis. 
False ID Rate
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Standard Recognition Memory Experiment 
The standard recognition memory experiment consists of two phases: a study 
phase and a test phase. During the study phase, participants are presented a list of items to 
memorize (e.g., a list of words or a list of faces); these items are called “targets.” During 
the test phase, participants are asked to distinguish between targets and new items that 
were not studied called “lures.” The targets are randomly intermixed with the lures and 
are presented one at a time for an “old” or “new” decision. A correct response for a target 
is old; these responses are called “hits.” A correct response for a lure is new; these 
responses are called “correct rejections.” Incorrectly declaring a target as new is a “miss” 
and incorrectly declaring a lure as old is a “false alarm.” Table 2 shows these four decision 
outcomes.  
Table 2 
The four decision outcomes of a recognition memory experiment. 
 Old New 
Target Hit Miss 
Lure False Alarm Correct Rejection 
 
The proportion of targets correctly identified as old is the hit rate and the 
proportion of lures incorrectly identified as old is the false alarm rate. Hit and false alarm 
rates are computed for each participant. A participant might, for example, correctly declare 
80 out of 100 targets as old (i.e. hit rate equals 80 percent, miss rate equals 20 percent) 
and might incorrectly declare 30 out of 100 lures as old (i.e. false alarm rate equals 30 
percent, correct rejection rate equals 70 percent).  
Signal-detection theory is capable of providing an interpretation of hit and false 
alarm rates obtained from recognition memory experiments (Egan, 1958; Green & Swets, 
1966). The standard, prototypical signal-detection model is illustrated in Figure 4. 
According to this view, recognition decisions are based on the strength of a memory signal 
in relation to a decision criterion. This approach assumes two Gaussian distributions: one 
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target distribution and one lure distribution. The difference in strengths between the two 
distributions reflects the amount of strength added to target items on account of being 
presented on the study list; lure items receive no added strength as they were not presented 
on the list but are noisy, hence a Gaussian distribution. In a recognition task, any item that 
generates a memory strength signal exceeding the criterion is declared to be old (i.e. the 
participant recognized the item). If the item fails to generate enough strength to surpass 
the criterion, the item is declared new (i.e. the participant did not recognize the item). The 
light grey area of the target distribution to the right of the decision criterion represents the 
hit rate, whereas the dark grey area of the lure distribution to the right of the decision 
criterion represents the false alarm rate. 
 
Figure 4. The standard signal detection model consists of two distributions: one lure 
distribution and one target distribution. These distributions rest along a memory strength 
axis. A decision criterion is placed somewhere along the axis such that memory signals 
for items exceeding that criterion are recognized as old and memory signals for items that 
fail to reach that criterion are determined to be new. 
Response Bias 
Response bias refers to the likelihood of declaring an item as old (a bias to choose 
an item as having been recognized) and this likelihood is represented by the location of 
the decision criterion along the memory strength axis. Shifting the decision criterion to 
the right means that items will have a lower likelihood of being declared old (Figure 5A). 
Only items that generate a very strong memory signal will be declared old; most items 
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will be declared new. As such, the hit rate and false alarm rate will decrease as a smaller 
portion of the target and lure distributions fall to the right of the decision criterion (i.e. the 
shaded regions of the distributions are smaller). Shifting the decision criterion to the left 
(Figure 5B) means that items will have a greater likelihood of being declared old as many 
targets and lures will generate a strong enough signal to exceed the decision criterion. 
When this happens, the hit rate and false alarm rate will increase as a greater portion of 
the target and lure distributions fall to the right of the decision criterion (i.e. the shaded 
regions of the distributions are larger).  
 
Figure 5. Different response biases. The location of the decision criterion can shift along 
the memory strength axis which can affect the hit and false alarm rates, but underlying 
discriminability does not change. Figure 5A represents conservative responding, whereas 
Figure 5B represents liberal responding. 
 




The target and lure distributions can also shift along the memory strength axis. The 
extent to which the two distributions overlap reflects the participant’s ability to 
discriminate targets from lures. High discriminability is evident when the target 
distribution is largely separated from the lure distribution (Figure 6A). The highest level 
of discriminability is when a target is always recognized and a lure is never recognized 
(i.e. a hit rate of 1.0 and a false alarm rate of 0). Low discriminability is evident when the 
target and lure distributions largely overlap (Figure 6B). The lowest level of 
discriminability is when targets and lures are recognized equally. In Figure 5 we can see 
that despite placing the decision criterion at different points along the memory strength 
axis (i.e. despite differences in response bias), discriminability is the same because the 
target and lure distributions have the same amount of overlap.  
 
Figure 6. Different discriminability. The lure and target distributions can shift along the 
memory strength axis and the distance between these distributions depicts discriminability. 
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Signal-Detection Model and Lineups 
The extension of the prototypical signal-detection model to police-constructed 
lineups is rather straightforward. A lineup consists of a police suspect (who may be 
innocent or guilty) and several fillers. The police should select fillers that match the 
general description of the perpetrator. A lineup is considered “fair”, if an innocent suspect 
does not resemble the perpetrator more so than the other fillers (to ensure that the innocent 
suspect does not stand out). In this case, the innocent suspect distribution and the filler 
distribution are one and the same (and will from here on just be referred to as the innocent 
suspect distribution). Thus, there exists two distributions in this model: an innocent 
suspect distribution and a guilty suspect distribution (Figure 7). The amount of overlap 
between the innocent suspect distribution and the guilty suspect distribution represents the 
eyewitnesses’ discriminability, and an identification is made only if the memory strength 
of the most familiar face in the lineup exceeds a decision criterion. The area of the guilty 
suspect distribution to the right of the decision criterion is the correct ID rate (shaded in 
light grey), whereas the area of the innocent suspect distribution to the right of the decision 
criterion is the false ID rate (shaded in dark grey). Although signal-detection models have 
been traditionally applied to standard list-learning recognition paradigms, this basic 
signal-detection model has been shown to fit experimental lineup data (e.g. Wixted et al., 
2016; Seale-Carlisle & Mickes, 2016). 
 
Figure 7. Signal-detection model for lineups consists of two distributions: one distribution 
for innocent suspects (and fillers for a fair lineup) and one distribution for guilty suspects.  




The diagnostic-feature-detection (DFD) hypothesis holds that the simultaneous 
presentation of faces better enables the eyewitness to detect the features that are unique to 
the perpetrator (i.e. features that are diagnostic of guilt) while discounting the features that 
the perpetrator shares with other members in the lineup (i.e. the features that are non-
diagnostic; Wixted & Mickes, 2014). By focusing on the diagnostic features, eyewitnesses 
are able to improve their ability to discriminate innocent from guilty suspects. For example, 
if the perpetrator was a young, White male, then attaching weight to those features would 
not be helpful and would instead serve to impair discriminability because all of the lineup 
members would be young, White males. Having the faces presented simultaneously 
allows eyewitnesses to immediately detect and discount non-diagnostic features (e.g. the 
age, ethnicity, and gender of the suspect) and to instead attach more weight to features that 
are not shared and are thus more diagnostic. The sequential presentation of faces, on the 
other hand, limits the ability of the eyewitness to detect (and then discount) the common, 
non-diagnostic facial features, which means that eyewitnesses will tend to attach weight 
to diagnostic and non-diagnostic features, thereby reducing discriminability. These are 
currently untested predictions of the DFD hypothesis, but the research discussed in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are consistent with these predictions. 
Preview of Upcoming Chapters 
 Chapter 2 contains the methodological details shared among the eight eyewitness 
identification experiments discussed in this thesis. In Chapter 3, a direct comparison 
between the US lineup and the UK lineup is made. In Chapter 4, the validity of the verbal 
overshadowing effect (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) is re-examined and a 
diagnostic feature-detection account of the verbal overshadowing effect is proposed. In 
Chapter 5, the validity of the weapon focus effect (Loftus et al., 1987) is re-examined. In 
Chapter 6, several potential markers of eyewitness identification accuracy are compared 
to determine which marker is best. Chapter 7 discusses the general findings from these 
experiments as well as any overarching strengths and limitations of the research conducted.   




The methods that apply to the experiments in this thesis are described in this 
chapter. 
General Procedure 
The general procedure used in the experiments reported in this thesis consisted of 
two phases: a study phase and a test phase. During the study phase, participants took on 
the role of an eyewitness by watching a video of a mock crime. Each mock crime video 
consisted of a single perpetrator, though in some of the videos a victim was also present. 
After witnessing the crime, participants engaged in a distractor task. The distractor task 
was designed to limit the participants’ ability to rehearse information from the video so 
that participants rely on their long-term memory (rather than short-term or working 
memory) when making an identification from the lineup. During the test phase, 
participants were shown a perpetrator-present or perpetrator-absent lineup. Participants 
were then instructed to identify the perpetrator if the perpetrator was present in the lineup 
or, if the perpetrator was not present in the lineup, choose no one by clicking the 
“perpetrator is not present” button. Participants then rated their confidence in their 
identification decision. After the test phase, participants were asked specific details about 
the mock crime they had witnessed. One of the questions asked specifically about the type 
of crime committed in the video. Participants who paid attention during the study phase 
should have answered this question correctly. Because these experiments took place 
online and outside the confines of a controlled laboratory, correctly answering this 
question ensured that the participant paid enough attention during the study phase in order 
to potentially identify the perpetrator from a lineup. Failing to answer this question 
correctly provided reasonable grounds for exclusion from further analyses. 
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Calculating Correct ID, False ID, and Filler ID rates. 
Correct ID Rate 
Because participants witness a crime that contains one perpetrator, each participant 
makes only one attempt to identify the perpetrator from a perpetrator-present or 
perpetrator-absent lineup. Thus, a participant can make one correct ID, false ID, or filler 
ID. The group’s correct ID rate is calculated by adding the total number of correct IDs 
across the entire group of participants and dividing that number by the total number of 
perpetrator-present lineups. For instance, if 100 participants were presented a perpetrator-
present lineup and only 60 participants correctly identified the perpetrator, the correct ID 
rate would be .60 (i.e. 60/100 = .60). 
False ID Rate 
Several methods can be used to calculate the false ID rate. If the perpetrator-absent 
lineup contains a designated innocent suspect, then the false ID rate can be calculated by 
dividing the total number of false IDs made by the group of participants by the total 
number of perpetrator-absent lineups presented to that group. For instance, if 100 
participants were shown perpetrator-absent lineups and 20 participants falsely identified 
the innocent suspect, the false ID rate would be .20 (i.e. 20/100 = .20). However, if the 
perpetrator-absent lineup does not contain a designated innocent suspect, the false ID rate 
is estimated. One way to estimate the false ID rate is to designate the most often identified 
filler as the innocent suspect. This method estimates the false ID rate by dividing the 
number of times this filler is identified by the total number of perpetrator-absent lineups. 
Another method does not designate an innocent suspect and, instead, estimates the number 
of false IDs by dividing the total number of filler IDs by the number of fillers presented 
in a perpetrator-absent lineup. For instance, if participants were shown a perpetrator-
absent lineup that consisted of six fillers and participants identified 60 fillers in total, the 
estimated number of false IDs would be 10 (i.e. 60/6 = 10). In order to estimate the false 
ID rate, this value is then divided by the total number of perpetrator-absent lineups. If 100 
participants were shown these perpetrator-absent lineups, then the estimated false ID rate 
would be .10. That is, the number of filler IDs (60) is divided by the number of lineup 
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members (6) which provides the estimated number of false IDs (10). This estimated value 
is then divided by the total number of perpetrator-absent lineups (100), producing the 
estimated false ID rate (.10). This is the most often used method to estimate the false ID 
rate when a designated innocent suspect is not placed in a perpetrator-absent lineup (e.g. 
Palmer et al., 2013) and this method is used to estimate the false ID rate in this thesis. 
Filler ID Rate 
The filler ID rate can be calculated separately for perpetrator-present and 
perpetrator-absent lineups. The filler ID rate for perpetrator-present lineups is calculated 
by dividing the total number of filler IDs made by the group of participants by the total 
number of perpetrator-present lineups shown to that group. The filler ID rate for 
perpetrator-absent lineups can be calculated only if the lineup contains a designated 
innocent suspect. This is done by dividing the total number of filler IDs from a perpetrator-
absent lineup by the total number of perpetrator-absent lineups.  
Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis 
Discriminability was measured with receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
analysis because differences in discriminability and response bias are evident in ROC 
curves (Mickes et al., 2012). To construct the ROCs, the correct ID rates for each level of 
confidence were plotted along the y-axis and the false ID rates for each level of confidence 
were plotted along the x-axis. This produces a confidence-based ROC curve where each 
point reflects a correct and false ID rate for a particular level of confidence. A higher ROC 
indicates greater discriminability because, for any given false ID rate, the higher ROC 
yields a higher correct ID rate. Standard ROC analysis statistically compares the area 
underneath the full ROC, which extends across the full range of correct and false ID rates 
from 0 to 1. In this thesis, however, the false ID rates were estimated in all ROC analyses 
because there was no designated innocent suspect used in any of the eyewitness 
identification experiments. Because of this, the range of false ID rates for the confidence-
based ROCs extended from 0 to a value less than 1. This means that differences in 
discriminability were measured by comparing partial area under the curve (pAUC) values 
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for each confidence-based ROC. Unless otherwise stated, the conclusions from ROC 
analyses are the same using the other methods of calculating false IDs. 
Statistically Comparing pAUC Values 
The pAUC values were compared using the statistical package pROC (Robin et al., 
2011). The pROC package is for the statistical computing program R and includes tests 
for computing and comparing pAUC values for two ROC curves. Specificity (1 – false ID 
rate) was set in the analysis using the smallest, overall false ID rate obtained from either 
condition. In other words, the false ID rate from the condition that yielded the most 
conservative responding was used. The bootstrap method was used with the number of 
replications set to 2,000. This method calculates the pAUC values from the ROC curves 




     (1) 
, where s is the standard deviation of the bootstrap differences and pAUC1 and pAUC2 are 
the areas under the curve for the two ROCs. Therefore, D is the difference between the 
two pAUC values being compared and is expressed in standard deviation units. In all 
analyses, alpha was set to .05. 
Estimating Lineup Discriminability  
ROC analysis can determine whether a difference in discriminability or response 
bias has occurred (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), but in many cases ROC analysis cannot 
be conducted either because the correct and false ID rates for each level of confidence are 
not collected or there is not enough data to conduct a meaningful ROC analysis. Mickes, 
Moreland, Clark, and Wixted (2014) have advocated the use of d′ in circumstances where 
ROC analysis cannot be computed. This is a parametric measure of discriminability rooted 
in signal-detection theory that estimates the pAUC value (MacMillan & Creelman, 2005).  
If a lineup is “fair” (i.e. a lineup in which the fillers resemble the perpetrator as 
much as an innocent suspect), then the simplest signal-detection model for lineups consists 
of two equal-variance Gaussian distributions: a Gaussian distribution for innocent 
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suspects and a Gaussian distribution for guilty suspects (see Figure 1). Eyewitnesses will 
have stronger memory for the guilty suspect than the innocent suspect, on average, 
because the guilty suspect was previously seen. This means that the guilty suspect 
distribution rests further along the memory strength axis than the innocent suspect 
distribution. A decision criterion is placed somewhere along the memory strength axis 
such that memory signals for suspects exceeding that criterion are identified and memory 
signals for suspects that do not pass that criterion are not identified.  
 
Figure 1. The basic signal-detection model for lineups.  
The extent to which the two distributions overlap illustrates an eyewitness’s ability 
to discriminate the guilty suspect from the innocent suspect (Wixted & Mickes, 2014). 
The amount of overlap can vary depending on the distance between the means of the two 
distributions (i.e. the separation) and the variance of the two distributions (i.e. the spread). 
For instance, if the distance between the means of the two distributions is large, then the 
amount of overlap decreases, illustrating an increase in discriminability. However, if the 
variance of the two distributions is also large, then the amount of overlap increases, 







    (2) 
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, where µguilt and σ2guilt is the mean and variance for the guilty suspect distribution and µinn 
and σ2inn is the mean and variance for the innocent suspect distribution, respectively. 
Because σ2guilt and σ2inn are assumed to be equal, the difference in standard deviations 
between the two distributions no longer needs to be calculated. In the case when the two 




     (3) 
, where σ is the standard deviation of the guilty suspect and innocent suspect distributions.  
However, it is possible to estimate d′ using a single correct and false ID rate. For 
this reason, d′ was calculated in this thesis using the formula: 
𝑑′ = 𝑧(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝐷 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) − 𝑧(𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐷 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)  (4) 
Equation 4 estimates d′ by converting a single correct and false ID rate into z-scores. A z-
score indicates how many standard deviations a value is above or below the mean. Values 
falling above the mean are transformed into positive z-scores and values falling below the 
mean are transformed into negative z scores. For values at the mean, the z-score is 0 
(because these values do not deviate from the mean). The distribution of correct ID rates 
(and false ID rates) can range from 0 to 1.00. If we assume that the distribution is Gaussian 
(as the signal-detection model assumes), then the mean of that distribution is .50. 
Proportions larger than .50 are converted into positive z-scores and proportions smaller 
than .50 are converted into negative z-scores. Two proportions that are equally distant 
from .50 result in the same z-score with alternate signs. For instance, the z-score for a 
correct ID rate of .75 is .67 and the z-score for a false ID rate of .25 is -.67 (i.e. these 
values are both equally distant from .50 and, thus, have the same z-score, just with 
alternate signs). Using these values, d′ equals 1.35 (i.e. .67 – (-.67) = 1.35). This means 
that the distance between the mean of the guilty suspect distribution and the mean of the 
innocent suspect distribution is 1.35 times greater than the standard deviation of the two 
distributions. Likewise, a d′ of 2.0 would mean that the distance between the two 
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distributions (i.e. the separation) is twice as large as the standard deviation of the two 
distributions (i.e. the spread).  
 
Figure 2. Visualizing d′ and the signal-detection model. The false ID rate of .25 reflects 
the dark grey area of the Innocent Suspect distribution. The correct ID rate of .75 reflects 
the light grey area of the Guilty Suspect distribution. The distance between the means of 
the innocent suspect and guilty suspect distributions visually depicts discriminability. This 
distance corresponds to the sum of the z transformed correct ID rate minus the z 
transformed false ID rate.  
To visualize how Equation 4 combines these z-scores into an estimate of 
discriminability see Figure 2. The light grey area of the guilty suspect distribution reflects 
a correct ID rate of .75 and the dark grey area of the innocent suspect distribution reflects 
a false ID rate of .25. We know that transforming these correct and false ID rates into z-
scores yield values .67 for the correct ID rate and -.67 for the false ID rate. The z-score .67 
represents the distance between the decision criterion and the mean of the guilty suspect 
distribution. Likewise, the z-score -.67 represents the distance between the decision 
criterion and the mean of the innocent suspect distribution. Adding these two z-scores, as 
done in Equation 4, gives the distance between the means of the innocent suspect and 
guilty suspect distributions, and this distance is a visual depiction of discriminability (see 
Chapter 1 for review).   
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Testing for Significance 
A G statistic can be used in order to statistically compare two d′ values (Gourevitch 
& Galanter, 1967). For instance, d′1 and d′2 are statistically compared using the formula: 
𝐺 =
𝑑1





     (5) 
, where the numerator is the difference in the d′ values and V(d′1) and V(d′2) are the 
variances for both lineups. The denominator is expressed in standard deviation units by 
taking the square root of V(d′1) and V(d′2). Therefore, G is the difference in the d′ values 
being compared and is expressed in standard deviation units. In all analyses alpha was set 
to .05. 
Comparing d′ and pAUC 
Mickes et al. (2014) compared d′ based statistics based on G from Gourevitch and 
Galanter (1967) with ROC-based statistics based on D from Robin et al. (2011). G and D 
were calculated using lineup data from several eyewitness identification experiments. The 
correlation between G and D was very strong, r = .95. Thus, whether pAUC or d′ is used 
to measure eyewitnesses’ discriminability from a lineup, the conclusions will often be the 
same. However, ROC analysis is the preferred method of measuring discriminability 
because the pAUC value is a non-parametric measure of discriminability, unlike d′. 
Confidence-Accuracy Characteristic Analysis 
In the past, many claims about the weak relationship between confidence and 
accuracy were made. However, those claims were based on the use of the point bi-serial 
correlation coefficient, which can mask a strong confidence-accuracy relationship (Juslin 
et al., 1996). When the data are analysed using calibration analysis, or confidence-
accuracy characteristic (CAC) analysis, there is typically a strong confidence-accuracy 
relationship for individuals who make an identification from a lineup in the laboratory 
(e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006; Horry et al., 2012; Sauer et al., 2010; Wixted et al., 2015) 
and in the field (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Wixted et al., 2015).  
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CAC analysis most directly supplies the answer to the question that judges and 
juries have about a testifying eyewitness who has identified a suspect: how accurate is that 
suspect ID likely to be given the level of confidence that was expressed? CAC analysis 
plots suspect ID accuracy as a function of confidence using any numerical confidence 
rating scale. Confidence levels throughout this thesis were binned into low, medium, and 
high because there were too few responses for certain levels. Suspect ID accuracy for an 
eyewitness identification is calculated for low, medium, and high confidence levels using 
the following formula: 
𝐴 =  
(# 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝐷𝑠)
(# 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐷𝑠 +# 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐼𝐷𝑠)
    (6) 
. Equation 6 calculates suspect ID accuracy, denoted as A, by dividing the number of 
correct IDs by the total number of suspect IDs. Importantly, filler IDs are excluded from 
this equation because triers of fact are mainly concerned with the accuracy for suspects. 
The false IDs were estimated with the same method that was used to conduct ROC analysis.  
Suspect ID Accuracy and Prior Probability 
The number of correct and false IDs obtained in an experiment is dependent on the 
prior probability of guilt (i.e. the proportion of lineups that contain the guilty suspect). In 
this thesis, the guilty suspect base rate was approximately 50% for each eyewitness 
identification experiment. Suspect ID accuracy reported in these experiments would, in 
general, be lower if the base rate was lower than 50% and higher if the base rate was 
higher than 50%. Still, the relationship between two CAC curves would remain so long as 
the base rate did not vary between conditions. It is important to note that in the real world 
the guilty suspect base rate is unknown. Yet, there is some indication that suspect ID 
accuracy for high levels of confidence does not vary greatly across different base rates 
(Wixted et al. 2016). This means that suspect ID accuracy for at least high levels of 
confidence calculated in the laboratory (with a base rate of 50%) can serve as a reasonable 
estimate of suspect ID accuracy in the real world (where the base rate is often unknown). 
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Computing CAC Standard Errors 
The standard errors associated with suspect ID accuracy scores cannot be directly 
computed and were therefore estimated using a 10,000-trial bootstrap procedure. On each 
trial, the observed data from perpetrator-present lineups were randomly sampled with 
replacement to obtain a bootstrap sample of suspect IDs for that trial. For example, if there 
were 150 high confidence suspect IDs out of 500 lineups, the observed high confidence 
correct ID rate would equal 150/500 = .30. Thus, on each bootstrap trial, a high confidence 
suspect ID was registered with probability .30 for each of the 500 lineups (i.e., a high 
confidence suspect ID would be registered approximately every third lineup, on average). 
The first bootstrap trial might yield 157 suspect IDs, the next bootstrap trial might yield 
141 suspect IDs, and so on. Similarly, on each bootstrap trial, the observed data from 
perpetrator-absent lineups were randomly sampled with replacement to obtain a bootstrap 
sample of filler IDs for that trial. For example, if there were 100 high confidence filler IDs 
out of 500 lineups, the observed high confidence filler ID would equal 100 / 500 = .20. 
Thus, on each bootstrap trial, a high confidence filler ID would be registered with 
probability .20 for each of 500 lineups. The first bootstrap trial might yield 94 filler IDs, 
the next bootstrap trial might yield 101 filler IDs, and so on.  
After obtaining a bootstrap sample of suspect IDs and filler IDs on a given 
bootstrap trial, a suspect ID accuracy score could be computed in exactly the same manner 
it was computed for the observed data. Thus, for example, if there were 157 suspect IDs 
and 94 filler IDs on the first bootstrap trial and the size of the lineup was 6, then suspect 
ID accuracy for the first bootstrap trial would equal 157/(157 + 94/6) = .909. Note that the 
bootstrap sample of 94 filler IDs was divided by the lineup size to estimate the number of 
false IDs from perpetrator-absent lineups. Similarly, if there were 141 suspect IDs and 101 
filler IDs on the second bootstrap trial, then suspect ID accuracy for the second bootstrap 
trial would equal 141/(141 + 101/6) = .893. This process was repeated for 10,000 bootstrap 
trials, and the standard deviation of the 10,000 bootstrap suspect ID scores provided the 
estimated standard error. The same procedure was followed for each confidence level (i.e. 
high, medium, and low) in all conditions.  




The US Lineup Outperforms the UK Lineup1 
The United States and the constituent countries that comprise the United Kingdom 
(England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales) have responded similarly to concerns of 
fallible eyewitness testimony. In the UK, the Devlin Committee chaired by Law Lord 
Patrick Arthur Devlin investigated a number of criminal cases from the early 1970s in 
order to draw conclusions on the reliability of suspect IDs. Several years following the 
Devlin Report (1976), Parliament passed the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE; 
1984) which instituted several codes of practice to standardize the methods used to collect 
eyewitness evidence in England and Wales. Meanwhile, in the US, the Innocence Project 
has helped release hundreds of individuals who were convicted either solely or in large-
part due to false IDs (Innocence Project, 2017). In response to these findings, U.S. 
Attorney General Janet Reno ordered a panel to discuss and develop national guidelines 
for collecting eyewitness evidence and, in October 1999, these guidelines were released 
(Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). The guidelines released by 
the U.S. Department of Justice and the legislation enacted by Parliament (i.e. PACE) 
advise the police to construct a lineup that consists of one suspect and a number of other 
fillers (see Chapter 1 for basic introduction to a lineup). Despite sharing these general 
characteristics, the US lineup and the UK lineup vary quite considerably.  
UK Lineup 
In 2003, the PACE code of practice was revised in order to favor the use of the 
Video Identification Parade Electronic Recording (VIPER) database and the Profile 
Matching (PROMAT) database. These databases have made it possible to create and store 
large amounts of moving video clips of fillers and suspects to be used in the construction 
                                                 
 
1 The experiments in this chapter have been published as Seale-Carlisle, T.M. & Mickes, 
L. (2016). US line-ups outperform UK line-ups. Royal Society Open Science, 6: 160300. 
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of lineups. Eyewitnesses are now required to view video clips of nine lineup members, 
one of whom is the police suspect, in a sequence that shows one video at a time. Each 
video clip starts with the lineup member facing straight towards the camera. The lineup 
member then rotates their head to the right, displaying the left side of their face, and then 
rotates their head back towards camera and continues turning their head until the right side 
of their face is in view. The video clip ends when the lineup member faces towards the 
camera again. The eyewitness laps through the lineup twice, viewing each lineup member 
one at a time. After the second lap, they can choose to see any or all of the lineup members 
again, or attempt to make a decision (by either picking a lineup member or rejecting the 
lineup). At this stage, they can also choose to view a matrix of all of the lineup members, 
which involves showing a static image of everyone in the lineup (akin to the simultaneous 
lineup procedure described below). Approximately half of the police forces in England 
and Wales and all of the police forces in Scotland use VIPER. The other half of police 
forces in England and Wales use PROMAT (Valentine, 2006). Both systems produce 
similar lineups but access a separate database of fillers. 
US Lineup 
In the US, the traditional lineup procedure is the simultaneous lineup which 
displays a photo of the police suspect and several fillers to the eyewitness all at the same 
time. In laboratory studies, the simultaneous lineup has been found to yield high rates of 
false IDs (Lindsay & Wells, 1980; Wells, 1984). Lindsay and Wells (1985) showed that 
presenting images sequentially rather than simultaneously could drastically reduce the 
false ID rate. Their sequential lineup procedure shows photos of lineup members one at a 
time and requires the eyewitness to decide whether a lineup member is or is not the 
perpetrator before seeing the next photo. The procedure typically terminates once an 
identification has been made. Currently, 32% of police jurisdictions in the US opt to use 
the sequential lineup procedure in place of the simultaneous lineup procedure (Police 
Executive Forum, 2013). 
 Mickes et al. (2012) used receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis (see 
Chapter 1 for review on ROC analysis) in order to determine which lineup procedure 
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yields higher discriminability. Using ROC analysis, Mickes et al. found the US 
simultaneous lineup procedure yields higher discriminability than the US sequential 
lineup procedure. A simultaneous advantage has been found by several independent 
laboratories (Carlson & Carlson, 2014; Dobolyi & Dodson, 2013; Gronlund et al., 2012) 
and data from two field studies provide converging evidence (Amendola & Wixted, 2014; 
Wixted et al., 2016).  
US Lineup vs. UK Lineup Predictions 
Will the US simultaneous lineup yield greater discriminability than the UK lineup? 
Because the UK lineup presents individuals in sequence, one may expect the simultaneous 
lineup to yield greater discriminability. However, despite there being a likely simultaneous 
advantage, there are several other factors that need to be taken into consideration (see 
Table 1). For instance, the UK lineup utilizes moving rather than static images and consists 
of nine lineup members rather than just six. The entire UK lineup is also shown twice to 
the eyewitness whereas the US lineup is only shown once. Because of the myriad of 
differences, it is difficult to predict which lineup yields greater discriminability. The 
possible impact of each of these differences is discussed below. 
Table 1 
The differences between the UK lineup and the US lineup that may impact 
discriminability are shown in this table.  
UK Lineup US Lineup 
Sequential Presentation Simultaneous Presentation  
Moving Images Static Images 
Multiple Laps (Time Restricted) One Lap (Free Viewing) 
9-Person Lineup 6-Person Lineup 
Note:  It has recently been shown that the simultaneous presentation of faces yields greater 
discriminability than the sequential presentation of faces. However, there are several other 
differences between the two lineups that may impact discriminability.  
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Moving vs. Static Images 
An eyewitness to a crime likely sees the face of the perpetrator from multiple 
angles and so, when an eyewitness is presented a lineup, a moving image of the suspect 
may contain information which would otherwise be lost in a static image. This extra 
information could help the eyewitness correctly identify the perpetrator or help remove 
suspicion from an innocent suspect. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that moving images 
improve discriminability.  
A series of studies conducted by Cutler and colleagues compared static photo 
lineups with video lineups. After witnessing a video recording of a mock crime, Cutler, 
Penrod, and Martens (1987) had participants attempt to identify the perpetrator from an 
enhanced or unenhanced sequential lineup. The enhanced lineup consisted of a close-up 
(face and shoulders), three-quarter (face and torso view), and full frontal static image of 
each lineup member. Brief video clips of each lineup member were then shown after the 
series of static images. The unenhanced lineup only consisted of the close-up static images. 
Correct and false ID rates were not originally reported for these conditions and, instead, 
the proportion of correct responses was computed. Cutler et al. note that the effect of 
enhanced lineup cues had surprisingly no significant effect on proportion correct. In a later 
study, Cutler and Fisher (1990) had participants witness a live mock crime and compared 
how participants performed when presented live lineups, video lineups, and photo lineups. 
The false ID rate was slightly, but significantly, lower for live and video lineups, while the 
correct ID rate was the same for all three lineup types.  
In review of these studies, Cutler, Berman, Penrod, and Fisher (1994) concluded 
that the additional information present in moving images produced a “trivial effect on 
identification accuracy” (p. 179) and that “there is no reason to believe that live lineups, 
videotaped lineups, or photo arrays produce substantial differences in identification 
performance” (p. 181). However, Valentine and Davis (2015) reanalyzed Cutler et al.’s 
(1987) data and found that the enhanced lineups (i.e. the lineups containing static and 
moving images) resulted in a significantly higher correct ID rate and a significantly lower 
false ID rate than the unenhanced lineups (i.e. the lineups just containing the static images). 
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Although Cutler et al. (1994) concluded that moving images had a trivial effect on 
“identification accuracy”, their data seem to provide some indication that moving images 
improve discriminability, though the size of the effect may be small.  
There have since been several other studies that have investigated the effects of 
moving and static images on discriminability from a lineup (e.g. Kerstohlt, Koster, & van 
Amelsvoolt, 2004; Valentine, Darling, & Memon, 2007; Havard, Memon, Clifford, & 
Gabbert, 2010; Humphries, Holliday, & Flowe, 2012). Valentine et al. (2007) constructed 
two UK lineups, one which utilized moving images, as required by PACE, and one which 
utilized static images. In this experiment, participants witnessed a live theft and were 
assigned to a perpetrator-present or a perpetrator-absent lineup. The perpetrator was 
recorded in a VIPER suite at a police station in order to create the moving image. A police 
identification officer selected fillers that matched the perpetrator on the relevant criteria 
dictated by PACE (e.g. age, height, and general position in life). The selection of fillers 
was carried out exactly as it would for an actual police-constructed lineup. The static 
images were single-shot frames showing a front view of the lineup member’s face. 
Participants watched the entire VIPER lineups from start to finish twice. They were then 
able to see any lineup member again, as many times as they wished, until they were able 
to make an identification decision. Thus, the two procedures followed PACE codes of 
practice except that static images were used in replace of moving images in one of the 
procedures. The correct ID rate was found to be significantly higher, and the false ID rate 
to be significantly lower, for the UK lineup containing the moving images than the UK 
lineup containing the static images, indicating an improvement in discriminability.  
Multiple Laps vs. One Viewing 
If an overly cautious eyewitness is only given one opportunity to identify the 
perpetrator, then a potential correct ID could be easily lost. This is particularly problematic 
for police jurisdictions that have adopted the sequential lineup procedure as this procedure 
induces conservative responding, which further reduces the correct ID rate (e.g. Steblay 
et al., 2001; 2011). To remedy this issue, some US jurisdictions have allowed eyewitnesses 
to view the entire array of lineup members again and, in some cases, multiple “laps” have 
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been allowed (Klobuchar, Steblay, & Caligiuri, 2006). Although this may help increase 
the correct ID rate, repeated exposure to the lineup may also interfere with eyewitnesses’ 
memory for the perpetrator (causing a reduction in discriminability). The field data from 
Klobuchar et al. show that identifications from subsequent laps resulted in roughly the 
same rate of suspect IDs but also a large increase in filler IDs. An increase in filler IDs 
reflects an increase in known errors and does not necessarily reflect worse discriminability 
for the suspect.  
Steblay, Dietrich, Ryan, Raczynski, and James (2011) compared correct and false 
ID rates from sequential single-lap and double-lap lineups. In Experiment 1, participants 
witnessed a video of a mock crime and attempted to identify the perpetrator after a brief 
delay. Participants had the option of viewing a second lap after having seen each lineup 
member, similar to the protocol in Klobuchar et al. (2006). For participants who opted to 
view a second lap, the correct ID rate increased by 6%, the filler ID rate increased by 14%, 
and the false ID rate increased by 23%. In Experiment 2, participants were assigned to 
either single-lap or double-lap sequential lineups. For those assigned to double-lap lineups, 
the correct ID rate increased by 9%, the filler ID rate increased by 5%, and the false ID 
rate increased by 15%. Participants who elected (Experiment 1) or were required 
(Experiment 2) to view the lineup twice made significantly more identifications indicating 
a liberal shift in response bias. Yet, the large increases in the false ID rate and the relatively 
smaller increases in the correct ID rate may also indicate a reduction in discriminability.  
To statistically compare discriminability for single-lap and double-lap lineups, I 
computed d′ from the overall correct and false ID rates reported by Steblay et al. (2011) 
and statistically compared these values using the G statistic (see Chapter 2 for review). If 
necessary, this approach can be used in place of ROC analysis (Mickes et al., 2014). In 
Experiment 1, participants that saw the lineup once (d′ = 1.55) had higher discriminability 
than those who elected to view the lineup twice (d′ = 1.40), but the difference was not 
significant (G = .30, p = .76). In Experiment 2, the effect of repeated laps was directly 
tested as participants were randomly assigned to single-lap or double-lap lineups. Those 
who viewed the lineup twice actually had higher discriminability (d′ = 1.40) than those 
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who viewed the lineup once (d′ = 1.33), but again, the difference was not significant (G 
= .18, p = 0.86). Viewing the entire lineup a second time likely introduced more 
interference for the memory of the perpetrator, but also helped participants compare lineup 
members. When participants are able to compare lineup members, they can become more 
aware of the features that are diagnostic of guilt (and those features which are not) and 
can use this information to aid discrimination on the second lap (Wixted & Mickes, 2014). 
This benefit may have counteracted the interference caused by viewing the lineup again, 
resulting in no significant difference in discriminability between single-lap and double-
lap lineups. 
Nine vs. Six Lineup Members 
The fairness of a lineup procedure has been a concern of eyewitness identification 
researchers for quite some time. Researchers have discussed that the showup procedure, 
which only presents the police suspect to the eyewitness, may be overly suggestive of guilt 
and may put innocent suspects at too great a risk of a false ID (e.g. Sobel, 1972; Levine 
& Tapp, 1973). Sobel (1972) has recommended presenting fillers alongside the suspect so 
as not to make the suspect appear too distinctive. However, Buckhout (1974) showed that 
innocent suspects that appear distinctive from the fillers (e.g. if the suspect’s photo was 
taken at a different angle than the fillers) are still at risk of a false ID. Researchers have 
since made a distinction between the number of fillers in a lineup, referred to as the 
nominal size of a lineup, and the number of fillers in a lineup that resemble the suspect, 
referred to as the functional size of a lineup (Wells, Leippe, & Olstrom, 1979). Simply 
increasing the nominal size of a lineup (i.e. by adding fillers that do not resemble the 
suspect) may not reduce the false ID rate (Malpass, 1981). An eyewitness attempting to 
identify the perpetrator can essentially ignore fillers that do not resemble the suspect. 
However, lineups with a greater functional size have been argued to reduce the false ID 
rate (Wells & Turtle, 1986). If fillers and suspects both resemble the perpetrator, an 
eyewitness may incorrectly pick a filler instead of an innocent suspect. Note that a 
reduction in the correct ID rate may occur for the very same reason. The nominal and 
functional size of the UK lineup is greater than the US lineup. The UK lineup consists of 
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eight fillers that resemble the suspect, whereas the US lineup only consists of 5 fillers that 
resemble the suspect. Do lineups with greater nominal and functional size yield greater 
discriminability?  
Cutler et al. (1987) conducted a study that directly manipulated lineup size. After 
participants witnessed a video recording of a mock crime, they were assigned to either a 
6-person or a 12-person lineup. The proportion of correct responses was lower for 12-
person lineups, but only when the perpetrator was partially disguised during the crime 
(note that the perpetrator was not disguised when present in the lineup). Because correct 
and false ID rates were not reported in this study, it is difficult to determine based on just 
proportion correct whether discriminability was also affected. Nosworthy and Lindsay 
(1990) manipulated nominal (Experiment 1) and functional (Experiment 2) lineup size. In 
both experiments participants witnessed a staged crime and attempted to identify the 
perpetrator from a lineup after a brief delay. Table 2 contains the correct ID rate, false ID 
rate, and d′ for each lineup condition in Experiments 1 and 2.  
In Experiment 1, nominal size was manipulated by adding 3 or 6 fillers to a 4-
person lineup. Participants were, therefore, assigned to either a 4-person, 7-person, or 10-
person lineup. The additional fillers did not resemble the suspect. This enabled the 
nominal size to increase without affecting the functional size of the lineup. The additional 
fillers drew very few filler IDs (only 2.3% of total IDs) indicating that participants 
virtually dismissed these lineup members. The false ID rates were similar for each lineup, 
but the correct ID rates were slightly higher for the 7-person and 10-person lineup. 
Interestingly, discriminability was higher for the 7-person (d′ = 1.63) and 10-person (d′ = 
1.64) lineup than the 4 person-lineup (d′ = 1.26). However, there was no significant 
difference in discriminability between the 4-person lineup and the 7-person lineup (G 
= .64, p = .51) or the 4-person lineup and the 10-person lineup (G = .70, p = .48).  
In Experiment 2, functional size was manipulated by adding fillers that resembled 
the suspect. In this experiment, participants attempted to identify the perpetrator from a 4-
person, 8-person, 12-person, 16-person, or 20-person lineup. Although some of the 
additional fillers drew a large amount of filler IDs (e.g. one filler in the 20-person lineup 
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received roughly 30% of incorrect IDs for that lineup), the functional size of the lineups 
did not significantly impact the correct and false ID rates (as shown in Table 2). However, 
the false ID rates were already low in the smaller lineup conditions, especially in the 8-
person lineup (where the innocent suspect was never identified). Nosworthy and Lindsay 
attributed these low false ID rates to choosing an innocent suspect that did not look like 
the perpetrator. The data were reanalyzed by designating the most often identified filler as 
the innocent suspect. Yet, when the data were reanalyzed this way, the conclusions were 
still the same; the functional size of the lineup did not significantly impact the false ID 
rates. Although the UK lineup has a greater functional size than the US lineup, these 
results suggest that this difference does not significantly impact the correct ID rate or the 
false ID rate and, therefore, has no impact on discriminability.  
Table 2 
The lineup size, correct ID rates, false ID rates, and d′ values for Experiments 1 and 2 
from Nosworthy and Lindsay (1990). 
Lineup Size Correct ID rate False ID rate d′ 
Experiment 1 (Nominal Size) 
4-Person .47 .09 1.26 
7-Person .53 .06 1.63 
10-Person .67 .09 1.64 
Experiment 2 (Functional Size) 
4-Person .48 .07 1.42 
8-Person .33 .00 1.61* 
12-Person .48 .04 1.70 
16-Person .33 .04 1.31 
20-Person .37 .00 1.72* 
 Note:  For Experiment 2, no participant falsely identified the innocent suspect in the 8-
person and 20-person lineups. A standard correction of the false ID rate of 0 was applied 
in order to estimate d′. The * shows the estimates. 
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US vs. UK Predictions Revisited 
Although the US lineup and the UK lineup differ in several respects, the extant 
eyewitness identification literature suggests that only two differences may actually impact 
discriminability: the lineup format (i.e. simultaneous or sequential) and the presentation 
format (i.e. moving or static images). The advantages are split between the two procedures. 
The US lineup receives an advantage because the simultaneous lineup procedure has been 
repeatedly shown to yield greater discriminability than the sequential lineup procedure 
(e.g. Mickes et al., 2012). Therefore, the US lineup procedure receives a check. The UK 
lineup receives the other advantage (and the other check) because lineups that contain 
moving rather than static images have shown a slight, but appreciable improvement in 
discriminability (Valentine et al., 2007; Valentine & Davis, 2015). The fact that the UK 
lineup shows nine lineup members, whereas the US lineup only shows six, is unlikely to 
cause a difference in discriminability. In addition, the fact that the UK lineup shows the 
entire lineup twice (rather than once) is also not likely to have any impact on 
discriminability. Because the advantages are split between the two lineup procedures, a 
direct comparison using ROC analysis is needed in order to determine whether the US 
lineup or the UK lineup yields greater discriminability. 
Confidence-accuracy Characteristic Analysis 
The results of ROC analysis are important for policymakers who are charged with 
deciding which type of lineup to use (Mickes, 2015). However, once a criminal case 
reaches a court of law, regardless of the procedure that was used during the investigation, 
and regardless of whether one procedure is shown to have greater discriminability than 
the other, judges and jurors need to know if high confidence IDs made by eyewitnesses 
are reliable. That is, they need to know if eyewitnesses who were highly confident are also 
likely to be accurate. ROC analysis does not provide that answer, but CAC analysis does 
(Mickes, 2015). The two main comparisons of interest therefore are: discriminability and 
reliability of the US lineup and the UK lineup. In comparing these lineup procedures, we 
ask the following questions: 1) which procedure will yield the best discriminability; 2) are 
confidence and accuracy related for both procedures? 
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Experiment 1 and 2 
Two experiments were conducted to compare discriminability and reliability of 
US and UK lineups, and they differed only slightly with regard to the UK lineup condition. 
In one of the experiments (but not the other), after lapping through the lineup twice, 
participants in the UK condition had the opportunity to view as many lineup members as 
often as desired before making their decision (PACE, 1984). Because there were no 
important differences in the results, the data was combined and presented together (but 
the frequency counts are presented separately in Table 4). We report the results of both 
ROC analysis, which evaluates the level of discriminability supported by the US and UK 
lineup procedures, and CAC analysis, which measures the confidence–accuracy 
relationship associated with suspect IDs for the two procedures. The Appendix contains 
the ROC and CAC analysis separately for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were undergraduate students from the University of California, San 
Diego and completed the experiment in exchange for course credit (N =2249; 1551 female, 
681 male and 17 did not state; age in years: M = 20.62; SD = 2.80). Participants were 
randomly assigned to the US lineup or UK lineup condition, and to a perpetrator-present 
lineup or a perpetrator-absent lineup. We determined that a sample size of 1000 (for both 
Experiment 1 and 2) would yield sufficient power to detect an effect size as large as the 
one observed in previous research for simultaneous versus sequential line-ups (Mickes et 
al., 2012). Data collection continued until the term ended. The UCSD Institutional Review 
Board approved of these experiments. 
Materials  
The study stimulus was a 20 s video of a mock crime of theft. The perpetrator, a 
young white male whose face was shown for 8 seconds, stole money and a tablet from a 
deserted office. A London Metropolitan Police Officer with specialized training in 
eyewitness identification procedures selected nine foils from the PROMAT database. As 
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specified by PACE, filler selections were based on the general similarities of the 
perpetrator’s appearance, age, ethnicity, weight, and position in life. The actor in the video 
was recorded in the same London Metropolitan Identification Suite in the same manner as 
the fillers. Note that these same fillers were used in the US lineup condition. 
Procedure  
In Experiment 1 (N = 962), participants in the UK condition watched the video of 
the crime, took part in a 5-minute distractor task (a game of Tetris), and viewed the UK 
lineup twice before making an identification. The UK lineup procedure consisted of nine 
videos displayed one at a time in a sequence. Those in the US condition watched the video 
of the crime, took part in the distractor task, and viewed six photos simultaneously 
arranged in a 2 X 3 matrix. The position of the perpetrator in the perpetrator-present 
lineups was randomly determined for each participant. No fillers were designated as the 
innocent suspect. Confidence in the identification decision was collected using an 11-point 
scale ranging from 0 (just guessing) to 100 (absolutely certain). Following their 
identification decision, participants then answered several questions including a validation 
question (what crime was committed?) and were finally debriefed.  
In Experiment 2 (N = 1,288), participants watched the video of the crime, took part 
in the same distractor task for five minutes and were either presented a US or UK lineup. 
Participants in the UK lineup viewed the entire lineup twice and were allowed to 
repeatedly view any member from the lineup before making an identification decision. As 
in Experiment 1, those in the US lineup condition viewed a simultaneous lineup presented 
in a 2 X 3 matrix.  
Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
Those who did not answer the validation question correctly were excluded from 
all analyses (n = 44). The total number of perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent trials 
as well as the number of correct IDs, false IDs, and filler IDs for every level of confidence 
for the UK and the US conditions across Experiments 1 and 2 are shown in Table 3.  




Response frequencies for every decision outcome for each level of confidence.  
 US Lineup  UK Lineup 
 Perp Present  Perp Absent  Perp Present  Perp Absent 
Confidence SID FID noID  FID noID  SID FID noID  FID noID 
 Experiment 1 
0 0 4 1  5 6  0 3 10  7 7 
10 1 0 0  4 0  0 3 3  1 1 
20 2 3 4  4 4  1 5 2  5 2 
30 7 10 6  12 6  1 17 4  6 2 
40 10 9 5  14 8  3 15 3  12 5 
50 15 13 7  25 11  3 19 12  18 8 
60 10 12 8  28 11  5 19 6  17 8 
70 17 12 18  27 18  11 27 12  21 10 
80 17 12 12  12 13  5 13 7  20 10 
90 12 5 12  5 19  4 5 10  11 6 
100 6 0 5  2 14  7 4 8  9 5 
 Experiment 2 
0 1 3 1  6 2  3 7 6  8 4 
10 1 3 3  4 0  0 2 2  1 1 
20 5 6 4  4 1  1 5 2  7 1 
30 5 10 6  13 12  2 8 10  21 4 
40 13 7 5  27 11  5 13 4  14 1 
50 12 26 16  26 19  6 19 12  33 8 
60 21 11 14  22 14  9 20 8  31 11 
70 28 14 18  38 31  16 26 17  44 13 
80 16 10 13  19 29  13 28 15  36 19 
90 13 4 11  12 16  8 14 10  22 11 
100 8 0 8  6 17  7 7 2  9 13 
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification; SID, suspect IDs; FID, filler IDs. 




The suspect ID rates for perpetrator-present lineups (i.e. correct ID rates), suspect 
ID rates for perpetrator-absent lineups (i.e. false ID rates) and filler ID rates for both 
perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineups are shown in Table 4. Because no 
innocent suspect was designated, the false ID rates were estimated by dividing the number 
of filler IDs from a perpetrator-absent lineup by the number of filler IDs presented in a 
perpetrator-absent lineup (i.e. 6 for the US and 9 for the UK). This is the most common 
method for estimating the false ID rate. There are other methods of estimating the false 
ID rate (as discussed in Chapter 2), but the conclusions presented in this chapter remain 
the same regardless of which method is used. The italicized values were used to construct 
the ROC curves in Figure 1. The bold italicized values are the overall correct and false ID 
rates that have been traditionally analysed in an effort to determine lineup superiority. 
However, because both the correct ID rate and the false ID rate are lower for the UK lineup 
procedure (and could, therefore, mean a shift in responding, not a difference in 
discriminability), an ROC analysis provides a clearer picture of the discriminability 















Suspect IDs, filler IDs and no IDs rates by level of confidence per condition for 
perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineups.  
  US Lineup  UK Lineup 
 Confidence SID FID noID  SID FID noID 
Perp Present 0 .39 .30   .20 .50  
 10 .38 .29   .19 .49  
 20 .38 .29   .19 .48  
 30 .37 .27   .19 .46  
 40 .35 .24   .18 .41  
 50 .31 .21 .31  .17 .36 .30 
 60 .26 .14   .15 .29  
 70 .20 .10   .13 .22  
 80 .13 .05   .08 .13  
 90 .07 .02   .05 .05  
 100 .02 .00   .03 .02  
Perp Absent 0 .09 .45   .08 .62  
 10 .09 .44   .07 .60  
 20 .09 .43   .07 .59  
 30 .08 .42   .07 .57  
 40 .08 .38   .07 .52  
 50 .06 .32 .45  .06 .48 .30 
 60 .05 .25   .05 .39  
 70 .03 .17   .04 .30  
 80 .02 .08   .02 .19  
 90 .01 .04   .01 .09  
 100 .00 .01   .00 .03  
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification; SID, suspect IDs; FID, filler IDs. 
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Discriminability was measured by conducting ROC analysis and comparing the 
partial area under the curve (pAUC) values for each lineup procedure, rather than 
computing the AUC for the full ROC. This is because the range of false ID rates for lineup-
based ROCs extends from 0 to a value less than 1. In order to calculate the pAUC, the 
most conservative false ID rate obtained from either lineup was selected, which is .08 
from the UK lineup. The pAUC values were compared using the statistical package pROC 
(Robin et al., 2011). ROC curves were constructed for the combined US and UK lineup 
conditions (Figure 1). The pAUC for the US lineup (0.017) was significantly greater than 
the pAUC for the UK lineup (0.010), D = 2.74, p = .006.  
 
Figure 1. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the US lineup and 
the UK lineup. The dashed line represents chance performance. The lines through the ROC 
curves were estimated using a hyperbolic function. 
A RE-EXAMINATION OF EYEWITNESS MEMORY PHENOMENA  
66 
 
Comparing Discriminability of Repeated Viewings 
There were some participants who opted to view the lineup members again (n = 
128). The majority of those participants only opted to see a lineup member once more (n 
= 85); very few participants opted to see multiple lineup members again (n = 43), which 
makes it difficult to estimate discriminability for this group of participants. Thus, we 
measured whether discriminability for those participants who opted to view lineup 
members again (n = 128) differed from those who did not. To do so, we computed d′ from 
the overall correct and false ID rates and compared them using the G statistic. We used 
this approach instead of ROC analysis because separating the data in this manner resulted 
in too few observations to perform a meaningful pAUC analysis (Mickes et al., 2014). 
Those who viewed lineup members more than the required two times had lower 
discriminability (d′ = 0.35) than those who viewed the lineup members twice (d′ = 0.68), 
but the difference was not significant (G = 1.14, p = 0.253). 
CAC Analysis 
The relationship between confidence and accuracy was examined using CAC 
analysis (Mickes, 2015). This analysis only focused on suspect IDs. Filler IDs in 
perpetrator-present lineups were ignored. This approach provides information most 
important for judges and jurors as fillers in lineups are already known to be innocent. 
Examining all of the errors (including filler IDs in perpetrator-present lineups) would, 
perhaps, be appropriate if testing a psychological theory of calibration. However, for this 
particular analysis, we sought to determine whether the US and UK lineup procedures 
differentially affected participants’ ability to calibrate confidence and accuracy for the 
suspect. 
The CAC plots are shown in Figure 2. Confidence was binned into low (0-60), 
medium (70-80), and high (90-100). For each level of confidence, suspect ID accuracy 
(A) = # correct suspect IDs / (# correct suspect IDs + # innocent suspect IDs). This 
calculation assumes that the base rates are equal or roughly equal, as they are in this 
experiment. Because there was no designated innocent suspect, false IDs were divided by 
the number of fillers present in the perpetrator-absent lineups: nine in the UK lineup and 
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six in the US lineup. Participants in the UK condition were less able to properly calibrate 
confidence and accuracy for high, medium, and low confident responses.  
 
Figure 2. Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) analysis for the US lineup 
and the UK lineup. The bars represent standard error bars. 
General Discussion 
Many countries look to the US and UK for adoption of identification procedures. 
However, the US and the UK identification procedures vary quite considerably. Thus, an 
important direct comparison between these two identification procedures is needed in 
order to determine which one is superior. In the first direct comparison of the US and the 
UK identification procedures using ROC and CAC analyses, the US identification 
procedure outperformed the UK identification procedure. Specifically, the US 
identification procedure yielded higher discriminability and significantly higher accuracy 
at each level of confidence. If these results replicate, many countries including the UK 
could improve the identification procedure simply by implementing the US simultaneous 
procedure.  
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The results from CAC analysis may suggest to some that the UK procedure is 
superior because eyewitnesses do not underestimate their confidence in their 
identifications as much as those shown the US procedure. Figure 2 shows suspect ID 
accuracy across low and medium confidence judgments. Low confidence judgments and 
medium confidence judgments were made, on average, with 55% and 75% confidence. 
Suspect ID accuracy for the UK procedure across low and medium levels of confidence 
provide a close match to these percentages, 65% and 76% respectively. Whereas, those in 
the US procedure are more “under-confident.” Ideally, an eyewitness’ confidence matches 
their suspect ID accuracy, but what is most important to the trier of fact is whether the 
procedure improves suspect ID accuracy even if this results in eyewitnesses becoming 
under-confident.  
It is not possible to pinpoint exactly why the US procedure outperformed the UK 
procedure because of the array of differences between the two procedures, but these 
findings could be an example of the often-replicated difference between simultaneous and 
sequential lineups (e.g. Mickes et al., 2012). Alternatively, the difference in performance 
between the two procedures may have been caused by the length of time to complete the 
US procedure compared to the UK procedure. Upon being shown a lineup, participants in 
the US condition can quickly make an identification decision, whereas participants in the 
UK condition must wait for the entire lineup to lap through twice before being able to 
make an identification decision (which takes approximately two minutes). Such a small 
difference in retention interval is unlikely to account for the drastic differences in 
discriminability and reliability, but the difference may still be worth considering. Similarly, 
another possibility is that participants taking part in the experiment online were less 
engaged during the UK procedure than the US procedure and this may have resulted in 
worse discriminability and reliability for those in the UK procedure. Lastly, it could be 
that this pattern of results is due, in part, to the small set of stimuli. Future studies should 
compare the US and UK lineups using a variety of face stimuli and, if the effect still holds, 
then each factor should be isolated in order to determine which specific factors affect 
discriminability and reliability. Given how many innocent and guilty suspects are tested 
using lineup procedures in both the US and the UK, such work should be an urgent priority.  




The Effect of Descriptions on Discriminability and Reliability 
Law enforcement officers often ask an eyewitness to a crime for a detailed 
description of the perpetrator (Technical Working Group, 1999). An accurate and detailed 
description is used by law enforcement officers to help apprehend or rule out individuals 
suspected of a crime and is also used to select appropriate fillers to be placed alongside 
the suspect in a lineup. A large body of research suggested that a verbal description should 
contribute to memory performance (Rundus, 1971; Woodward, Bjork, & Jongeward, 
1973; Darley & Glass, 1975; Glenberg, Smith, & Green, 1977; Glenberg & Adams, 1978). 
However, a series of experiments by Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) showed that 
a verbal description can cause a large reduction in the correct ID rate. This effect is called 
‘verbal overshadowing’ and there have since been numerous attempts to replicate this 
finding. 
Replicating the Verbal Overshadowing Effect 
Some researchers have replicated the effect in forensically relevant experiments 
(e.g. Fallshore & Schooler, 1995; Schooler, Ryan, & Reder, 1996; Dodson, Johnson, & 
Schooler, 1997; Ryan & Schooler, 1998), but several others have not (e.g. Lovett, Small, 
& Engstrom, 1992; Yu & Geiselman, 1993; Memon & Bartlett, 2002). Some have 
observed verbal overshadowing in standard recognition memory tasks (e.g. Brown & 
Lloyd-Jones, 2002; 2003) yet have also found an effect in the opposite direction (i.e. 
describing a studied face could facilitate memory; Brown & Lloyd-Jones, 2005). A meta-
analysis (Meissner & Brigham, 2001) found a small, statistically significant verbal 
overshadowing effect, a report less robust than Schooler and Engstler-Schooler’s (1990) 
original results, but the validity of the effect still remained in question. This is because the 
meta-analysis included studies that used a variety of stimuli, delays, filler tasks, and other 
materials, and many of the studies included in the meta-analysis either found no effect or 
an effect in the opposite direction. The first registered replication report (Alogna et al., 
2014), a concerted effort of 31 independent laboratories, attempted to directly replicate 
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the initial findings from Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990). The meta-analytic effect 
across the 31 studies found the size of the effect to be substantially smaller than the initial 
findings; still, a statistically significant verbal overshadowing effect was observed.  
Theoretical Implications of Verbal Overshadowing 
Despite successfully replicating the original report (Alogna et al., 2014), because 
there was no way to measure false ID rates (as the perpetrator was always present in the 
lineup), the particular effect verbalization has on identification performance remains 
unclear (Mickes & Wixted, 2015). That is, it is unclear whether the reduction in the correct 
ID rate was caused by conservative responding (i.e. a change in response bias) or because 
memory was adversely affected (i.e. a reduction in discriminability). Determining whether 
verbal overshadowing reflects a change in response bias, discriminability, or both has 
important theoretical implications (Mickes & Wixted, 2015; Rotello et al., 2014). There 
are three main theories of the verbal overshadowing effect. First, the content account (e.g., 
Meissner et al., 2001) holds that the verbal description interferes with the memory of the 
perpetrator, causing a reduction in discriminability. Second, the criterion-shift account 
(Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004) holds that verbal overshadowing reflects a change in 
response bias rather than a change in discriminability. Lastly, the processing account holds 
that the switch from visual to verbal processing (Schooler, 2002) affects both 
discriminability and response bias (Chin & Schooler, 2008). Each theory is discussed 
below. 
Content Accounts of Verbal Overshadowing 
Recoding Interference  
Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) argued that verbal overshadowing is 
caused by recoding interference. According to this theory, participants that attempt to 
describe a previously seen stimulus “recode” the visual memory of the stimulus into a 
verbal memory. However, the verbal memory may become impoverished when 
participants fail to describe key components of the stimulus. During a recognition task, 
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the impoverished verbal memory interferes with the visual memory causing a reduction 
in discriminability.  
In a series of experiments, Schooler and Engstler-Schooler showed that recoding 
interference occurs when participants describe a previously seen face. In Experiments 1 
and 2, participants watched a video of a mock bank robbery and were either instructed to 
describe the bank robber in as much detail as possible or complete a control task before 
attempting to identify the bank robber from a perpetrator-present lineup. In both 
experiments, participants who had described the perpetrator were less likely to correctly 
identify the perpetrator from the lineup compared to control participants. Schooler and 
Engstler-Schooler hypothesized that the impoverished verbal memory of the face 
interfered with the rich visual memory of the face during the recognition task. The verbal 
memory was impoverished because it was difficult to adequately describe the 
perpetrator’s face. Participants relying on this impoverished verbal memory were less able 
to identify the perpetrator as a result.  
Schooler and Engstler-Schooler found that recoding interference applies to other 
hard-to-describe stimuli as well. In Experiment 3, participants who studied and attempted 
to describe a particular colour were less likely to recognize that same colour compared to 
participants who did not provide a description. However, when participants described an 
easy-to-describe stimulus, recoding interference was reduced. In Experiment 4, 
participants watched the video of the bank robbery. After the video, participants were 
instructed to either describe the perpetrator’s face, complete a control task, or recall and 
write down the perpetrator’s spoken statement (at the beginning of the video, the 
perpetrator says to the bank clerk, “Just follow the instructions, don’t press the alarm, and 
you won’t get hurt”). Each group of participants then attempted to identify the perpetrator 
from the lineup and attempted to identify the statement from the video. The participants 
who described the perpetrator’s face experienced verbal overshadowing, replicating 
previous findings from Experiments 1 and 2. Those who described the spoken statement, 
however, did not experience verbal overshadowing. In fact, these participants had better 
memory for the spoken statement relative to controls. These results showed that verbal 
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overshadowing is particularly associated with memories that cannot be easily put into 
words. When the studied stimulus is easy to describe, memory may actually improve.  
Whether a stimulus is easy or hard to describe depends in part on 1) the ability of 
the participant to perceive the stimulus and 2) the ability of the participant to translate the 
various nuances of those perceptions into words. Recoding interference predicts a large 
verbal overshadowing effect for “individuals who possess a level of perceptual expertise 
that exceeds their verbal ability” (p. 399, Chin & Schooler, 2008). These individuals will 
be ill-equipped to effectively translate their rich perceptions of a stimulus into a rich verbal 
memory of the stimulus. Melcher and Schooler (1996) tested the verbal overshadowing 
effect across three groups of participants that had varying levels of perceptual and verbal 
expertise. They had participants taste and attempt to describe a glass of wine prior to a 
recognition task where the same wine and several other new wines were presented. 
Participants were either trained wine drinkers (professionals or had taken a wine seminar), 
untrained wine drinkers, or non-wine drinkers. Verbal overshadowing was only observed 
for the untrained wine drinkers, consistent with the recoding interference predictions. 
Those trained in wine drinking had the verbal ability to effectively translate those 
perceptions into words, whereas non-wine drinkers neither had much ability to perceive 
the taste of the wine nor describe the taste of the wine. However, the perceptual ability of 
untrained wine drinkers greatly exceeded their ability to describe the wine and they were 
less able to recognize the wine as a result.  
Retrieval-based Interference 
Retrieval-based interference theory holds that the inaccurate details within the 
description interfere with the memory of the perpetrator, causing a reduction in 
discriminability (Meissner, Brigham, & Kelley, 2001). During a lineup identification task, 
for example, retrieval-based interference occurs when participants retrieve inaccurate 
details from a previous description and mistakenly rely on those details to make an 
identification. If participants provide a large number of inaccurate details within their 
description, the amount of interference is predicted to increase and cause a greater 
reduction in discriminability. In a series of experiments, Finger and Pezdek (1999) had 
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participants witness a mock crime and later attempt to identify the perpetrator from a 
perpetrator-present lineup. Participants were given either elaborative description 
instructions based on the Cognitive Interview (Geiselman et al., 1984) or standard police 
description instructions. The Cognitive Interview is a method of interviewing 
eyewitnesses using several retrieval strategies that encourage elaborate and extensive 
recall of crime-related details; participants are encouraged to provide crime-related details 
even if they are somewhat unsure in their accuracy for those details (Geiselman et al., 
1984). Finger and Pezdek found that participants in the elaborative description condition 
(i.e. the Cognitive Interview condition) provided more correct and incorrect details about 
the perpetrator and were less able to correctly identify the perpetrator from a lineup (i.e. 
evidence of verbal overshadowing).  
If increasing the number of inaccurate details within the description increases the 
amount of retrieval-based interference, then limiting the number of inaccurate details 
within the description should decrease the amount of interference. In a study by Meissner 
et al. (2001), participants witnessed a mock crime and were either encouraged to describe 
the perpetrator in as much detail as they could provide (i.e. elaborative description 
instructions) or were instructed to only provide details of the face they could accurately 
remember. By mostly providing accurate details of the perpetrator, participants should 
provide fewer inaccurate details of the perpetrator and, consequently, reduce the amount 
of retrieval-based interference. Consistent with this prediction, those given elaborative 
description instructions provided many more correct and incorrect details, and were less 
able to correctly identify the perpetrator from a lineup. Whereas, those who were 
instructed to strive for accuracy rather than quantity of crime-related details provided 
fewer correct and incorrect details, and were better able to correctly identify the 
perpetrator. 
Content Account Limitations 
The content accounts of verbal overshadowing predict a strong correlation 
between description accuracy and discriminability. Consider an eyewitness that has 
described the perpetrator’s face and is attempting to identify the perpetrator from a lineup. 
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There should be less recoding interference when the eyewitness accurately describes the 
perpetrator. An eyewitness who accurately describes the perpetrator should “recode” the 
visual memory of the perpetrator into a reliable verbal memory which would be useful in 
discriminating the perpetrator from the innocent suspect. Similarly, there should be less 
retrieval-based interference, if the description of the perpetrator is highly accurate. This is 
because there will be few (if any) inaccurate details that the eyewitness could retrieve and 
use to make an identification. However, contrary to these predictions, the correlation 
between description accuracy and discriminability has not often been found. Although a 
few have found such a correlation (Meissner, Sporer, & Susa, 2008), the majority have 
not (e.g. Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Fallshore & Schooler, 1995; Kitigami, Sato, 
& Yoshikawa, 2002; Brown & Lloyd-Jones, 2003). It is difficult to ascribe the verbal 
overshadowing effect to the quality of the verbal descriptions when there is often no 
observed relationship between the two.  
Recoding interference and retrieval-based interference predict reduced 
discriminability for the verbalized stimulus; discriminability should remain unimpaired 
for other studied stimuli (as these stimuli were not described). Yet, verbal overshadowing 
has, in fact, been observed for stimuli that were not previously described. Dodson et al. 
(1997) had participants study a male and a female face. Afterwards, participants either 
described the male face, described the female face, or engaged in a control task. 
Participants who described only the male face or described only the female face were less 
likely to correctly identify both faces compared to control participants. Similarly, 
Westerman and Larsen (1997) had participants study photographs of a car and a face, but 
were instructed to either describe the car or engage in a control task. Participants who 
described the car were less likely to correctly identify the face compared to controls. It is 
difficult for the content accounts to explain why describing a previously seen stimulus 
such as a car impacts discriminability for an unrelated item such as a face.  
Transfer-Inappropriate Processing Account  
To accommodate these findings, Schooler, Fiore, and Brandimonte (1997) 
proposed an alternative account of verbal overshadowing, one which stems from the 
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transfer-appropriate processing and retrieval-induced forgetting frameworks. According 
to this account, verbally describing a previously seen stimulus causes a general, but 
temporary, shift in how participants process information. Schooler et al. regard this as a 
transfer-inappropriate processing shift that ultimately causes a reduction in 
discriminability for described and non-described stimuli, regardless of whether the 
description is highly accurate. The transfer-appropriate processing framework and the 
retrieval-induced forgetting framework are briefly discussed before a more detailed 
discussion of the transfer-inappropriate processing account. 
Transfer-appropriate Processing Framework 
The premise of the transfer-appropriate processing framework is that performance 
on a memory test benefits most when the processes used to encode the stimuli overlap 
maximally with the processes used to retrieve the stimuli (e.g. Roediger, Weldon, Challis, 
1989; Roediger, 1990). Processing mismatches between these two stages can result in 
retrieval failure. Morris, Bransford, and Frank (1977) demonstrated this by manipulating 
the processes used during encoding and retrieval for a list of words. During encoding, 
participants were presented with sentences designed to encourage semantic or phonemic 
encoding of a particular word. For example, participants were either presented “Eagle is 
a large bird” or “Eagle rhymes with legal” and were instructed to answer yes or no to each 
statement. During retrieval, participants took part in a standard recognition test where old 
words (e.g. eagle) and new words were randomly intermixed and presented one at a time 
to the participant for an old or new response. Participants then took part in a rhyme 
recognition test, which required participants to discriminate words that rhymed with old 
words from words that did not rhyme with old words (e.g. regal would be considered old 
as it rhymes with eagle). Results from the standard recognition test showed that 
participants who encoded the semantics of the word (e.g. eagle is a large bird) had better 
memory than participants who encoded the phonemic qualities of the word (e.g. eagle 
rhymes with legal). However, results from the rhyme recognition test showed the opposite 
pattern: those who encoded the phonemic qualities of the word had better memory in this 
test than those who had encoded the semantics of the word. The results by Morris et al. 
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highlight the importance of matching the processes used during the encoding and retrieval 
stages. The demands of the encoding and retrieval tasks can impact memory-related 
processes in a way that may hinder or facilitate memory performance. It is important to 
consider whether the task of verbally describing a previously seen face, for example, 
encourages retrieval processes that match well with the visual processes used to encode 
the face. 
Retrieval-induced Forgetting Framework 
Schooler et al. (1997) combined the transfer-appropriate processing framework 
with the idea of retrieval-induced forgetting. It has been shown that the act of retrieving 
information from memory can inhibit access to non-retrieved information, essentially 
causing forgetting of non-retrieved information. Anderson, Bjork, and Bjork (1994) 
demonstrated this by having participants study a list of category-exemplar pairs. For 
example, participants studied fruit-orange, fruit-apple, tree-hickory, and tree-maple. 
Following the study phase, participants practiced retrieving some of these items from a 
subset of categories, but did not practice retrieving other items from other categories. For 
instance, participants practiced retrieving fruits (i.e. by filling in fruit-or___ with 
“orange”), but did not practice retrieving items related to trees. Because fruits received 
retrieval practice they were labeled as RP (i.e. retrieval practice category), whereas trees 
were labeled as NRP (i.e. non-retrieval practice category) because they did not receive 
retrieval practice. Although some fruits received retrieval practice, some other fruits, such 
as “apple”, were not practiced. These items were labeled RP- because they belonged to a 
practiced category but did not receive retrieval practice. After a distractor task, participants 
were then asked to recall as many exemplars from the original study list as they could 
remember. The RP items (e.g. orange) were recalled more often than the NRP items (e.g. 
hickory), as one might expect. What is surprising is that the NRP items were recalled more 
often than the RP- items (e.g. apple). This result shows that retrieving a subset of items 
belonging to a specific category can inhibit recall of the other items belonging to that same 
category. In other words, retrieving “orange” from the study list inhibited the retrieval of 
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“apple”. Had participants not practiced “orange”, then “apple” would have been recalled 
as often as “hickory” or “maple” were recalled. 
Evidence for Transfer-inappropriate Processing 
Combining these two frameworks, Schooler et al. (1997) proposed that verbal 
overshadowing is caused by transfer-inappropriate processing. This account is based on 
the following four premises: 1) instructing participants to describe a previously seen 
stimulus encourages the retrieval of the verbalizable aspects of the stimulus. This premise 
follows from the transfer-appropriate processing framework which holds that retrieval 
processes are determined, in part, by the demands of the task (e.g. Morris et al., 1977; 
Roediger et al., 1989). Retrieving the verbalizable aspects of the stimulus 2) inhibits the 
retrieval of the non-verbalizable aspects of the stimulus. This premise is supported by 
research showing that retrieval of information belonging to a particular category inhibits 
the retrieval of other information belonging to that same category (e.g. Anderson et al. 
1994; Anderson & Spellman, 1995). This interference is not isolated to the described 
stimulus, but 3) is broad in scope and impairs non-verbal processing of other non-
described stimuli. Together, these three premises explain why discriminability is worse 
for studied items that were not described (e.g. Westerman & Larson, 1997; Dodson et al., 
1997) and why discriminability can be worse for studied items even when the description 
is highly accurate (e.g. Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Schooler & Fallshore, 1995). 
That is, according to this account, verbalizing a previously seen stimulus causes a general 
shift in processing which broadly impacts discriminability for both described and non-
described studied items. The reduction in discriminability can be reversed 4) if 
participants engage in a task that encourages “appropriate” processing – a task that 
encourages the retrieval of the non-verbalizable aspects of a stimulus.  
Finger (2002) tested whether verbal overshadowing can be reversed by engaging 
in an unrelated perceptual task prior to taking a recognition test. In Experiment 1, 
participants watched a video of a mock crime. After the video, participants either 
described the perpetrator or took part in a control task. Participants then engaged in either 
a non-verbal processing task in which they completed a series of mazes or a verbal 
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processing task in the form of a questionnaire. The maze task required participants to draw 
a line from the start of the maze to the correct end point. Those given the questionnaire 
were instructed to recall as many category exemplars as possible from six large categories. 
Participants then attempted to identify the perpetrator from a six-person lineup. In 
Experiment 2, the procedure was the same procedure used in Experiment 1, but the non-
verbal processing task was different. The maze task was replaced with a music task in 
which participants listened to an instrumental piece of music and had to count the number 
of times a particular tone was presented. Participants who had engaged in the maze task 
(Experiment 1) and the music task (Experiment 2) correctly identified the perpetrator more 
often than those who had took part in the questionnaire. In fact, these participants 
performed as well as those who had not previously described the perpetrator. These results 
suggest that verbal overshadowing occurs as a result of widespread disruption of 
perceptual processes (i.e. a shift towards verbal processing). This disruption can be 
corrected by engaging in a perceptual task, such as a maze or a music task, prior to taking 
a recognition test (i.e. shifting participants back towards non-verbal processing).  
Finger (2002) showed that it is possible to reverse verbal overshadowing by 
engaging in an unrelated perceptual task, but can an unrelated perceptual task also 
contribute to verbal overshadowing? If describing the perpetrator encourages the use of 
verbal processes which are not conducive to identification, perhaps there are other tasks 
that can encourage the use of verbal processes as well. Macrae and Lewis (2002) had 
participants study a video of a mock crime. Following the video, participants did not 
describe the perpetrator, but rather engaged in either a global or local processing task. Face 
recognition has been shown to rely heavily on global processes (e.g. Tanaka & Farah, 
1993). Engaging in a task that encourages the use of global processing might facilitate 
face recognition, whereas engaging in a task that discourages the use of global processing 
(i.e. a local processing task) might impair face recognition (i.e. might lead to a verbal 
overshadowing effect). Participants were presented with a long list of Navon (1977) 
letters. These are large letters (e.g. T) that are comprised of smaller different letters (e.g. 
y). Participants either had to report the large letter (global processing task) or the small 
letter (local processing task) or read an unrelated text for the same duration (control task). 
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Participants then attempted to identify the perpetrator from a perpetrator-present lineup. 
Macrae and Lewis found that participants who shifted towards local processing (i.e. who 
reported the smaller letters) were less likely to correctly identify the perpetrator than 
control participants. In effect, verbal overshadowing occurred even though participants 
had not described the perpetrator. Yet, those who shifted towards global processing (i.e. 
who reported the large letters) were better at correctly identifying the perpetrator than 
control participants. Results from Finger (2002) and Macrae and Lewis (2002) 
demonstrate that the specific processing operations utilized in between study and test can 
either cause verbal overshadowing or reverse verbal overshadowing. 
Criterion Shift Account 
Although eyewitnesses are required to describe the perpetrator to law enforcement 
officers (Technical Working Group, 1999), the task of verbally describing the perpetrator 
is, nevertheless, challenging. Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) argued that participants who 
find this task especially difficult may believe that their memory for the perpetrator is poor 
and, as a result, may be more cautious when attempting to make an identification (i.e. may 
be more conservative in making an identification). This theory makes two key predictions: 
participants who had described the perpetrator will be less likely to correctly identify the 
perpetrator from the lineup (i.e. fewer correct IDs) and, when the perpetrator is absent 
from the lineup, participants will be less likely to choose an innocent suspect (i.e. fewer 
false IDs). Most of the verbal overshadowing literature has not provided perpetrator-
absent lineups (e.g. Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Westerman & Larsen, 1997; 
Finger & Pezdek, 1999; Macrae & Lewis, 2001) – making it impossible to measure false 
IDs. Whereas, the few studies that have shown perpetrator-absent lineups have not 
provided participants the option to reject the lineup (e.g. Dodson et al., 1997; Ryan & 
Schooler, 1998) which makes these false IDs useless in determining whether a change in 
response bias has occurred.  
In Experiment 1, Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) had participants watch a video 
of a mock crime and randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions: 
participants either described the specific features of the perpetrator, described the holistic 
A RE-EXAMINATION OF EYEWITNESS MEMORY PHENOMENA  
80 
 
features of the perpetrator, or completed a control task. The specific feature task required 
participants to fill out a questionnaire regarding the perpetrator’s hair colour, eye colour, 
nose, mouth, ears, and so on. Participants assigned to the holistic feature task were given 
a questionnaire asking participants to rate the perpetrator’s intelligence, friendliness, 
honesty, and the “averageness” of the perpetrator’s face. Those in the control condition 
had to list exemplars of several unrelated categories. Participants then attempted to 
identify the perpetrator from either a perpetrator-present or perpetrator-absent lineup. For 
each lineup, participants had the option to either identify a lineup member or reject the 
lineup in the event the perpetrator was absent. By providing these options to participants, 
Clare and Lewandowsky could properly measure the correct and false ID rates.  
They predicted that participants in the featural and holistic conditions would make 
fewer correct and false IDs than control participants. The correct ID rate for participants 
in the featural (.69) and holistic conditions (.57) was lower compared to control 
participants (.80). That is, a verbal overshadowing effect was observed for those who had 
described the perpetrator’s face. However, the question of interest was whether this 
reduction in the correct ID rate was also accompanied by a reduction in the false ID rate. 
If so, this pattern would indicate that these participants were less likely to make an 
identification (i.e. a conservative shift in decision criterion). If, however, the false ID rate 
increased while the correct ID rate decreased, then a reduction in discriminability has 
occurred. This is what the content and transfer-inappropriate processing accounts of verbal 
overshadowing predict (i.e. because these participants described the perpetrator, 
discriminability should be worse). The false ID rate for those in the featural condition 
(0.00) was lower compared to control participants (.05), indicating a conservative shift in 
decision criterion. Yet, the false ID rate for those who had described the holistic features 
(.20) was higher compared to control participants (.05), indicating a reduction in 
discriminability.  
Criterion Shift Account Limitations 
Altogether, these findings provide mixed support for the criterion shift account. 
Although a conservative shift in decision criteria occurred for those in the featural 
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condition, it is not clear why a conservative shift did not also occur for those in the holistic 
condition. In both of these conditions participants described the perpetrator, and, 
according to Clare and Lewandowsky, both groups of participants should be more 
conservative in making an identification. Perhaps participants only experienced difficulty 
when attempting to describe the specific features of the perpetrator’s face and did not 
experience difficulty when attempting to describe the holistic features of the perpetrator. 
Participants in the holistic condition simply had to rate how friendly, honest, attractive, 
etc. the perpetrator looked. This may have been too easy of a task. Participants might have 
experienced difficulty if they actually had to explain why the perpetrator looked friendly, 
for example. Such a task might have caused participants to become more conservative 
when making an identification.  
To statistically compare discriminability for control, featural and holistic 
conditions, d′ was computed from the overall correct and false ID rates reported by Clare 
and Lewandowsky and statistically compared using the G statistic (see Chapter 2 for 
review). Discriminability was significantly worse for those in the holistic condition (d′ = 
1.03) compared to those in the control condition (d′ = 2.53, G = 2.49, p = .01), but there 
was no significant difference in discriminability for those in the featural condition (d′ = 
2.83) compared to those in the control condition (d′ = 2.53, G = .31, p = .75). It is not clear 
why discriminability was only reduced in the holistic condition and not also reduced in 
the featural condition. Both the transfer-inappropriate processing account and content 
accounts of verbal overshadowing predict a reduction in discriminability for both 
conditions. As it currently stands, it remains unclear whether verbal overshadowing is 
caused by a shift in response bias or a reduction in discriminability. Further analysis is 
needed that specifically measures response bias and discriminability. 
Experiment 3 
To determine whether verbal overshadowing reflects a change in response bias, 
discriminability, or both, a replication of Experiment 1 from Schooler and Engstler-
Schooler (1990) was conducted. Importantly, a perpetrator-absent lineup condition was 
included in order to measure false ID rates. With both correct and false ID rates, receiver 
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operating characteristic (ROC) analysis can then be conducted (see Chapters 1 and 2 for 
review; Wixted & Mickes, 2012; Gronlund et al., 2014; National Research Council, 2014). 
Reliability of an Identification 
If verbal overshadowing reduces discriminability (producing a lower ROC) and 
not just a conservative shift in responding, Alogna et al. (2014) wrote that suspect IDs 
admitted as evidence in court “…should be weighted less if the witness had provided a 
description earlier” (p. 557). Mickes (2015) made the point that because ROC analysis 
does not measure the reliability of a suspect ID (i.e. ROC analysis is not a measure of 
probative value), a more appropriate analysis for judges and jurors is confidence-accuracy 
characteristic (CAC) analysis. It can answer the question: is an identification made with 
high confidence likely to be accurate? In many cases, people can appreciate conditions 
that affect their memory and adjust their confidence accordingly (e.g., if they only saw the 
perpetrator for a short duration, they tend to be less likely to give high confidence 
identifications, but those high confidence identifications tend to be highly accurate; e.g. 
Palmer et al., 2013). An eyewitness may or may not appreciate the fact that providing a 
verbal description can impact memory accuracy. CAC analysis was conducted in order to 
test whether confidence and accuracy are related across all levels of confidence. 
Methods 
Participants  
Undergraduate students (N = 780) at the University of California, San Diego 
(UCSD) participated online for course credit. According to results of a power analysis, 
based on the ROC results reported in Experiment 1 of Mickes et al. (2012), a total sample 
size of 780 was estimated to detect a difference between the groups with 80% power. 
Participants (n = 63) reported that they previously viewed the video and 
were therefore not included in the analyses. Of the remaining (n = 717; 472 female, 239 
male, and 6 did not specify; age in years: M = 20.5, SD = 2.55). Participants were 
randomly assigned to the control condition or the verbal condition, and were tested on a 
perpetrator-present (ncontrol = 171; nverbal = 190) or a perpetrator-absent lineup (ncontrol = 
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188; nverbal = 168) based on random assignment. The UCSD Institutional Review Board 
approved of this experiment. 
Materials  
Many of the materials used throughout the study, including the videotape of the 
bank robbery, the instructions throughout the experiment, and the photographs of the 
lineup members, were the same materials used in the original (Schooler & Engstler-
Schooler, 1990) and replicated reports (Alogna et al., 2014). Schooler provided a digitized 
version of these materials to incorporate for computer use. The original crossword puzzle 
given to participants during the distractor task in the original report was no longer 
available, so Schooler selected a comparable crossword puzzle for the replicated report, 
which was also used in this experiment.  
Procedure 
As shown in Figure 1, participants studied a video of the bank robbery and, 
immediately following the video, either provided a verbal description of the perpetrator 
(i.e. the bank robber) or completed a control task (i.e. listed countries and their 
corresponding capitals). Participants then engaged in a 20-minute distractor task (i.e. 
attempted to solve the crossword puzzle) before viewing a lineup. The lineup either did or 
did not contain the target. The size of the lineup was modified from eight to six members 
in order to randomly assign participants to perpetrator-absent and perpetrator-present 
lineup conditions. This was done so that the eight original photos of the lineup members 
could still be used. If the lineup consisted of eight members, then a new filler would be 
needed to replace the perpetrator in the perpetrator-absent lineup. Confidence in the 
identification decision was also collected in order to conduct ROC and CAC analyses. It 
is important to note that in the original study (Experiment 4; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 
1990) a between-subjects condition was included, but was excluded in this study. Also, 
the delay (i.e. length of the distractor task) was 10 minutes in the original study as opposed 
to 20 minutes in this study. These changes were made in order to follow the exact 
procedure used in Alogna et al. (2014). 




Figure 1. Illustration of the task sequence for the first registered replication report 
(RRR Study 1) from Alogna et al. (2014).  
Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
The total number of perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent trials as well as the 
number of correct IDs, false IDs, and filler IDs for every level of confidence for the verbal 
and the control condition are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Response frequencies displayed for every decision outcome for each level of confidence.  
 Verbal Condition  Control Condition 
 Perp Present  Perp Absent  Perp Present  Perp Absent 
Confidence CID FID noID  FID noID  CID FID noID  FID noID 
1 1 0 2  2 1  3 2 1  5 2 
2 3 7 2  5 6  1 4 1  11 4 
3 5 10 3  13 3  10 6 8  22 6 
4 18 12 14  20 13  17 15 12  35 14 
5 24 14 12  32 30  19 13 7  35 20 
6 31 5 5  14 17  21 9 3  14 8 
7 16 3 3  5 7  13 4 2  6 6 
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification; CID, correct IDs; FID, filler IDs. 




The suspect ID rates for perpetrator-present lineups (i.e. correct ID rates), suspect 
ID rates for perpetrator-absent lineups (i.e. false ID rates) and filler ID rates for both 
perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineups for each level of confidence are shown 
in Table 2. The original (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and replicated reports 
(Alogna et al., 2014) observed a 22% [95% confidence interval: -44% to -0.01%] and 4% 
[95% confidence interval: -7% to -1%] reduction in correct ID rate due to verbalization, 
respectively. We observed an 8% [95% confidence interval: -4% to 20%] increase in 
correct ID rate, but the confidence interval for the correct ID rate findings, ignoring false 
ID rates, overlap with the confidence intervals for both the original and replicated reports. 
Table 2 
Identification rates for perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineups. 
  Perp Present  Perp Absent 
 Confidence Correct ID Filler ID no ID  False ID Filler ID no ID 
Verbal 1 .52 .27   .09 .54  
 2 .51 .27   .09 .53  
 3 .50 .23   .08 .50  
 4 .47 .18 .22  .07 .42 .46 
 5 .37 .12   .05 .30  
 6 .25 .04   .02 .11  
 7 .08 .02   .01 .03  
Control 1 .49 .31   .11 .68  
 2 .47 .30   .11 .65  
 3 .47 .28   .10 .60  
 4 .41 .24 .20  .08 .48 .32 
 5 .31 .15   .05 .29  
 6 .20 .08   .02 .11  
 7 .08 .02   .01 .03  
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification. 
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To measure whether verbalization affects discriminability, and not just response 
bias, ROC analysis was conducted. The italicized values in Table 2 were used to construct 
the ROC curves shown in Figure 2. Because lineup-based ROCs extend from 0 to a value 
less than 1, pAUC was calculated (Mickes, et al. 2012) by using the false ID cutoff of .082 
(i.e. 1 - .082 = .918) for both conditions. The pAUC for the control condition (0.036) was 
not significantly different than the pAUC for the verbal condition (0.027), D = -0.45, p 
= .65. Thus, the ROC curves reveal that discriminability in the verbal condition was not 
significantly different than discriminability in the control condition. Note that the 
Appendix contains the ROC analysis using the other method of estimating the false ID 
rate (see Chapter 2). The conclusions are the same regardless of which method is used to 
estimate the false ID rate. 
 
Figure 2. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the Verbal and 
Control conditions. The lines through the ROC curves were estimated using a hyperbolic 
function. The dashed line represents chance performance. 




Confidence levels were binned into low (1-3), medium (4-5), and high (6-7) 
because there were too few responses in some levels. For each level of confidence, suspect 
ID accuracy (A) = # correct suspect IDs / (# correct suspect IDs + # innocent suspect IDs). 
The CAC curves shown in Figure 3 appear to show the same level of accuracy for low, 
medium, and high levels of confidence between the two conditions. Note that the 
Appendix contains the CAC analysis using the other method of estimating the false ID 
rate. Namely, the most often identified filler was designated as the innocent suspect. The 
conclusions are the same regardless of which procedure is used.  
 
Figure 3. Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) curves for Verbal and Control 
Condition. The bars represent standard error bars. Note that the error bar for high 
confidence judgments in the verbal condition is very small. 
Discussion 
Alogna et al. (2014) attempted a direct replication of Experiment 4 from Schooler 
and Engstler-Schooler (1990). Participants watched a video of a mock crime and, 
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immediately after watching the video, either described the perpetrator or completed a 
control task. Twenty minutes later participants attempted to identify the perpetrator from 
a perpetrator-present lineup. Alogna et al. found a small, statistically significant reduction 
in the correct ID rate for participants who had previously described the perpetrator, 
replicating Schooler and Engstler-Schooler’s original result. However, because the false 
ID rate was not measured in conjunction with the correct ID rate, it is unclear whether this 
verbal overshadowing effect reflects a reduction in discriminability or just a conservative 
shift in response bias. Several theories suggest that verbal overshadowing reflects a 
reduction in discriminability (e.g. Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1991; Schooler et al., 
1997; Meissner et al., 2001), but more recently Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) have 
argued that verbal overshadowing reflects a conservative shift in response bias rather than 
a reduction in discriminability. To determine whether verbalization affected response bias 
or discriminability, a near-direct replication was conducted, but a perpetrator-absent 
lineup condition was included in order to measure both correct and false ID rates. With 
both correct and false ID rates, ROC curves can be constructed and statistically compared 
in order to reveal any significant difference in discriminability and response bias (Mickes 
et al., 2012). In this experiment, verbally describing the perpetrator did not result in a 
reduction in discriminability. ROC analysis revealed no significant difference in 
discriminability between participants who had described the perpetrator and control 
participants. Below, this finding is discussed with respect to each theory of verbal 
overshadowing. 
Content Accounts of Verbal Overshadowing 
The content accounts of verbal overshadowing predict worse discriminability for 
participants who had described the perpetrator because the description interferes with the 
memory of the perpetrator (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Meisner et al., 2001). In 
this experiment, description-related interference should have had a maximum effect on 
discriminability because participants described the perpetrator immediately after watching 
the mock crime video. At this time, the memory of the perpetrator was likely undergoing 
consolidation and was, therefore, highly susceptible to interference. In list-learning 
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paradigms, for instance, it has long been demonstrated that the effects of interference have 
the strongest impact on memory performance when the interfering list is presented 
immediately after the study list; if the interfering list is presented at a later time during the 
retention interval (i.e. when more of the items on the study list have been consolidated), 
then the interference has less of a detrimental impact on memory performance (Muller & 
Pilzeker, 1900; Skaggs, 1925; Postman & Alper, 1946; for review, see Wixted, 2004). Yet, 
there was no significant difference in discriminability between the verbal and control 
condition. The fact that participants described the perpetrator immediately after watching 
the mock crime video and yet, no difference in discriminability was found, strongly 
suggests that description-related interference is, perhaps, not substantial enough to cause 
a reduction in discriminability.  
Transfer-Inappropriate Processing Account  
According to the transfer-inappropriate processing account of verbal 
overshadowing (Schooler et al., 1997), participants who describe the perpetrator switch to 
a processing style that makes it difficult for participants to identify the perpetrator from a 
lineup. Although this account generally predicts reduced discriminability for participants 
who had described the perpetrator, because there was a twenty minute delay between 
description and identification, participants may have had enough time to switch back to a 
processing style more conducive to identification. Chin and Schooler (2008) argued that 
“time or other peripheral events may easily shift processing back to a more global 
orientation, thus eliminating the verbal overshadowing effect” (p. 404). This argument, 
however, is rather unconvincing because it is not clear how the passage of time, per se, 
causes participants to switch processing styles. It seems just as dubious to say, for example, 
that the passage of time itself is the cause of forgetting, a point which McGeoch (1932) 
has articulated long ago. A more reasonable explanation for this finding might actually 
link the presence or absence of factors during the retention interval to changes in 
processing style. 
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Criterion-shift Account of Verbal Overshadowing 
Although no significant difference in discriminability was observed, participants 
who had described the perpetrator were more conservative when making an identification. 
This finding is consistent with the criterion-shift account of verbal overshadowing (Clare 
& Lewandowsky, 2004). These participants most likely experienced difficulty during the 
description task and, as a result, believed their memory for the perpetrator was poor (even 
though they were just as good at discriminating innocent from guilty suspects as controls). 
This belief may have caused participants to make an identification only when they felt 
very confident in the accuracy of their memory (i.e. choosing to reject the lineup when 
they felt unsure).  
Verbal Descriptions and Reliability 
To determine whether confidence and accuracy were related for all levels of 
confidence, CAC analysis was conducted. CAC analysis revealed that identifications 
made with high confidence were higher in accuracy than identifications made with 
medium confidence which, in turn, were higher in accuracy than identifications made with 
low confidence. Furthermore, CAC analysis revealed that identifications made with high 
confidence were comparably reliable for both groups. The ROC result is of theoretical 
interest, but, perhaps the more informative results are from CAC analysis given that police 
investigators are unlikely to stop collecting verbal descriptions. Many researchers believe 
that suspect IDs admitted as evidence in court “…should be weighted less if the witness 
had provided a description earlier” (Alogna et al., 2014, p. 557). Yet, the CAC curves did 
not differ whether or not participants provided verbal descriptions. The upshot is that 
identifications made with high confidence were likely to be accurate even in the verbal 
condition. That is, those identifications are reliable and if that result replicates, then that 
is an important finding for judges and jurors. 
Experiment 3 
After the first registered replication attempt (Alogna et al., 2014), 22 of those 
laboratories ran another replication (attempting to replicate Experiment 1 from Schooler 
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& Engstler-Schooler, 1990). This time, participants described the perpetrator or completed 
a control task for the allotted time immediately before viewing the lineup (see Figure 4). 
The meta-analytic effect across the 22 studies found a much larger verbal overshadowing 
effect (i.e. a much larger reduction in the correct ID rate). Still, the same issue applies. It 
is not clear whether the reduction in correct ID rate reflects a reduction in discriminability 
or a conservative shift in response bias. 
 
 
Figure 4. Task sequence for the second registered replication report (RRR Study 
2) from Alogna et al. (2014). 
Methods 
Participants  
Participants (N = 780) were recruited from Royal Holloway, University of London 
(n = 138), Amazon Mechanical Turk (n = 245), and SampleSize (n = 397). The participants 
(n = 10) who reported previously viewing the video were excluded from the analyses. The 
remaining participants (n = 770, 442 female; 318 male; 10 did not state; age in years: M 
= 27.9, SD = 11.1) were randomly assigned to the control condition or to the verbal 
condition and a perpetrator-absent lineup (ncontrol = 179; nverbal = 185) or a perpetrator-
present lineup (ncontrol = 196; nverbal = 210). Royal Holloway, University of London Ethics 
Board approved this study. 




The materials used throughout the study were the same materials used in 
Experiment 1 and the original report (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990).  
Procedure  
Participants studied a video of a bank robbery, engaged in a 20-minute distractor 
task, either provided a verbal description of the target (i.e. the bank robber) or completed 
a control task before viewing a lineup (see Figure 4). The lineup either did or did not 
contain the perpetrator. The size of the lineup was modified from eight to six members 
which enabled participants to be randomly assigned to perpetrator-present and perpetrator-
absent conditions while keeping the size of the lineup constant. Confidence in the 
identification decision was also collected in order to conduct ROC and CAC analyses.  
Results 
Descriptive Analysis  
The total number of correct IDs, false IDs, and filler IDs for every level of 
confidence for the verbal and the control condition are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3 
Response frequencies are displayed for every decision outcome per level of confidence.  
 Verbal Condition  Control Condition 
 Perp Present  Perp Absent  Perp Present  Perp Absent 
Confidence CID FID noID  FID noID  CID FID noID  FID noID 
1 0 1 2  1 0  0 2 0  1 0 
2 2 5 3  4 1  3 3 2  4 6 
3 5 8 11  13 5  7 5 2  13 7 
4 12 10 14  29 17  21 10 9  29 19 
5 29 13 34  33 32  47 10 15  33 23 
6 30 4 18  10 38  25 3 9  10 20 
7 2 2 5  3 15  19 0 4  3 11 
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification; CIDs, correct IDs; FIDs, filler IDs. 
A RE-EXAMINATION OF EYEWITNESS MEMORY PHENOMENA  
93 
 
ROC Analysis  
The suspect ID rates for perpetrator-present lineups (i.e. correct ID rates), suspect 
ID rates for perpetrator-absent lineups (i.e. false ID rates) and filler ID rates for each level 
of confidence are shown in Table 4. The italicized values were used to construct the ROC 
curves shown in Figure 5. The original (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and 
replicated reports (Alogna et al., 2014) observed a -25% [95% confidence interval: -45% 
to -5%] and -16% [95% confidence interval: -21% to -1%] reduction in the correct ID rate 
due to verbalization, respectively. We observed a -24% [95% confidence interval: -33% 
to -14%] reduction in the correct ID rate. The correct ID rate findings, ignoring false ID 
rates, replicated both the original and replicated experiments.  
Table 4 
Correct ID, false ID, filler ID and no ID rates per level of confidence per condition.  
  Perp Present  Perp Absent 
 Confidence Correct ID Filler ID noID  False ID Filler ID noID 
Verbal 1 .38 .21   .07 .42  
 2 .38 .20   .07 .41  
 3 .37 .18   .06 .38  
 4 .35 .14 .41  .06 .34 .58 
 5 .29 .09   .04 .25  
 6 .15 .03   .02 .10  
 7 .01 .01   .00 .02  
Control 1 .62 .21   .09 .52  
 2 .62 .20   .09 .51  
 3 .61 .18   .08 .49  
 4 .57 .14 .21  .07 .42 .48 
 5 .46 .09   .04 .26  
 6 .22 .03   .01 .07  
 7 .10 .01   .00 .02  
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification. 
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ROC analysis was conducted to determine whether verbalization affects 
discriminability and not just response bias. The ROC curves shown in Figure 5 reveal that 
the verbal condition ROC is lower than the control condition ROC and that difference was 
significant. The pAUC was calculated by using the false ID cutoff of .59 for both 
conditions. The pAUC for the control condition (0.15) was significantly greater than the 
pAUC for the verbal condition (0.09), D = 3.15, p = .002. Note that the Appendix contains 
a separate ROC analysis that estimated the false ID rate by taking the most often identified 
filler as the innocent suspect. The conclusions are the same regardless of which procedure 
is used. 
 
Figure 5. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the Verbal and 
Control conditions. Best-fitting lines are drawn through the curves. The dashed line 
represents chance performance. 




Confidence levels have been binned into low (1-3), medium (4-5), and high (6-7) 
because there were too few responses in some levels. For each level of confidence, suspect 
ID accuracy (A) = # correct suspect IDs / (# correct suspect IDs + # innocent suspect IDs). 
The CAC curves in Figure 6 show similar accuracy for each level of confidence regardless 
of condition. Although discriminability is lower in the verbal condition (as determined by 
ROC analysis), suspect IDs made in the verbal condition are as reliable as the suspect IDs 
made in the control condition. The Appendix contains a separate CAC analysis that 
estimated the false ID rate by taking the most often identified filler as the innocent suspect. 
The conclusions are the same regardless of which method is used. 
 
Figure 6. Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) curves for Verbal and Control 
conditions. The bars represent standard error bars. 
Discussion 
Alogna et al. (2014) attempted to directly replicate Experiment 1 from Schooler 
and Engstler-Schooler (1990). Participants watched a video of a mock crime and engaged 
in a twenty minute distractor task. Participants then either described the perpetrator or 
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completed a control task right before attempting to identify the perpetrator from a 
perpetrator-present lineup. Thus, Experiment 2 was the same as Experiment 1 with the 
exception that the description was provided right before identification (whereas the 
description was provided twenty minutes prior to identification in Experiment 1). Alogna 
et al. found a large, statistically significant reduction in the correct ID rate for participants 
who had previously described the perpetrator, replicating Schooler and Engstler-
Schooler’s original result. However, this result may either reflect a reduction in 
discriminability or a conservative shift in response bias. A near-direct replication was 
conducted that included a perpetrator-absent lineup condition in order to measure correct 
and false ID rates and conduct ROC analysis (Mickes et al., 2012).  
The results from ROC analysis indicate that participants who had described the 
perpetrator immediately before identification had significantly worse discriminability 
than control participants. Yet, in Experiment 3, when participants in the verbal condition 
provided descriptions twenty minutes prior to identification, discriminability did not differ 
from the control condition. Why is there no significant difference in discriminability when 
the delay between description and identification is large, but there is a difference in 
discriminability when the delay is short?  
The diagnostic feature-detection (DFD) hypothesis may provide insight into this 
difference (Wixted & Mickes, 2014). The hypothesis was initially proposed to account for 
the discriminability advantage that simultaneous lineup presentations have over 
procedures that involve showing an individual in isolation (as with sequential lineups or 
showups). By seeing the lineup members together, it is readily apparent to the eyewitness 
that there are features shared across lineup members that should be discounted because 
they are not diagnostic of guilt. For example, if the perpetrator were a young, White male, 
then adding weight to those features would not be helpful because all of the lineup 
members would be young, White males. As a result, when eyewitnesses see the lineup 
member together, they are able to discount features that are shared, and thus focus on 
features that are diagnostic of guilt. This strategy is less likely to be used when lineup 
members are presented individually. The same concept may help to explain why verbal 
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descriptions only impair discriminability when they are made after a delay. More 
specifically, participants may use more diagnostic feature descriptions immediately after 
encoding than they do after a delay. After a delay, by contrast, the description may become 
more general, corresponding to the common features that everyone in the lineup shares. 
In that case, the participants may have a tendency to rely on the description they just gave 
when trying to identify the face of the perpetrator. To the extent that they rely on the 
general (shared) facial features mentioned in the verbal description, discriminability 
would be impaired. To assess whether or not the DFD hypothesis can help to account for 
the differences in discriminability when verbal descriptions are delayed, a content analysis 
of the verbal descriptions provided in Experiments 1 and in Experiment 2 was conducted. 
Content Analysis 
To conduct the content analysis, 20 words were identified based on the appearance 
of the eight images of the perpetrator and fillers. Ten words were selected that would likely 
be useful in differentiating the perpetrator from fillers (diagnostic-feature words) and 10 
words were selected that would not likely be useful in differentiating the perpetrator from 
fillers (non-diagnostic-feature words). The diagnostic-feature words were descriptors that 
were not shared by all of the lineup members. The diagnostic-feature words that were 
selected were chin, jaw, cheek, brow, forehead, eye, oval, round, wavy, and point. The 
non-diagnostic-feature words were descriptors that are shared by all of the lineup members. 
The non-diagnostic-feature words we selected were white, male, age, brown, black, 
moustache, dark, weight, build, and height. The diagnostic-feature and non-diagnostic 
feature words were counted from descriptions provided by participants in the verbal 
condition in Experiment 1 (immediate descriptions) and compared with those descriptions 
in Experiment 2 (delayed descriptions).  
Significantly more diagnostic feature words were used when verbal descriptions 
were provided immediately after watching the mock crime video (Experiment 1; M = 2.3, 
SD = 1.5) compared to when verbal descriptions were provided 20 minutes after watching 
the mock crime video (Experiment 2; M = 2.0, SD = 1.3, t(785) = 2.57, p = .01). Those 
who described the perpetrator immediately after watching the mock crime video 
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(Experiment 1) also provided fewer non-diagnostic feature words (M = 2.9, SD = 1.6) than 
those who described the perpetrator 20 minutes later (Experiment 2; M = 3.6, SD = 1.7, 
t(785) = 5.03, p < .001). A 2 × 2 analysis of variance revealed a significant interaction 
between type of feature (diagnostic vs. non-diagnostic) and time of verbal description 
(immediate vs. delayed), F(1, 1570) = 30.2, p < .001. These results provide evidence for 
the DFD hypothesis. 
Experiment 5 
According to the DFD hypothesis (Wixted & Mickes, 2014), the verbal 
overshadowing effect may be due to the fact that participants tend to describe non-
diagnostic features, which are features shared by everyone in the lineup. To the extent that 
non-diagnostic features are given weight, participants will be less able to discriminate the 
perpetrator from a similar-looking member in the lineup. An analysis of the written 
descriptions provided by participants in Experiments 3 and 4 showed a difference in the 
type of features used to describe the perpetrator. Participants in Experiment 3 described 
more diagnostic features of the perpetrator. For instance, participants described the 
perpetrator’s cheek, jaw, brow, eyes, and forehead more so than participants in Experiment 
4. These participants had greater discriminability than control participants, though the 
difference was not significant. Participants in Experiment 4 described more non-
diagnostic features of the perpetrator such as the perpetrator’s ethnicity, gender, age, 
weight, and height. Consistent with the DFD hypothesis, these participants had 
significantly worse discriminability than control participants.  
These results indicate that the amount of diagnostic and non-diagnostic words used 
to describe the perpetrator may have an impact on discriminability. It is difficult to make 
any firm conclusions, however, because these two groups of participants were compared 
across experiments. In Experiment 5, participants watched a video of a mock crime and 
were instructed to describe either the specific features of the perpetrator, the general 
features of the perpetrator, or a set of items that were unrelated to the crime video before 
viewing a perpetrator-present or perpetrator-absent lineup. By instructing participants to 
describe the specific or general features of the perpetrator, we sought to manipulate the 
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amount of diagnostic and non-diagnostic words used to describe the perpetrator. We 
reasoned that the features specific to the perpetrator were less likely to be shared amongst 
the fillers in the lineup and so, these features were much more likely to be diagnostic of 
guilt. Whereas, the general features of the perpetrator were much more likely to be shared 
amongst the fillers in the lineup. Thus, these features were much more likely to be non-
diagnostic of guilt. Confidence in the identification decision was collected in order to 
conduct ROC and CAC analyses. It was predicted that those in the general description 
condition would use fewer diagnostic and more non-diagnostic words to describe the 
perpetrator than those in the specific description condition and, as a result, would yield 
worse discriminability. However, although there may be a difference in discriminability 
between groups, both groups of participants may be equally reliable. 
Methods 
Participants  
Participants (N = 948) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants 
that failed to answer the validation question correctly (stating the crime committed; n = 
23) were excluded from all analyses. The remaining (n = 925; 399 male, 523 female, 3 
unspecified; age in years: M = 31.8, SD = 10.7) participants were randomly assigned to 
either the unrelated group (n = 310), the specific feature group (n = 310), or the general 
feature group (n = 305). Participants were then randomly assigned to be tested on either a 
perpetrator-present lineup (nunrelated = 158; nspecific = 156; ngeneral = 144) or a perpetrator-
absent lineup (nunrelated = 152; nspecific = 154; ngeneral = 161). Royal Holloway, University of 
London Ethics Board approved this study.  
Materials 
The crime video featured a young white male walking into a lobby where an 
unattended laptop was located. The perpetrator walks down the hall towards the camera, 
quickly surveys the area and steals the laptop. The perpetrator’s face was shown for 
roughly 12 seconds. A front-face photograph of the perpetrator’s face was used in all of 
the perpetrator-present lineups. All of the fillers were young, white males that matched 
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the description of the perpetrator. Fillers were selected from the Florida Department of 
Corrections Offender Network (http://www.dc.state.fl.us/AppCommon/) using the 
following search criteria: male, 20-21 years old, white, height of 5’10”-6’2”, brown or 
black, short hair with no facial hair and no distinguishing features. From here, 100 faces 
that matched these descriptions were collected and grey-scaled. For each participant, five 
filler images were randomly retrieved for a perpetrator-present lineup and six filler images 
were randomly retrieved for a perpetrator-absent lineup. Thus, there was no designated 
innocent suspect placed in perpetrator-absent lineups. 
Procedure 
After consenting to participate, participants studied a video of a mock crime and 
were then instructed to either describe the specific features of the perpetrator, the general 
features of the perpetrator, or describe a set of items that were unrelated to the crime video. 
After engaging in a 5-minute distractor task, participants were then presented a six-person 
lineup that either did or did not contain the perpetrator. Confidence in the identification 
decision was collected using an 11-point scale ranging from 0% (just guessing) to 100% 
(absolutely certain). Confidence was collected in order to conduct ROC and CAC analyses. 
After the lineup, participants answered a set of questions about the video including a 
validation question (“What crime was committed?”) before being debriefed. 
Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
There were 23 participants who failed to answer the validation question correctly 
and were therefore excluded from all analyses. The total number of perpetrator-present 
and perpetrator-absent trials as well as the number of correct IDs, false IDs, and filler IDs 
for every level of confidence for the general feature, specific feature, and unrelated 
conditions are shown in Table 5. A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to 
determine whether the length of the descriptions was significantly different among the 
three groups of participants. This analysis revealed a significant difference in the length 
of descriptions among the three groups of participants, F(2,924) = 242.6, p < .001). 
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Subsequent t-tests revealed that participants assigned to the unrelated condition provided 
longer descriptions (M = 67.7, SD = 38.4) than those assigned to the specific feature 
condition (M = 34.2, SD = 21.0, t(613) = 13.4, p < .001), and those assigned to the specific 
feature condition provided longer descriptions than those assigned to the general feature 
condition (M = 22.0, SD = 14.8, t(618) = 8.39, p < .001). These differences might have 
affected the ROC results discussed below. 
Table 5 
Response frequencies for every identification decision outcome are displayed for each 
level of confidence for Unrelated, Specific Feature, and General Feature conditions.  
  Perp Present  Perp Absent 
  Correct IDs Filler IDs no IDs  Filler IDs no IDs 
Unrelated 0 0 2 5  7 0 
 10 0 0 1  3 1 
 20 1 3 1  0 1 
 30 1 7 5  9 2 
 40 0 4 4  16 7 
 50 4 10 7  19 11 
 60 3 3 9  12 10 
 70 4 11 5  9 15 
 80 8 6 16  9 11 
 90 5 3 8  3 9 
 100 4 0 4  3 4 
Specific 0 0 0 2  2 4 
 10 0 1 1  1 0 
 20 0 3 4  5 1 
 30 3 3 7  5 3 
 40 1 4 3  6 6 
 50 4 8 8  12 8 
 60 7 9 8  6 10 
 70 7 9 19  11 16 
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  Perp Present  Perp Absent 
  Correct IDs Filler IDs no IDs  Filler IDs no IDs 
 80 8 3 7  9 16 
 90 6 1 11  3 16 
 100 1 1 7  1 13 
General 0 0 3 2  1 2 
 10 0 0 1  0 1 
 20 1 3 2  2 1 
 30 1 4 6  8 1 
 40 4 4 2  7 1 
 50 6 6 10  10 12 
 60 8 4 10  12 9 
 70 9 7 9  7 23 
 80 9 4 10  4 18 
 90 6 2 10  2 15 
 100 3 1 11  3 13 
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification. 
 
ROC Analysis 
The suspect ID rates for perpetrator-present lineups (i.e. correct ID rates), suspect 
ID rates for perpetrator-absent lineups (i.e. false ID rates) and filler ID rates for both 
perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineups for each level of confidence are shown 
in Table 6. The bold italicized values are the overall correct and false ID rates. The correct 
ID rate in the general feature condition (.297) was greater than the correct ID rates in the 
specific feature condition (.237) and the unrelated condition (.208). The false ID rate in 
the unrelated condition (.093) was greater than the false ID rates in the specific condition 
(.066) and the general condition (.061). The unrelated condition yielded the lowest correct 
ID rate (.208) and the highest false ID rate (.093), which suggests that discriminability 
was worse in this condition than in the general or specific feature conditions. The specific 
feature condition yielded a lower correct ID rate and higher false ID rate than the general 
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feature condition, which also suggests that discriminability was worse for this condition 
compared to the general feature condition. In order to determine whether discriminability 
was significantly different across the three conditions, the correct and false ID rates for 
each level of confidence were plotted in ROC space in order to construct ROCs for each 
condition. The italicized values in Table 6 were used to construct the ROC curves shown 
in Figure 7. 
Table 6 
Correct ID, false ID, filler ID and no ID rates for perpetrator-present and perpetrator-
absent lineups by level of confidence per condition.  
  Perp Present  Perp Absent 
 Confidence CID Filler ID noID  FID Filler ID noID 
Unrelated 0 .21 .34   .10 .62  
 10 .21 .34   .10 .58  
 20 .21 .33   .09 .56  
 30 .20 .31   .08 .50  
 40 .20 .26   .07 .44  
 50 .19 .23 .45  .06 .34 .44 
 60 .17 .16   .04 .22  
 70 .15 .14   .03 .15  
 80 .12 .06   .02 .09  
 90 .06 .02   .01 .04  
 100 .03 .02   .00 .02  
Specific 0 .24 .27   .07 .40  
 10 .24 .27   .06 .38  
 20 .24 .26   .06 .38  
 30 .24 .24   .06 .34  
 40 .22 .22   .05 .31  
 50 .21 .20 .49  .05 .27 .60 
 60 .19 .15   .03 .20  
 70 .14 .09   .03 .16  
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  Perp Present  Perp Absent 
 Confidence CID Filler ID noID  FID Filler ID noID 
 80 .10 .03   .01 .08  
 90 .05 .01   .00 .03  
 100 .01 .01   .00 .01  
General 0 .30 .24   .06 .37  
 10 .30 .22   .06   
 20 .30 .22   .06 .36  
 30 .29 .20   .06 .35  
 40 .29 .18   .05 .30  
 50 .26 .15 .46  .04 .25 .63 
 60 .22 .11   .03 .18  
 70 .17 .10   .02 .11  
 80 .11 .04   .01 .06  
 90 .06 .02   .01 .03  
 100 .02 .01   .00 .02  
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification; FID, false IDs. 
The ROC curves shown in Figure 7 reveal that the general feature condition ROC 
is greater than the specific feature condition ROC which is greater than the unrelated 
condition ROC. The pAUC for all three conditions was calculated by using the false ID 
cutoff of .939. Because three comparisons were being made, the alpha level was corrected 
using Bonferroni corrections so that a significant difference would be accepted as p < .017. 
The pAUC from the general feature condition and the unrelated condition ROCs were first 
compared. The pAUC for the general feature condition (0.012) was not significantly 
greater than the pAUC for the unrelated condition (0.007), D = 1.28, p = .23. Next, the 
pAUCs from the general feature condition and specific feature ROC were compared. 
Again, the pAUC was calculated by using the false ID cutoff of .939. The pAUC for the 
general feature condition (0.012) was not significantly greater than the pAUC for the 
unrelated condition (0.008), D = .783, p = .43. Lastly, the pAUCs from the specific feature 
condition and the unrelated condition was compared. Although the pAUC for the specific 
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feature condition (.008) was greater than the pAUC for the unrelated condition (.007), 
there was no significant difference, D = .424, p = .67.  
 
Figure 7. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the General, Specific, 
and Unrelated conditions. The lines through the ROC curves were estimated using a 
hyperbolic function. The dashed line represents chance performance. 
CAC Analysis 
Confidence levels have been binned into low (0% – 60%), medium (70% – 80%), 
and high (90% – 100%) because there were too few responses in some levels. For each 
level of confidence, suspect ID accuracy (A) = # correct suspect IDs / (# correct suspect 
IDs + # innocent suspect IDs). The CAC curves in Figure 8 show similar accuracy for 
medium and high levels of confidence regardless of condition. This means that suspect 
IDs, with the exception of low confident suspect IDs, made in the general or specific 
feature condition are as reliable as the suspect IDs made in the unrelated condition. 




Figure 8. Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) curves for the General, 
Specific, and Unrelated conditions. The bars represent standard error bars. 
Discussion 
In this experiment, we manipulated description instructions to encourage the use 
of diagnostic or non-diagnostic descriptions. We reasoned that the amount of diagnostic 
and non-diagnostic words used to describe the perpetrator could affect discriminability or 
reliability from a lineup. Participants watched a video of a mock crime and either 
described the specific features of the perpetrator, the general features of the perpetrator, 
or described several unrelated items. ROC analysis revealed no significant difference in 
discriminability among the three groups of participants. Although participants described 
the perpetrator using specific or general features, participants in the unrelated condition 
wrote, on average, more words than participants in the general and specific feature 
conditions. In fact, participants in the general and specific feature conditions hardly used 
any words to describe the perpetrator beyond the basic requirements, perhaps because the 
task was too difficult. If participants wrote more details about the general or specific 
features of the perpetrator such that the length of the descriptions were the same as the 
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length of descriptions in the unrelated condition, then a difference in discriminability 
might have been observed.  
In order to determine whether describing the perpetrator impacted the reliability 
of participants’ suspect IDs, CAC analysis was conducted. CAC analysis revealed that 
confidence and accuracy are, once again, related. Specifically, participants who expressed 
low confidence in their suspect IDs were less accurate than those who expressed medium 
confidence who, in turn, were less accurate than those who expressed high confidence. 
Across medium and high confidence, there appeared to be no significant difference in 
suspect ID accuracy across the three conditions. Thus, despite participants describing the 
perpetrator, which has been shown to impact discriminability (e.g. in Experiment 2), they 
were just as reliable across medium and high confidence as those who had not previously 
described the perpetrator. This result is informative to judges and jurors who may need to 
determine the reliability of a suspect ID that was made after an eyewitness described the 
perpetrator to the police.   




The Effect of a Weapon on Discriminability and Reliability 
If a perpetrator is armed during a crime, an eyewitness may focus on the weapon 
the perpetrator is holding at the expense of focusing on the perpetrator’s face (Loftus, 
Loftus, & Messo, 1987). The “weapon focus” effect is expected to impact memory in two 
ways: 1) the eyewitness is less able to accurately recall contextual details of the crime and 
2) the eyewitness is less able to discriminate guilty from innocent suspects in a lineup. 
The focus of this chapter is to determine to what extent weapon focus impacts 
discriminability from a lineup and to address the reasons why this effect might occur. 
Throughout the last thirty years, two theories have been tested. 
Weapon Focus in the Laboratory  
Arousal/Stress Hypothesis 
In a real-life crime situation, a perpetrator holding a weapon likely induces 
considerable emotional stress in an eyewitness. Past research has shown that the level of 
emotional stress or arousal a participant experiences is closely related to how that 
participant performs on a variety of tasks; too much or too little arousal can hinder 
performance (e.g. Yerkes & Dodson, 1908; Hebb, 1955; Broadhurst, 1959; Duffy, 1962; 
Humphreys & Revelle, 1984). Easterbrook (1959) proposed that attention and arousal 
interact to determine which aspects of the environment are utilized. According to this 
theory, high levels of arousal could lead to a perceptual or attentional narrowing causing 
the source of the arousal to be over-monitored and other peripheral aspects of the 
environment to be unmonitored and underutilized.  
Based on Easterbrook’s (1959) hypothesis, Loftus (1979) argued that the threat of 
a weapon elicits high levels of physiological arousal which could cause eyewitnesses to 
focus almost exclusively on the weapon (the source of the arousal), at the expense of 
attending to the peripheral details, such as the perpetrator’s face. Loftus et al. (1987) 
attempted to demonstrate this in the laboratory. In Experiment 1, participants studied a set 
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of slides which either depicted a customer (i.e. the target) paying for a meal at the counter 
of a restaurant with a check or depicted the target revealing a gun and demanding money 
from the cashier. The two series of slides were virtually identical except that in one 
condition the target hands a check to the cashier (weapon-absent condition) and, in the 
other condition, the target points a gun at the cashier (weapon-present condition). The 
target’s face was in clear view in both conditions. Following a 15 minute distractor task, 
participants attempted to identify the target from a 12-person lineup. The target was 
always present in the lineup. Those in the weapon-present condition were less likely to 
correctly identify the target than those in the weapon-absent condition, although the effect 
was only marginally significant. This marginal effect was likely due to a small sample of 
participants. In Experiment 2, the same procedure from Experiment 1 was used, but twice 
as many participants were recruited. In this experiment, a significant reduction in the 
correct ID rate was found for those in the weapon-present condition compared to those in 
the weapon-absent condition. Eye tracking data were also analyzed. Participants fixated 
more, and for a longer duration, on the gun than they did on the check. This finding is 
consistent with the arousal/stress hypothesis as the participants fixated for a longer 
duration on the threatening stimulus (i.e. the gun) than they did on the non-threatening 
stimulus (i.e. the check) and were less able to correctly identify the perpetrator from a 
perpetrator-present lineup as a result.  
Do Participants Feel Threatened in the Laboratory? 
Psychologists have questioned whether a perpetrator shown holding a weapon in 
a series of images, a video recording, or a staged crime can cause participants to feel 
personally threatened (e.g. Deffenbacher, 1983). Loftus et al. (1987) did not measure 
emotional arousal and so, it is difficult to pinpoint whether participants focused on the 
weapon in response to feeling threatened or for some other reason. Of course, participants 
in laboratory experiments cannot be threatened with actual guns or knives due to ethical 
concerns. For this reason, Maass and Kohnken (1989) attempted to simulate the arousal 
an eyewitness experiences by threatening participants with an injection. Maass and 
Kohnken told participants that the purpose of the experiment was to investigate the 
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relation between sport-related physical activity and psychological well-being. This cover 
story justified the presence of a syringe used for injections in the experimental room. 
However, the true purpose of the experiment was to determine whether exposure to the 
syringe, and the threat of an injection in particular, could affect participants’ memory for 
the nurse administering the injection. Simply being exposed to the syringe might cause 
participants to feel emotionally aroused and cause memory impairment, but Easterbrook’s 
(1959) hypothesis predicts greatest memory impairment for participants who are exposed 
to the syringe and who feel personally threatened (i.e. those who are threatened with an 
injection). 
After participants were briefed on the cover story, a confederate nurse (i.e. the 
target) walked in either holding a syringe partially filled with some yellow liquid or a pen. 
Both the syringe and the pen were held about one meter away from the participant. The 
nurse then either informed the participant that they would receive an injection (i.e. 
threatening condition) or informed the participant that they were simply picking up a drug 
to be given to participants in another room (i.e. non-threatening condition). The nurse then 
put the syringe or the pen down on the table in front of the participant and left the room. 
After one minute, an experimenter came in the room and told the participant that they 
were not going to receive an injection and asked the participant to fill out a questionnaire 
regarding their mood. Participants then engaged in various distractor tasks for roughly 20 
minutes before attempting to identify the nurse from a seven person lineup, but the nurse 
was never present in the lineup.  
Exposure to the syringe caused participants’ mood to become more negative 
compared to those exposed to the pen. These participants reported feeling angrier, more 
agitated, and more nervous. Participants who were exposed to the syringe were also 
significantly more likely to make a false ID than participants who had been exposed to the 
pen. Yet, the threat of an injection did not significantly worsen participants’ mood and did 
not lead to a significant increase in false IDs. That is, threatened participants performed 
just as well as those who were not threatened. These results suggest that the weapon focus 
effect is at least, in part, an attentional phenomenon. The presence of the syringe (i.e. the 
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weapon) seemed to grab attention, resulting in worse memory for the target. However, the 
expected interaction between attention and emotional arousal was not found. It could be 
that the presence of the weapon was so threatening that the additional threat manipulation 
was largely ineffective (i.e. a ceiling effect). It could also be that threatening participants 
with an injection was not threatening enough to increase participants’ emotional arousal 
(i.e. a floor effect). Though, perhaps the most likely explanation is that the interaction 
between emotional arousal and attentional focus is not driving the weapon focus effect. 
Similar weapon focus studies in the laboratory have attempted to elicit greater emotional 
arousal by threatening participants (e.g. Cutler et al., 1987a; Kramer, Buckhout, & Eugino, 
1990; Hulse & Memon, 2006). These studies have also failed to find a significant 
difference in identification accuracy between participants who were threatened and those 
who were not threatened. This means that something other than emotional arousal may be 
causing the effect.  
Unusual Item Hypothesis 
On April 24, 1997, a man walked into a doughnut shop in downtown Toronto and 
threatened to kill a hostage unless he was given some money. The robber had his arm 
wrapped around the hostage’s neck so tightly that the hostage would soon choke to death. 
Eyewitnesses to the robbery eventually gave in to the robber’s demands and, after 
receiving a small sum of money, the hostage was released (Mitchell, Livosky, & Mather, 
1998). This robbery is notable because the hostage was not a customer or a staff member, 
but rather a goose from a nearby pond. The situation was so baffling and unexpected to 
eyewitnesses that they spent most of their time inspecting the goose rather than focusing 
on the perpetrator’s face.  
The story of the “goose robber” illustrates how the presence of an unusual or 
unexpected object can direct attention towards the object and away from the peripheral 
details of a scene which, in this case, resulted in poorer memory for the perpetrator. Loftus 
and Mackworth (1978) demonstrated this by showing participants a series of images that 
contained congruent or incongruent objects. For example, one scene depicted a farmhouse 
complete with a barn and picket fence, but in the centre of the scene was either a tractor 
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(congruent object) or an octopus (incongruent object). They found that participants fixated 
earlier, more often, and for a longer duration on the incongruent objects than the congruent 
objects. Loftus and Mackworth developed a three stage model of early visual scene 
processing to explain these findings. According to this model, the general qualities of the 
scene are analysed first in order to generate the appropriate schema. Once a schema has 
been activated, the degree to which each object is congruent with the schema is assessed. 
Any incongruity between the activated schema and objects contained within the scene is 
resolved by either updating the schema or reinterpreting the object. In order to update the 
schema or reinterpret the object, attention is directed towards that object and away from 
the peripheral objects of the scene. Thus, attention is directed towards objects that are 
incongruent with the schema and away from the peripheral objects of the scene, which 
could impact memory for those peripheral objects.  
Loftus et al. (1987) applied this concept to the weapon focus effect. As previously 
discussed, they presented a series of images depicting a person standing in front of a 
cashier inside a restaurant. The person either presented a check to the cashier, as is 
typically done to pay for a meal, or presented a gun. People do not typically see weapons 
such as guns inside restaurants and so, the gun was an object that was incongruent with 
the restaurant schema. Because the gun was unexpected and the check was not, 
participants spent more time looking at the gun than the check and were also less able to 
correctly identify the perpetrator. 
Can Other Unusual Items Cause Weapon Focus?  
If participants focused on the weapon largely because it was unusual or unexpected, 
then perhaps other unexpected objects can cause a weapon focus effect. Pickel (1998) had 
participants watch a video of a mock crime where the perpetrator either presented an 
unusual or a common object. In Experiment 1, a man inside an office walked up to a 
counter and extended his hand towards a receptionist. In the unusual object condition, the 
man either held a raw, whole chicken or a gun. These objects were chosen because they 
were objects not typically seen in the workplace. In the common object condition, the man 
either held a wallet or a pair of scissors. These objects were chosen because they were 
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objects one might typically see in the workplace. After the video, participants filled out 
various questionnaires regarding the perpetrator and other details in the video. Participants 
then attempted to identify the perpetrator from a perpetrator-present lineup. Participants 
who were exposed to the unusual objects (i.e. the raw chicken and gun) were less able to 
recall details about the perpetrator than participants who were exposed to the common 
objects (i.e. the wallet and scissors), but there was no significant difference in the correct 
ID rate between participants in the unusual object condition and participants in the 
common object condition. The same procedure was used in Experiment 2, but the 
perpetrator in these videos held a different set of objects. The video showed a man walking 
towards a receptionist in an electronic store. In the unusual object condition, the 
perpetrator held a Pillsbury doughboy figurine or a butcher knife. In the common object 
condition, the perpetrator held a screwdriver or a pair of sunglasses. Again, participants 
that watched the videos of the man holding the unusual objects were less able to recall 
crime-related details, but there was no significant difference in the correct ID rate between 
the two groups. In a follow-up study, Pickel (1999) again found no significant difference 
in the correct ID rate between participants assigned to the unusual object condition and 
the common object condition. 
More recently, Erickson, Lampinen, and Leding (2014) presented participants a 
series of images depicting a man in a bar carrying either a gun, a rubber chicken, or an 
empty glass. Participants then attempted to identify the perpetrator from a perpetrator-
present or perpetrator-absent lineup. Those assigned to the weapon present condition (i.e. 
the gun) or the unusual item condition (i.e. the rubber chicken) correctly identified the 
perpetrator as often as those who were assigned to the normal item condition (i.e. who 
saw the empty glass). This replicates the previous findings from Pickel (1998; 1999). 
However, these participants were more likely to falsely identify an innocent suspect 
compared to participants who were assigned to the normal item condition. In order to 
determine whether this difference in the false ID rate impacted discriminability, d′ was 
computed for each condition and statistically compared using the G statistic (see Chapter 
2 for review). Those in the weapon present condition (d′ = .37) were significantly worse 
at discriminating innocent from guilty suspects than those in the normal item condition (d′ 
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= .89), G = 2.92, p < .01. Yet, what is of interest is that the rubber chicken also reduced 
discriminability for the perpetrator (d′ = .44), G = 2.55, p = .01, consistent with the unusual 
item hypothesis. However, it is important to note that when this analysis was limited to 
participants who saw the rubber chicken and the perpetrator in the same image (i.e. the 
“during” condition), there was no significant difference in discriminability for those in the 
unusual item condition (d′ = .23) compared to those in the normal item condition (d′ = .67), 
G = 1.44, p = .07.  
Weapon Focus for Actual Crimes 
According to Cutshall and Yuille (1989) the events typically seen in the laboratory 
are not comparable to the events typically seen in actual crimes. They argue that 
participants in laboratories are essentially uninvolved bystanders who are rarely 
threatened and rarely feel a personal threat to the extent that an actual eyewitness to a 
crime is likely to feel. Some have argued, in fact, that the majority of the extant weapon 
focus findings suffer from weak ecological validity (e.g. Cooper, Kennedy, Herve, and 
Yuille, 2002). This has encouraged researchers to find evidence of a weapon focus effect 
outside the confines of a laboratory and within the field (e.g. Cooper et al., 2002). Because 
it is not known whether the suspect of a crime is factually innocent or guilty, it is difficult 
to observe whether the presence of a weapon during a crime affects either the correct or 
false ID rate. However, a weapon focus effect might result in a reduction in the suspect ID 
rate. If memory is worse for the perpetrator because the perpetrator was carrying a 
weapon, then an eyewitness who was previously exposed or threatened with a weapon 
might be less likely to identify the suspect and more likely to identify a filler. This pattern 
could provide some support for the weapon focus effect. 
Pike, Brace, and Kynan (2002) analyzed 2,628 live lineups from nine police forces 
throughout England and Wales. They found that neither the presence of a weapon nor the 
threat of violence impacted the rate of suspect IDs. Valentine, Pickering, and Darling 
(2003) analyzed 640 identification decisions from 314 video lineups constructed by the 
Metropolitan Police in London. Eyewitnesses exposed or threatened with a weapon 
identified the suspect as often as those eyewitnesses who were not exposed or threatened 
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with a weapon. Together, the findings in the laboratory and the findings in the field suggest 
that the presence of a weapon has, at most, a marginal impact on identification accuracy. 
Expert Opinion 
Although the effect has not often been found in the laboratory (e.g., Cutler & 
Penrod, 1988; Cutler et al., 1986; Kramer et al., 1990; Pickel, 1998; 1999; Hulse & 
Memon, 2006; Carlson et al., 2016) and has not been found for actual crimes (Tollestrup, 
Turtle, & Yuille, 1994; Behrman & Davey, 2001; Pike et al., 2002; Valentine et al., 2003; 
Wagstaff, MacVeigh, Scott, Brunas-Wagstaff, & Cole, 2003; Mecklenburg, 2006; for 
review, see Fawcett, Russell, Peace, & Christie, 2011), 87% of eyewitness experts agreed 
with the statement that “The presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitness’s ability to 
accurately identify the perpetrator’s face” and 77% would be willing to testify to that 
effect in court (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001). Is weapon focus as strong and 
reliable as many eyewitness experts believe it to be? 
An early meta-analysis by Steblay (1992) found that the presence of a weapon 
during a crime significantly reduced the correct ID rate, but the size of the effect was small. 
Nearly two decades later, a second meta-analysis found that the presence of a weapon 
during a crime caused a small, but significant, reduction in identification accuracy 
(Fawcett et al., 2011). Identification accuracy, in this sense, did not distinguish between 
changes in correct and false IDs, but combined correct IDs, correct rejections, false IDs 
and misses into an overall accuracy score. Although the meta-analyses have found a small 
effect, it is not clear whether the presence of a weapon during a crime impacts memory 
for the perpetrator. This is because many studies investigating weapon focus only 
measured changes in the correct ID rate (e.g. Loftus et al., 1987; Kramer et al., 1990; Shaw 
& Skolnick, 1994; Pickel, 1998; 1999) or only measured changes in the false ID rate (e.g. 
Maas & Kohnken, 1989; Hulse & Memon, 2006). A change in the correct ID rate (or the 
false ID rate) due to the presence of a weapon may reflect either a change in 
discriminability or a change in response bias (Wixted & Mickes, 2012). In order to 
determine whether weapon focus reflects a reduction in discriminability or a conservative 
shift in response bias, the correct and false ID rates must be measured. With correct and 
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false ID rates, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis can then be conducted, 
which can determine if weapon focus impacts discriminability or response bias (Wixted 
& Mickes, 2012).  
Gaps in Research 
Ten studies (Cutler & Penrod, 1988; Cutler et al., 1987a, b; Cutler et al., 1986; 
O’Rourke et al., 1989; Carlson & Carlson, 2012; 2014; Erickson et al., 2014; Carlson et 
al., 2017; Carlson, Dias, Weatherford, & Carlson, 2016) have investigated weapon focus 
in perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineups. However, of these ten studies, five 
did not report correct and false ID rates for weapon present and weapon absent conditions 
(Cutler & Penrod, 1988; Cutler et al., 1987a, b; Cutler et al., 1986; O’Rourke et al., 1989). 
Two studies (Carlson & Carlson, 2012; Erickson et al., 2014) reported correct and false 
ID rates for weapon present and weapon absent conditions, but did not conduct ROC 
analysis. Still, a clear reduction in discriminability was evident in both of these studies as 
the overall correct ID rate was significantly lower in the weapon present condition than 
the weapon absent condition, while the overall false ID rate was significantly higher in 
the weapon present condition than the weapon absent condition. There are only three 
weapon focus studies that have measured discriminability using ROC analysis (Carlson 
& Carlson, 2014; Carlson et al., 2016; Carlson et al., 2017). The presence of a weapon 
impacted discriminability (i.e. producing a lower ROC) in two of these studies (Carlson 
& Carlson, 2014; Carlson et al., 2016). The effect was not found in Carlson et al. (2017) 
and, as we shall see, Carlson and Carlson’s (2012; 2014) findings are confounded.  
Perceptual Analysis 
I conducted a fine-grained perceptual analysis of the weapon present and weapon 
absent videos used in Carlson and Carlson (2012; 2014). I analysed frames that contained 
the perpetrator’s face. There were 44 frames in the weapon absent video and 69 frames in 
the weapon present video that contained the perpetrator’s face. Photo editing software (i.e. 
Adobe Photoshop CS) calculated the number of pixels the face occupied in each frame 
and the level of brightness for each face.  
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Size of the Face 
Because the size of the face, as measured in pixels, was dependent on the size of 
the image, a percentage was calculated by taking the size of the face and dividing that by 
the size of the image. For example, if the face in a particular frame consisted of 10,000 
pixels and the image was 640 x 360 pixels or, in other words, 230,400 pixels in total, then 
the face occupied 4.3% of the frame (i.e. 10,000/230,400 = 4.3%). The perpetrator’s face 
in the weapon present video occupied, on average, 3.8% (SD = 1.8%) of each frame, 
whereas the perpetrator’s face in the weapon absent video occupied, on average, 22.6% 
(SD = 7.8%) of each frame. That difference is highly significant, t(111) = 19.65, p < 001. 
The size of the face in the weapon present video was smaller because the perpetrator was 
filmed at a greater distance from the camera.  
Brightness of the Face 
The brightness of the perpetrator’s face was measured for each frame and was 
averaged across frames to determine the overall brightness of the perpetrator’s face in the 
weapon present and weapon absent videos. Brightness ranged from 0 (completely black) 
to 255 (completely white). Each pixel has a colour that falls somewhere between 0 and 
255. Therefore, if the face was recorded in dim lighting, then the pixels that comprise the 
face will, on average, have a lower value (i.e. a value closer to 0) than if the face was 
recorded in bright lighting. The perpetrator’s face in the weapon present video was darker 
(M = 119.6, SD = 32.9) than the perpetrator’s face in the weapon absent video (M = 153.9, 
SD = 32.4) and that difference is highly significant, t(111) = 5.46, p < .001. The 
perpetrator’s face in the weapon present video was darker because the perpetrator was 
standing further away from the hallway light.  
Considering these differences, it is not surprising to observe greater 
discriminability in the weapon absent condition than the weapon present condition. It is 
reasonable to expect eyewitnesses to have better memory for the perpetrator when the 
perpetrator’s face is closer to the camera and is shown in bright instead of dim light.  
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This perceptual analysis of the weapon present and weapon absent videos 
confounds Carlson and Carlson’s (2012; 2014) findings. If these findings are ignored, then 
there are only two studies that have shown reduced discriminability for the perpetrator 
when the perpetrator previously held a weapon (Erickson et al., 2014; Carlson et al., 2016), 
which is hardly strong evidence of a weapon focus effect. In fact, there is a recent study 
from the same laboratory that found no difference in discriminability between weapon 
present and weapon absent conditions (Carlson et al., 2017). So, the question remains, 
does weapon focus impact discriminability or response bias?  
Is Weapon Focus Meaningful to Judges and Jurors? 
If weapon focus is reliably found to reduce discriminability, is this effect 
meaningful to judges and jurors? Intuitively, it may seem that informing judges and jurors 
of effects that reduce discriminability would improve jury decision making, but this is not 
necessarily the case. Judges and jurors should not be concerned with whether an effect 
reduces discriminability and, instead, should be concerned with the reliability of suspect 
IDs admitted as evidence in court. Because ROC analysis does not measure the reliability 
of a suspect ID, a more appropriate analysis for judges and jurors is confidence-accuracy 
characteristic (CAC) analysis (Mickes, 2015). CAC analysis plots suspect ID accuracy 
across varying levels of confidence (from low-confident identifications to high-confident 
identifications). In many cases, people can appreciate conditions that affect their memory 
and adjust their confidence accordingly (e.g., if they only saw the perpetrator for a short 
duration, they tend to be less likely to give high confidence identifications, but those high 
confidence identifications tend to be highly accurate). An eyewitness may or may not 
appreciate the fact that the presence of a weapon can impact memory accuracy. If 
eyewitnesses can appreciate that their memory is less accurate because of the presence of 
the weapon, then they should be able to use their confidence judgments more appropriately. 
This information can potentially be very useful to judges and jurors attempting to 
determine the veracity of a suspect ID. 




Although weapon focus has been studied extensively for several decades (e.g. 
Loftus et al., 1987), it is still unclear how weapon focus impacts lineup identification 
performance in terms of discriminability and reliability. The current experiment sought to 
determine whether weapon focus reflects a reduction in discriminability or a shift in 




Participants (N = 644) from the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) 
completed the experiment in exchange for course credit. Participants who failed to answer 
the validation question correctly (stating the crime committed; n = 75) were excluded 
from all analyses. The remaining (n = 569; 132 male, 432 female, 5 unspecified; age in 
years: M = 20.4, SD = 2.5) participants watched a weapon present video and a weapon 
absent video and, thus, made two separate identification decisions from two separate 
lineups. Note that a within-participants design was chosen because it would help reduce 
any between-participants’ error that may hide a weapon focus effect. For each lineup, 
participants were randomly assigned to be tested on either a perpetrator-present lineup (n 
= 562) or a perpetrator-absent lineup (n = 576). This means that, in total, we collected 
1,138 identification decisions. The UCSD Institutional Review Board approved this study. 
Materials  
The study stimuli were third-person point of view video recordings of eight 
criminal scenarios (i.e. eight videos of different crimes each recorded from a third person 
perspective) that involved a unique perpetrator and witness for each video. The criminal 
situations included: two house burglaries, two carjackings, two muggings, and two public 
confrontations. The perpetrators were white men in their early twenties. The perpetrators’ 
faces were shown for 6 – 9 seconds. Two versions for each criminal situation were 
recorded that included or did not include a weapon. Filmmakers did their best to record 
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the same scene with and without a weapon. In the weapon-absent conditions, the 
perpetrators clenched their fist, whereas, in the weapon-present conditions, the 
perpetrators either held a gun (a black, handheld pistol) or a knife. Filler selections later 
used in the lineups were based on the general similarities of the perpetrators’ appearance, 
age, ethnicity, height, and weight. Fillers were collected from the Florida Correctional 
database (http://www.dc.state.fl.us/) from the supervised population information list. 
Procedure  
Following consent, participants were randomly assigned to a weapon present or 
weapon absent condition and watched a recording of one of the eight criminal scenarios. 
Participants then engaged in a 5-minute distractor task (a game of Tetris) before attempting 
to identify the perpetrator from a lineup. Participants were randomly assigned to a 
perpetrator-present or perpetrator-absent lineup that presented six photos simultaneously 
arranged in a 2 X 3 matrix. The position of the perpetrator in the perpetrator-present 
lineups was randomly determined for each participant and participants were instructed 
that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the lineup. No fillers were designated as 
the innocent suspect. Confidence in the identification decision was collected using an 11-
point scale ranging from 0 (just guessing) to 100 (absolutely certain). Following their 
identification decision, participants answered several questions about the crime, including 
a validation question (what crime was committed?), and were asked to supply 
demographic information.  
Participants then watched another crime video that either included or did not 
include a weapon (i.e. every participant viewed two different crime videos, one of which 
included a weapon). Following the crime video, participants took part in the same 
distractor task for 5 minutes and attempted to identify the perpetrator from a simultaneous 
lineup. After making an identification decision, participants answered general questions 
about the crime video (which included a validation question) and were then fully debriefed.  




Descriptive Analysis  
Those who did not answer the validation questions correctly were excluded from 
all analyses (n = 75 participants). In Table 1, the type of weapon used is displayed as well 
as the d' values for the weapon-present and weapon-absent conditions in each video. A 
perceptual analysis was then conducted. 
Table 1 
The weapon, d' values, and the difference between those values displayed for each video.  
Video Weapon W Present W Absent Difference WF Trend 
Video 1 Knife 1.42 1.89 -.47 Yes 
Video 2 Gun .92 1.00 -.08 Yes 
Video 3 Gun 2.22 2.03 .19 No 
Video 4 Knife .26 .63 -.37 Yes 
Video 5 Knife 1.03 1.63 -.60 Yes 
Video 6 Knife 2.31 2.12 .19 No 
Video 7 Gun 2.04 1.84 .15 No 
Video 8 Knife 1.98 2.38 -.40 Yes 
 Note:  W Present, weapon present; W Absent, weapon absent. The weapon focus trend 
was measured by subtracting the d' for the weapon present condition by d' for the weapon 
absent condition. These differences were not significant. 
Perceptual Analysis 
A perceptual analysis was conducted of the eight weapon present videos and the 
eight weapon absent videos used in this experiment. This analysis sought to determine 
whether the size and the brightness of a perpetrator’s face was significantly different 
between the weapon present and weapon absent videos. Adobe Photoshop CS was used to 
conduct this analysis. Every frame from the eight crime videos that contained a face of a 
perpetrator was used in this analysis. In total, there were 1,516 frames that contained the 
perpetrator’s face across the weapon present videos and 1,268 frames that contained the 
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perpetrator’s face across the weapon absent videos. Note that a perceptual analysis of each 
crime video is presented in the Appendix. This includes a perceptual analysis of the size 
of the perpetrator’s face for each video and a perceptual analysis of the brightness of the 
perpetrator’s face for each video. 
The size of the perpetrator’s face was measured in pixels and that number was 
divided by the total number of pixels in the frame. The perpetrator’s face occupied, on 
average, 21.6% (SD = .17%) of the frame across the eight weapon present videos, whereas 
the perpetrator’s face occupied, on average, 22% (SD = .15%) of the frame across the 
eight weapon absent videos. That difference was not statistically significant, t(2782) = 
-.621, p = .535, which means that the size of the perpetrator’s face across the eight crime 
videos was virtually the same between the weapon present condition and the weapon 
absent condition.  
The brightness of the perpetrator’s face was measured for each frame from the 
eight weapon present videos and the eight weapon absent videos. The perpetrator’s face 
across the eight weapon present videos was slightly brighter (M = 112.1, SD = 42.0) than 
the perpetrator’s face across the eight weapon absent videos (M = 110.2, SD = 40.4), but 
that difference was not significant, t(2782) = .818, p = .413. Thus, the perpetrator’s face 
across the weapon present videos was just as bright as the perpetrator’s face across the 
weapon absent videos.  
Because the perceptual analysis revealed no significant difference in the size and 
the brightness of the perpetrator’s face across the eight crime videos, the data from each 
video were collapsed into an overall weapon present and weapon absent condition. 
Response frequencies for false IDs, filler IDs, misses, correct rejections, and correct IDs 
for each level of confidence for weapon present and weapon absent conditions are 








Response frequencies for every decision outcome displayed for each level of confidence.  
 Weapon Present  Weapon Absent 
 Perp Present  Perp Absent  Perp Present  Perp Absent 
Confidence CID FID noID  FIDs noID  CID FID noID  FID noID 
0 0 3 3  5 5  0 5 2  1 6 
10 0 1 2  6 1  3 2 1  2 2 
20 2 5 3  8 1  5 1 1  5 2 
30 4 12 0  18 3  5 7 4  8 7 
40 8 5 6  14 8  10 5 4  10 14 
50 11 13 10  19 14  16 9 9  23 19 
60 17 9 7  21 19  19 8 10  20 19 
70 23 6 10  29 22  27 8 12  16 24 
80 24 5 7  17 20  33 3 11  20 24 
90 29 2 5  13 23  21 2 10  14 18 
100 30 2 5  5 18  26 2 7  3 10 
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification; CIDs, correct IDs; FIDs, filler IDs. 
ROC Analysis 
The suspect ID rates for perpetrator-present lineups (i.e. correct ID rates), suspect 
ID rates for perpetrator-absent lineups (i.e. false ID rates), and the filler ID rates for both 
perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineups for each level of confidence are shown 
in Table 3. The italicized values were used to construct the ROC curves shown in Figure 
1. Because there was no designated innocent suspect, the false ID rate was estimated by 









Suspect IDs, filler IDs and no IDs for perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineup 
rates by level of confidence per condition.  
  Weapon Present  Weapon Absent 
 Confidence SID FID noID  SID FID noID 
Perp Present 0 .55 .23   .50 .18  
 10 .55 .22   .49 .16  
 20 .55 .22   .47 .16  
 30 .54 .20   .45 .15  
 40 .53 .16   .40 .13  
 50 .50 .14 .22  .33 .11 .29 
 60 .46 .09   .25 .08  
 70 .39 .06   .16 .05  
 80 .31 .03   .09 .02  
 90 .22 .02   .04 .01  
 100 .11 .01   .01 .01  
Perp Absent 0 .08 .50   .08 .46  
 10 .08 .49   .08 .45  
 20 .08 .47   .07 .45  
 30 .07 .44   .07 .43  
 40 .06 .38   .07 .40  
 50 .06 .34 .53  .06 .36 .48 
 60 .05 .28   .05 .27  
 70 .04 .21   .03 .20  
 80 .02 .11   .02 .14  
 90 .01 .06   .01 .06  
 100 .00 .02   .00 .01  
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification; SIDs, suspect IDs; FIDs, filler IDs. 
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Figure 1 shows the ROC curves for the weapon present and weapon absent 
conditions. In order to calculate the pAUCs, the most conservative false alarm rate from 
the weapon absent condition (.08) was used because both ROC curves extend to this cutoff 
(Robin et al., 2011). Selecting the most liberal false alarm rate obtained from the weapon-
present condition would require a portion of the ROC for the weapon absent condition to 
be extrapolated to that cutoff. The pAUC for the weapon present condition (.038) was not 
significantly different than the pAUC for the weapon absent condition (0.029), D = 0.55, 
p = .60. Though there was no significant difference between the two curves, the weapon 
present curve does look higher at higher levels of confidence (i.e., more conservative 
responding). Because of this, we compared the pAUCs of both conditions using a smaller 
false ID cutoff (.035). Using this cutoff, the pAUC for the weapon present condition (.008) 
was not significantly different than the pAUC for the weapon absent condition (.007), D 
= 0.05, p = .97.  
 
Figure 1. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the Weapon Present 
and Weapon Absent conditions. The lines through the ROC curves were estimated using 
a hyperbolic function. The dashed line represents chance performance.  
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CAC Analysis  
The relationship between confidence and accuracy was examined using CAC 
analysis (Mickes, 2015). The CAC plots are shown in Figure 2. Confidence was binned 
into low (0-60), medium (70-80), and high (90-100) confidence because there were too 
few identifications at some levels. Participants who expressed medium or high confidence 
in selecting the suspect from the weapon present and weapon absent condition seem to 
calibrate memory accuracy of the perpetrator with confidence in their suspect 
identification decision equally well. Whereas, those participants in the weapon present 
condition who expressed low confidence may have been less accurate than those in the 
weapon absent condition. The data appear too noisy at low levels of confidence to make 
any firm conclusions. 
 
Figure 2. Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) curves for the Weapon 
Present and Weapon Absent conditions. The bars represent standard error bars. 
Discussion 
The presence of a weapon has been found to adversely impact an eyewitness’s 
ability to correctly identify the perpetrator from a lineup (e.g. Loftus et al., 1987). 
Although this effect is often not found (e.g., Cutler & Penrod, 1988; Cutler et al., 1986), 
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two meta-analyses have found a small, significant effect (Steblay, 1992; Fawcett et al., 
2011). Yet, many of the studies that have found an effect, have only reported differences 
in the correct ID rate between weapon present and weapon absent conditions. A difference 
in correct ID rates may reflect a reduction in discriminability or a conservative shift in 
responding (Wixted & Mickes, 2012). Despite this ambiguity in how a weapon might 
impact identification performance, eyewitness experts largely agree that the weapon focus 
effect is a reliable effect and many are willing to testify in court that a weapon causes an 
eyewitness to be less able to accurately identify the perpetrator from a lineup (Kassin et 
al., 2001). 
In Experiment 6, we investigated the weapon focus effect in perpetrator-present 
and perpetrator-absent lineups in order to measure correct and false ID rates. With correct 
and false ID rates, ROC analysis can then be conducted and differences in discriminability 
and response bias are evident in ROC curves. Our results indicate that the presence of a 
weapon during a crime does not impact an eyewitness’s ability to discriminate innocent 
from guilty suspects, which does not replicate the only other published weapon focus 
study in which ROC analysis was conducted (Carlson and Carlson, 2014). Although no 
significant difference was found, the ROC for the weapon present condition appeared to 
be slightly higher than the ROC for the weapon absent condition across high levels of 
confidence. A separate pAUC analysis was conducted, but revealed no significant 
differences in discriminability across high levels of confidence. Critically, it may have 
been the case that a weapon focus effect occurred for some stimuli, but the process of 
combining the data into an overall ROC curve hid an effect. Although none of the d' values 
in the weapon present condition differed significantly from the d' values in the weapon 
absent condition (see Table 1), a few videos show a lower d' in the weapon present 
condition and a higher d' in the weapon absent condition. Because there is not enough data 
to conduct pAUC analysis for each video, more data is needed to see if these trending 
effects are actually significant.  
The CAC analysis shows that the presence of a weapon does not impact an 
eyewitness’s ability to confidently and accurately identify the perpetrator from a lineup. 
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Despite the willingness of many eyewitness experts to testify in court on the deleterious 
effects of weapon focus (Kassin et al., 2001), these data suggest, based on CAC analysis, 
that the presence of a weapon does not impact the reliability of a suspect ID. 
Experiment 7 
Although an overall weapon focus effect (in terms of discriminability) was not 
found in Experiment 1, it could be the case that the process of combining the data across 
the varied set of stimuli masked a true weapon focus effect. Two videos that showed a 
trend towards a weapon focus effect (video 2 and video 5; see Table 5) were selected as 
the stimuli in this experiment. Will the weapon focus trend continue to hold once more 
participants are recruited? 
Methods 
Participants  
Participants (N = 630) from the University of California, San Diego completed the 
experiment in exchange for course credit. Participants that failed to answer the validation 
question correctly (stating the crime committed; n = 46) were excluded from all analyses. 
The remaining (n = 584; 157 male, 420 female, 7 unspecified; age in years: M = 20.3, SD 
= 2.5) participants watched a weapon present video and a weapon absent video and, thus, 
made two separate identification decisions from two separate lineups. However, for each 
lineup, participants were randomly assigned to be tested on either a perpetrator-present 
lineup (n = 578) or a perpetrator-absent lineup (n = 590). This means that, in total, we 
collected 1,168 identification decisions. The UCSD Institutional Review Board approved 
this study. 
Materials  
The study stimuli were third-person point of view video recordings of two criminal 
scenarios (i.e. a mugging and a public confrontation) that were originally presented in 
Experiment 1 and found to show a trend toward a weapon focus effect. 




The procedure was the same as in Experiment 6. 
Results 
Descriptive Analysis  
Those who did not answer every validation question correctly were excluded from 
all analyses (n = 46 participants). Response frequencies for false IDs, filler IDs, misses, 
correct rejections, and correct IDs for each level of confidence for weapon present and 
weapon absent conditions are displayed in Table 4. In Table 5, d' values are displayed for 
weapon present conditions and weapon absent conditions for both videos. 
Table 4 
Response frequencies for every identification decision outcome are displayed for each 
level of confidence.  
 Weapon Present  Weapon Absent 
 Perp Present  Perp Absent  Perp Present  Perp Absent 
Confidence CID FID noID  FID noID  CID FID noID  FID noID 
0 0 5 4  6 4  1 3 2  3 3 
10 4 4 0  7 4  2 5 1  7 0 
20 4 5 2  5 6  2 1 3  7 2 
30 7 16 6  14 7  4 8 1  24 12 
40 6 12 5  25 16  11 10 2  14 4 
50 17 11 8  32 22  12 11 11  20 15 
60 11 12 8  24 11  18 15 9  26 19 
70 25 17 7  16 21  18 15 15  23 34 
80 18 5 10  7 16  17 4 10  6 16 
90 17 4 4  4 23  20 7 9  8 18 
100 24 3 8  5 20  27 1 6  5 23 
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification; CIDs, correct IDs; FIDs, filler IDs. 
 




The weapon, d' values in the weapon present and weapon absent condition, and the 
difference between those values are displayed for both videos.  
Video Weapon W Present W Absent Difference WF Trend 
Video 2 Gun 1.01 .95 .06 No 
Video 5 Knife 1.60 1.60 .00 No 
 Note:  The weapon focus trend was measured by subtracting the d' value for the weapon 
present condition by the d' value for the weapon absent condition. 
ROC Analysis  
The suspect ID rates for perpetrator-present lineups (i.e. correct ID rates), suspect 
ID rates for perpetrator-absent lineups (i.e. false ID rates), and the filler ID rates for both 
perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineups for each level of confidence are shown 
in Table 6. The italicized values were used to construct the ROC curves shown in Figure 
3. Because there was no designated innocent suspect, the false ID rate was estimated by 















Suspect IDs, filler IDs and no IDs for perpetrator-present and perpetrator-absent lineup 
rates by level of confidence per condition.  
  Weapon Present  Weapon Absent 
 Confidence SID FID noID  SID FID noID 
Perp Present 0 .46 .33   .47 .28  
 10 .46 .31   .47 .27  
 20 .44 .29   .46 .26  
 30 .43 .28   .45 .25  
 40 .41 .22   .44 .22  
 50 .39 .18 .21  .40 .19 .25 
 60 .33 .14   .36 .15  
 70 .29 .10   .29 .10  
 80 .20 .04   .23 .04  
 90 .14 .02   .17 .03  
 100 .08 .01   .10 .00  
Perp Absent 0 .08 .50   .08 .50  
 10 .08 .47   .08 .49  
 20 .08 .45   .08 .46  
 30 .07 .43   .07 .44  
 40 .06 .38   .06 .35  
 50 .05 .30 .52  .05 .30 .52 
 60 .03 .19   .04 .24  
 70 .02 .11   .02 .15  
 80 .01 .05   .01 .07  
 90 .01 .03   .01 .05  
 100 .00 .02   .00 .02  
Note:  Perp, perpetrator; ID, identification; SIDs, suspect IDs; FIDs, filler IDs. 
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Discriminability was measured by conducting ROC analysis and comparing the 
pAUCs as was previously done in Experiment 1. Figure 3 shows the ROC curves for the 
weapon present and weapon absent conditions collapsed across both videos. The pAUC 
for the weapon present condition (0.008) was not significantly different than the pAUC 
for the weapon-absent condition (0.008), D = 0.009, p = .99. This replicates the findings 
from the previous experiment: no weapon focus effect was found. 
 
Figure 3. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the Weapon Present 
and Weapon Absent conditions. The lines through the ROC curves were estimated using 
a hyperbolic function. The dashed line represents chance performance. 
CAC Analysis  
The CAC plots are shown in Figure 4. Confidence was binned into low (0-60%), 
medium (70-80%), and high (90-100) confidence. For each level of confidence, suspect 
ID accuracy (A) = # correct suspect IDs / (# correct suspect IDs + # innocent suspect IDs). 
Participants who expressed low, medium, or high confidence in selecting the suspect from 
the weapon present and weapon absent condition calibrated their memory accuracy of the 
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perpetrator with confidence in their suspect identification decision equally well. This 
replicates the CAC results from Experiment 6. 
 
 
Figure 4. Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) curves for the Weapon 
Present and Weapon Absent conditions. The bars represent standard error bars. 
General Discussion 
Because a large variety of videos were used as stimuli in Experiment 6 and data 
from each video were subsequently collapsed into an overall ROC and CAC, it is possible 
that a weapon focus effect occurred for some of the videos but such an effect was hidden 
due to collapsing the data across the wide variety of videos. In Experiment 7, two videos 
were selected from Experiment 1 that showed non-significant differences in d' that trended 
towards a weapon focus effect (i.e. video 2 and video 5; see Table 1). After more data was 
collected, the differences in d' were reduced and ROC analysis revealed no significant 
difference in discriminability between weapon present and weapon absent conditions for 
each video.  
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The results from Experiment 7 replicate the results from Experiment 6; no weapon 
focus effect was found. Although two meta-analyses (Steblay, 1992; Fawcett et al., 2011) 
of the weapon focus literature have been conducted, it is still not clear whether the 
presence of a weapon impacts discriminability. Carlson et al.’s (2017) findings and the 
findings from these two experiments suggest that a weapon (whether a gun or a knife) has 
no effect on discriminability, but a previous experiment conducted by Carlson and 
colleagues (Carlson et al., 2016) has shown a weapon focus effect (i.e. reduced 
discriminability in the weapon present condition). This issue might be resolved by 
conducting a registered replication report that attempts to replicate Loftus et al.’s (1987) 
original findings (similar to how the first registered replication report attempted to 
replicate the verbal overshadowing effect from Schooler and Engstler-Schooler, 1990). 
However, a perpetrator-absent lineup should be included in order to measure correct and 
false ID rates, and ROC analysis should be conducted. This way, the registered replication 
report could determine, across many independent laboratories, whether the presence of a 
weapon causes a reduction in discriminability. 
Regardless of whether the presence of a weapon was found to reduce 
discriminability, triers of fact ought to be interested in whether the presence of a weapon 
impacts the reliability of a suspect ID. At the moment, eyewitness experts are largely 
willing to testify that the presence of a weapon impairs the ability of the eyewitness to 
accurately identify the perpetrator from a lineup (Kassin et al., 2001). However, CAC 
analysis conducted in Experiments 6 and 7 indicate that eyewitnesses who were exposed 
to a weapon were just as able to confidently and accurately identify the perpetrator as 
those who were not exposed to a weapon. This means that eyewitnesses who make a 
highly confident suspect ID after being exposed to a weapon are reliable and that is 
important for judges and jurors to know.   




Confidence is the Best Available Marker of Suspect ID Accuracy 
In criminal trials it is often the case that eyewitness identification evidence is the 
strongest or only evidence available to prosecutors (Goldstein et al., 1989). Triers of fact 
(i.e. judges and jurors) tend to place a great deal of faith in this evidence in determining 
the guilt or innocence of a suspect (Loftus, 1975, 1979; Ellison & Buckhout, 1981; 
Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981). This can be problematic because eyewitnesses have 
been known to make mistakes despite honest attempts to correctly identify the perpetrator. 
For example, the Innocence Project, whose mission it is to lobby on behalf of wrongfully 
convicted individuals, has helped release 334 innocent suspects through the use of DNA 
testing and have found false identifications (false IDs) to be the leading cause of these 
wrongful convictions (Innocence Project, 2017). With this problem in mind, eyewitness 
identification researchers have explored several possible markers of eyewitness 
identification accuracy that may be able to reliably differentiate between a correct ID and 
a false ID (e.g. Sporer, 1993; Smith, Lindsay, & Pyrke, 2000).  
Confidence in the Identification Decision 
The confidence an eyewitness expresses in an identification decision happens to 
be the most extensively researched as well as the most controversial marker of eyewitness 
identification accuracy (Wells & Murray, 1983; Lindsay, 1986; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & 
Cutler, 1995; Mickes, 2015). Much of the early research has shown that confidence can 
easily become inflated irrespective of identification accuracy. For instance, an eyewitness 
may increase their confidence in their identification decision after hearing that other 
eyewitnesses have identified the same suspect (Luus & Wells, 1994) or by being exposed 
to the same suspect again (Brown, Deffenbacher & Sturgill, 1977). An early review of the 
literature found a weak relationship between confidence and accuracy and determined that 
confidence is “functionally useless in forensically representative settings” (p. 165, Wells 
& Murray, 1984).  
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A more recent meta-analysis found the confidence-accuracy (CA) relationship to 
be noticeably stronger when the analysis was limited to eyewitnesses who chose a lineup 
member (i.e. excluding those that did not select a lineup member) and when confidence 
was measured at the time of the initial identification (Sporer et al., 1995). Limiting the 
analysis to “choosers” is reasonable because only choosers end up testifying in court. 
Measuring confidence at the time of the initial identification is reasonable as well because 
there is less of an opportunity for confidence to become inflated at that time (Wixted et 
al., 2015). Still, Sporer et al. (1995) emphasized that “… confidence is far from a perfect 
indicator of witness accuracy” (p. 324).  
The meta-analyses by Wells and Murray (1984) and Sporer et al. (1995) have 
interpreted the CA relationship as weak and modest, respectively, based on low values 
derived from the point-biserial correlation coefficient. Juslin et al. (1996) point out, though, 
that this value is flawed. A low point-biserial correlation does not necessarily mean a weak 
CA relationship. The point-biserial correlation coefficient is a useful effect-size statistic 
for measuring how well accuracy (correct vs. incorrect IDs) predicts eyewitness 
confidence, but triers of fact are interested in the opposite question of how well eyewitness 
confidence predicts accuracy. This means that the point-biserial correlation coefficient can 
fluctuate on a wide range of values even when confidence is perfectly calibrated with 
accuracy. Juslin et al. (1996) have analysed the CA relationship using calibration curves. 
Analysing the CA relationship in this way shows a strong relationship (e.g. Brewer & 
Wells, 2006; Brewer & Palmer, 2010).  
Yet, calibration analysis is limited in its use to triers of fact. This is because 
calibration analysis includes filler IDs in measurements of accuracy. Fillers are known 
innocent members presented alongside the police suspect in a lineup; they are not suspects. 
CAC analysis (Mickes, 2015), on the other hand, excludes filler IDs, showing the 
relationship between confidence and accuracy for identified suspects. It is this information 
that is most informative to triers of fact. When CAC analysis is conducted, highly 
confident eyewitnesses in the laboratory (e.g. Mickes, 2015) and in the field (Wixted et 
al., 2016) are shown to be highly accurate. Thus, although early reviews of the scientific 
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literature have found confidence to be a generally poor marker of identification accuracy 
(e.g. Wells & Murray, 1983), recent analyses convincingly show that confidence, when 
properly measured, is actually a strong predictor of identification accuracy (Mickes, 2015). 
Visual Behaviour 
The belief that confidence is uninformative of accuracy has spurred researchers to 
investigate other possible markers of eyewitness identification accuracy. So far, several 
markers have been identified as being somewhat capable of differentiating between 
correct and false IDs. These include the accuracy of the description of the perpetrator (e.g. 
Pigott & Brigham, 1985), the time it takes to identify a lineup member (e.g. Sporer, 1992; 
1993) and the visual behaviour used to examine the faces in the lineup (e.g. Flowe & 
Cotrell, 2011). Of these three markers, analysing visual behaviour while scanning a face 
seems particularly promising because eye movements are an essential component of 
studying and recognizing a face.  
Visual Behaviour during the Study Phase 
Henderson, Williams, and Falk (2005) demonstrated this by recording eye 
movements while participants studied a list of faces. Participants were instructed to either 
fixate at the centre of each face, thereby restricting their eye movements, or were allowed 
to freely view each face. During the recognition test, studied “old” faces (i.e. targets) and 
novel “new” faces (i.e. lures) were randomly presented one at a time for an old or new 
recognition decision. A correct response for a target is old; these responses are called “hits.” 
A correct response for a lure is new; these responses are called “correct rejections.” 
Incorrectly declaring a target as new is a “miss” and incorrectly declaring a lure as old is 
a “false alarm” (See Chapter 1 for review). Discriminability was significantly lower when 
eye movements were previously restricted. Henderson et al. suggested that by restricting 
eye movements, participants were less able to encode the crucial facial information 
contained outside of foveal vision (i.e. outside the sharp, but central vision of the eye) and 
had worse recognition memory as a result.  
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Visual Behaviour during the Recognition Phase 
Differences in visual behaviour are also seen for old and new faces during 
recognition tests. For instance, within the first five seconds of viewing a face, participants 
fixate more on a new face than on an old face, but the distance between these fixations is 
smaller (i.e. their eye movements are more constrained) and participants end up sampling 
more regions of a new face (i.e. regions closer to the eyes, nose, and mouth; Althoff & 
Cohen, 1999). Because of the stark differences in visual behaviour when participants study 
and attempt to recognize faces, it is possible that there are differences in visual behaviour 
when an eyewitness makes a correct or a false ID. Perhaps, suboptimal scanning of an 
innocent suspect during a lineup causes participants to falsely recognize that face. 
Analysing eyewitnesses’ visual behaviour may therefore help distinguish between a 
correct and false ID. 
Visual Behaviour in Eyewitness Studies 
Forensic studies have utilized eye tracking methods to shed light on the memorial 
processes used when witnessing a crime (e.g. Loftus et al., 1987) and, more recently, when 
identifying a suspect from a lineup (e.g. Mansour, Lindsay, Brewer, & Munhall, 2009; 
Flowe, 2011; Flowe & Cotrell, 2011). Flowe and Cottrell (2011) had participants study a 
list of computer generated faces (i.e. targets). After a brief delay, participants attempted to 
identify the targets from a series of target-present and target-absent simultaneous lineups. 
Their eye movements were recorded for each lineup.  
There were several differences in visual behaviour when participants made correct 
and false IDs. First, falsely identified innocent suspects received more fixations during the 
lineup, on average, than correctly identified perpetrators. Second, upon first viewing the 
faces in the lineup (i.e. the first fixations made to each face in the lineup), more time was 
spent fixating on identified perpetrators than identified innocent suspects. However, once 
participants began to revisit previously scanned faces, more time went back to fixating on 
the identified innocent suspect than the identified perpetrator. Third, the length and 
number of return visits to the identified innocent suspect indicate that participants took 
more time, in total, to identify the innocent suspect than to identify the perpetrator. This 
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replicates previous studies which have found that perpetrators are identified faster than 
innocent suspects (e.g. Sporer, 1992; 1993). Perhaps participants felt more certain when 
identifying the perpetrator than when identifying the innocent suspect and thus did not the 
feel the need to spend more time looking back and forth between similar looking faces to 
make an identification.  
In a similar study, Mansour et al. (2009) had participants watch twelve short mock 
crime videos, each depicting a unique perpetrator committing the same crime. After a brief 
delay, participants then attempted to identify the perpetrators from a series of perpetrator-
present and perpetrator-absent simultaneous lineups. Eye movements were recorded 
during the identification process. Mansour et al. compared the number of first-order and 
second-order comparisons made for correct and false IDs. A first-order comparison occurs 
when participants fixate on a face (A) and then fixate on another face (B) before fixating 
back on the previous face (A). A second-order comparison occurs when participants fixate 
on a face (A), then fixate on a second face (B), and then a third face (C), before fixating 
back onto the first face (A). Mansour et al. hypothesized that participants will make more 
first-order and second-order comparisons when making a false ID than when making a 
correct ID. This is because first-order and second-order comparisons suggest deliberation 
in the decision process and participants are expected to deliberate more when making a 
false ID. This hypothesis was partially supported. Correct IDs and false IDs received the 
same number of first-order comparisons, but false IDs received significantly more second-
order comparisons than correct IDs.  
Although the literature is small, consisting of only a handful of studies, recording 
participants’ visual behaviour has shown some systematic differences between correct and 
false IDs (Flowe, 2011). Namely, participants fixate more, and for a longer duration, on 
innocent suspects who are falsely identified than they do for perpetrators who are correctly 
identified. Yet, there may be more information to glean from the eyes of eyewitnesses. It 
has recently been shown that pupil dilations in the eye could reflect memorial processes 
in standard recognition tasks (e.g. Vo, Jacobs, Kuchinke, Hofmann, Conrad, Schacht, & 
Hutzler, 2008). To the best of my knowledge, no eyewitness identification study has 
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analysed pupil dilations when participants witness a perpetrator committing a crime or 
when participants attempt to identify a perpetrator from a lineup. It is possible that pupil 
dilations and eye movements can both serve as robust markers of eyewitness identification 
accuracy. 
Pupil Dilations  
Early cognitive psychology research dating back to the 1960s has investigated 
slight changes in pupil size. Psychosensory fluctuations in pupil size are small (no more 
than 0.5 - 1.0mm) and are thus difficult to see with the naked eye (Beatty, 1982b). Yet, 
these slight but consistent pupillary changes appear to reflect cognitive processes 
occurring in the brain (Beatty, & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). Described as “a permanently 
implanted electrode” and “the only visible part of the brain” (Janisse, 1977, p. 1), the pupil 
has been able to serve as a physiological indicator of psychological processes in a wide 
array of tasks (Beatty, & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). Recently, researchers have sought to 
determine whether pupil dilations can serve as a physiological indicator of recognition 
memory processes in standard list-learning recognition tasks (e.g. Maw & Pomplun, 2004; 
Otero et al., 2006; Ryan, Hannula, & Cohen, 2007; Vo et al., 2008; Goldinger, He, & 
Papesh, 2009; Kafkas & Montaldi, 2011; Heaver & Hutton, 2011; Papesh & Goldinger, 
2012).  
Pupil Dilations and Recognition Memory 
According to dual-process theorists, two processes contribute to a recognition 
decision: recollection and familiarity (e.g. Wixted & Mickes, 2010). Recollection consists 
of retrieving specific details associated to an item, whereas familiarity allows one to 
confidently appreciate the fact that an item or event was previously experienced even 
though no contextual detail can be retrieved (for review see Yonelinas, 2002). In a series 
of experiments, Otero, Weekes, and Hutton (2011) investigated whether pupils dilated to 
recollection-based or to familiarity-based responses. In Experiment 1, participants studied 
a list of words for an upcoming recognition test. During the recognition test, old and new 
words were randomly presented one at a time for an old or new recognition decision. For 
every item that was deemed old, participants would respond “remember” when 
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experiencing recollection and “know” when experiencing familiarity (for review of the 
remember/know procedure, see Tulving, 1985). If participants believed the item was not 
previously studied, then they would respond “new”. Participants’ pupils were measured 
when making these judgments.  
If participants’ pupil dilations reflect recognition memory processes (i.e. 
recollection and familiarity), then participants who respond “remember” should have 
greater pupil dilations than participants who respond “know”. Remember judgments are 
thought to reflect stronger memories, on average, than know judgments as remember 
judgments are reliably associated with higher confidence, higher accuracy, and faster 
reaction times than know judgments (e.g. Dunn, 2004; Rotello & Zeng, 2008; Wixted & 
Stretch, 2004). More generally, old items should elicit greater pupil dilations than new 
items because old items have been previously studied. The results showed that old items 
elicited greater pupil dilations than new items, replicating previous studies that have found 
a similar pupil old/new effect (Gardner, Mo, & Borrego, 1974; Gardner, Mo, & Krinsky, 
1974; Maw & Pomplun, 2004; Otero et al., 2006; Vo et al., 2008). In addition, “remember” 
responses to old items elicited greater pupil dilation than “know” responses to old items. 
“Remember” responses also happened to be significantly more accurate than “know” 
responses (i.e. participants were much more likely to respond “know” to a new item than 
to respond “remember” to a new item). Together, these results suggest that the extent to 
which the pupil dilates during a recognition task contains information about 1) how 
strongly the participant recognizes the item and 2) how accurate they are in their 
recognition decision. 
In Experiment 2, Otero et al. manipulated memory strength for old items by having 
participants study a list of words in either deep encoding or shallow encoding conditions. 
In the shallow encoding condition, participants were instructed to count the number of 
syllables for each word, whereas in the deep encoding condition, participants were 
instructed to generate a synonym for each word. Similar procedures have produced strong 
memories for words that were encoded deeply and have produced weak memories for 
words that were encoded shallowly (e.g. Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975). 
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After studying the list of items (either under deep or shallow encoding instructions), 
participants then took part in a recognition task where old and new items were randomly 
presented one at a time for an old or new recognition decision. Participants’ pupils were 
recorded when making a recognition decision. As in Experiment 1, a pupil old/new effect 
was observed; pupil dilations were greater for old items than for new items. However, 
words that were encoded deeply (i.e. the stronger memories) elicited larger pupil dilations 
than words that were encoded shallowly (i.e. the weaker memories).  
Experiments 1 and 2 have thus far demonstrated that 1) the pupil dilates more for 
old items than for new items, and 2) the extent to which the pupil dilates contains 
information about how strongly the participant recognizes the item and 3) how accurate 
they are in their recognition decision. Experiment 3 sought to determine whether the pupil 
dilates more for items that were correctly recognized than for items that were falsely 
recognized. In this experiment, participants studied lists of exemplars from several 
different categories. For example, participants studied items such as bear, lion, giraffe, 
monkey, mouse, and camel which are exemplars from the category mammals. During the 
recognition test, old exemplars (e.g. bear), new exemplars (e.g. zebra), and new unrelated 
items (e.g. flower) were randomly presented one at a time to participants for an old or new 
recognition decision. As in Experiments 1 and 2, a significant pupil old/new effect was 
observed; old items (e.g. bear) elicited greater pupil dilations than new items (e.g. zebra 
and flower). What is of interest though in this experiment is, after participants recognized 
an item as old, whether their pupils dilated more for items that were correctly recognized 
(e.g. correctly recognizing bear as old) than for items that were falsely recognized (e.g. 
falsely recognizing zebra as old). Pupil dilations were, in fact, greater for items that were 
correctly recognized than for items that were falsely recognized and this was true even 
when participants falsely recognized new exemplar items (e.g. zebra), which were highly 
similar to previously studied exemplars. Together, these results suggest that, when an 
eyewitness identifies a suspect from a lineup with a certain amount of confidence, the 
pupil will dilate more for the identified perpetrator than for the identified innocent suspect.  
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Pupil Dilations and Decision-Making 
Many studies over the past several decades have shown that changes in pupil size 
can be linked to participants’ choice during perceptual, cognitive, and economic decision-
making tasks (e.g. Hess & Polt, 1964; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Simpson & Hale, 1969). 
This decision-related pupil dilation has been specifically linked to the formation of a final 
decision (Einhauser, Stout, Koch, & Carter, 2008; Einhauser, Koch, & Carter, 2010) as 
well as the commitment to that decision (e.g. Hupe, Lamirel, & Lorenceau, 2009; 
Einhauser et al., 2010). However, it is still unclear which specific elements of the decision-
making process cause the pupil to dilate.  
Recently, de Gee, Knapen, and Donner (2014) sought to link decision-related pupil 
dilations to the time course of a decision, the decision outcome, as well as participants’ 
own personal response bias towards a decision (i.e. liberal or conservative bias) during a 
protracted visual discrimination task. In this task, participants had to detect the presence 
or absence of a visual target within a noisy, static background as fast as possible. The 
target was a low contrast vertical grating which was superimposed onto the background 
noise. Half of the trials contained the target and the other half of trials did not contain the 
target. Responding “present” when the target was present was a hit. Responding “present” 
when the target was absent was a false alarm. Responding “absent” when the target was 
present was a miss and responding “absent” when the target was absent was a correct 
rejection. Thus, this task was conceptually similar to a standard recognition memory task 
as both tasks require participants to discriminate between signal-present and signal-absent 
trials, resulting in four decision outcomes (i.e. hits, false alarms, misses, and correct 
rejections). The key difference, though, is that this is not a memory task, but rather a 
perceptual task. Researchers have shown that the pupil dilates more for strong memories 
than for weak memories, such that a large pupil is more likely to indicate a hit than a false 
alarm (e.g. Otero et al., 2011), but will that same pattern emerge in a memory-less visual 
discrimination task? In other words, will the pupil dilate more when the target is more 
visible than when it is less visible and, if so, will hits elicit larger pupils than false alarms? 
If the pupil does indeed reflect the strength of participants’ memory for an item, then 
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perhaps, in a memory-less discrimination task, the pupil will not dilate more for hits than 
false alarms. 
They found that, relative to a pre-trial baseline, the pupil dilated during the time 
course of the decision-making process as well as the commitment to the final “present” or 
“absent” decision, consistent with previous findings (e.g. Einhauser et al., 2010). However, 
they also found that the pupils dilated more when participants said “present” than when 
they said “absent,” regardless of whether the target was actually present or absent. That is, 
the pupil did not dilate more for hits than for false alarms, but did dilate more when 
participants believed that the target was present than when they believed that the target 
was absent (i.e. hits and false alarms elicited larger pupil dilation than misses and correct 
rejections). Lastly, the strength of this pupil choice effect seemed to depend on how 
conservative participants were in their decision to say “present.” de Gee et al. split 
participants into “liberal” and “conservative” subgroups based on the median response 
criterion of the group. Conservative leaning participants exhibited a very strong pupil 
choice effect, whereas no effect was observed in the liberal subgroup. de Gee et al. argue 
that conservative leaning participants were often expecting to say “absent” to most trials, 
but were surprised when they perceived a strong enough signal to warrant a “present” 
response. Several recent studies have linked pupil dilation to surprise about perceptual 
targets (e.g. Hakerem & Sutton, 1966; Privitera, Renninger, Carney, Klein, & Aguilar, 
2010) and other behaviorally relevant events (Preuschoff, t Hart, & Einhauser, 2011). 
Together, these findings show that the pupil not only dilates more when participants say 
“present” than when they say “absent” but that the strength of this pupil choice effect 
depends on the participants’ liberal or conservative responding. 
The Present Experiment 
The confidence an eyewitness expresses in their identification decision is a strong 
predictor of suspect identification accuracy (e.g. Mickes, 2015; Wixted et al., 2016). This 
means that if an eyewitness makes an identification with high confidence, it is highly 
likely that the identified suspect is the perpetrator (i.e. a correct ID), whereas if an 
eyewitness makes an identification with low confidence (e.g. if the eyewitness guesses 
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that the suspect is the perpetrator), it is increasingly likely that the suspect ID is error prone 
(i.e. a false ID). Still, there may be other markers of suspect identification accuracy that 
may further help differentiate a correct ID from a false ID. For example, the way in which 
eyewitnesses visually scan the perpetrator’s face may be different to the way they scan an 
innocent suspect’s face (Mansour et al., 2009; Flowe & Cottrell, 2011), and this 
information may help differentiate a correct ID from a false ID. In addition, the pupil may 
dilate more when eyewitnesses make a correct ID than when they make a false ID. The 
present experiment sought to determine which potential marker of suspect identification 
accuracy is best. In this experiment, participants studied and attempted to recognize a list 
of criminal faces. Participants’ visual behavior and pupil dilations were measured while 
making recognition decisions. Participants’ confidence in their recognition decisions was 
also measured in order to conduct CAC analysis (Mickes, 2015).  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from Royal Holloway, University of London and 
completed the experiment in exchange for £10 payment (N = 16; 10 female, 6 male; age 
in years: M = 20.14; SD = 2.60). 
Materials 
Participants studied a list of faces gathered from the Florida Department of 
Corrections Offender Network (http://www.dc.state.fl.us/AppCommon/). This database 
was used because it helped collect many face images of good quality rather than having 
to do with the fact that these individuals were criminals. The descriptive details of the 
criminals included: male, 20-30 years old, white, height of 5’10”-6’2”, brown or black 
hair with no facial hair and no distinguishing features. From here, 60 faces that matched 
these descriptions were collected and grey-scaled. A mask of each face was made using 
Adobe Photoshop CS. Small areas (20 X 20 pixels) of each face were randomly mixed so 
that the image no longer resembled a face, but retained the same level of luminance as the 
original face image. This mask could serve as a useful baseline when measuring pupil 
dilations during recognition judgments. 
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Apparatus and Pupil Measurement 
The faces were displayed on a 1024 × 768 pixel CRT monitor (60 Hz refresh rate) 
at a distance of 68 cm, which was sustained with the use of a table-mounted headrest. Eye 
movements and maximum pupil size were recorded monocularly (right eye) with an SR 
Research EyeLink 1000, with a sampling rate of 500 Hz. Due to constant fluctuation in 
pupil size over time, and variation between individuals, a pupil dilation ratio was 
calculated. The maximum pupil size from the first 250 ms period of each trial was used as 
the baseline value and compared with the maximum pupil size from the latter 2750 ms 
period of each trial. Otero et al. (2011) used this method to calculate the pupil dilation 
ratio, but others have taken the maximum pupil size value when the item was presented 
and divided that by the maximum pupil size value when the mask was presented (e.g. 
Heaver & Hutton, 2011).  
Procedure 
Following consent, participants were instructed that they were going to take part 
in a memory test while their eyes were being tracked and their pupils were being recorded. 
In order to record the changes in pupil size, participants placed their head on top of a 
headrest which kept their eyes stationary throughout the experiment. In order to respond, 
participants used a keyboard which was placed slightly below eye level. Before beginning 
the actual experiment, participants practiced responding on the keyboard while they were 
positioned on the headrest.  
After the practice trials, participants were then calibrated on the eye tracker and 
began studying the list of faces. During the study phase, 30 faces, randomly selected from 
the pool of 60 faces, were shown for three seconds each. A mask was briefly shown after 
each face. After the study phase, participants were recalibrated and began the test phase. 
During the test phase, old and new faces were randomly intermixed and presented one at 
a time for an old or new recognition decision. Participants then made a recognition 
decision using a 1 – 6 confidence scale. Responses 1 – 3 indicated that the face was new 
with 1 being absolutely certain the face was new and 3 being a guess that the face was 
new. Responses 4 – 6 indicated that the face was old with 6 being absolutely certain the 
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face was old and 4 being a guess that the face was old. Confidence was collected in order 
to conduct CAC analysis. Participants were recalibrated with a one-point calibration after 
each face was shown. After completing the experiment, participants were debriefed and 
were paid for their participation. Note that an old/new memory task was used in order to 
measure changes in the average pupil dilation. An eyewitness identification task would be 
less suitable because changes in pupil size are very noisy.  
Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
The total number of target-present and target-absent trials as well as the number 
of hits, false alarms, misses, and correct rejections for every level of confidence are shown 
in Table 1. Next, we see whether participants’ confidence in their recognition decision, 
their visual behaviour while making a recognition decision, or their pupillary responses to 
the list of criminal faces can be used to differentiate hits from false alarms. 
Table 1 
Response frequencies for every recognition decision outcome are displayed for each level 
of confidence.  
  Target-Present  Target-Absent 
  Hits Misses  False Alarms Correct Rejections 
Said Present 6 113   15  
 5 125   61  
 4 93   64  
Said Absent 3  48   69 
 2  71   156 
 1  29   116 
Note:  Responses 4, 5, and 6 indicate that the participant believed the face was present on 
the study list and responses 1, 2, and 3 indicate that the participant believed the face was 
not present on the study list. 




Recognition decisions that received an old response were used to perform CAC 
analysis. Old responses 4, 5, and 6 refer to low confidence, medium confidence, and high 
confidence, respectively. The CAC curves in Figure 1 show that as participants recognized 
a criminal face with increasing confidence, it was increasingly likely that the recognition 
decision was a hit rather than a false alarm. This means that recognition decisions made 
with high confidence are highly reliable and recognition decisions made with lower 
confidence are increasingly error prone. This finding shows, once again, that confidence 
can be a strong predictor of accuracy – a point which recognition memory theorists (e.g. 
Egan, 1958; Wixted & Mickes, 2010) and eyewitness identification researchers appreciate 
(Mickes, 2015; Wixted et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 1. Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) curve for the recognition 
memory data. The bars represent standard error bars. 




Number of Fixations 
When participants recognized a face as old, did they fixate more on the correctly 
recognized faces (i.e. the hits) or the falsely recognized faces (i.e. the false alarms)? 
Previous studies have found that when participants identify a suspect from a lineup, 
participants fixate on the falsely identified innocent suspect (i.e. the false IDs) more than 
the correctly identified perpetrator (i.e. the correct IDs; e.g. Mansour et al., 2009; Flowe 
& Cottrell, 2011). In this experiment, participants did fixate on the falsely recognized faces 
(M = 7.4, SD = 2.1) more than the correctly recognized faces (M = 7.2, SD = 2.0), but that 
difference was not significant, t(469) = .39, p = .70.  
First Fixation Dwell Time 
Previous studies have also found that when a suspect is identified from a lineup, 
participants spend more time first fixating on the correctly identified perpetrator than the 
falsely identified innocent suspect (e.g. Flowe & Cottrell, 2011). In this experiment, 
participants spent more time first fixating on the falsely recognized faces (M = 319ms, SD 
= 300ms) than the correctly recognized faces (M = 300ms, SD = 332ms), but that 
difference was not significant, t(469) = .60, p =.55. 
Pupil Dilations 
Pupil Dilations and Recognition Memory 
To determine whether participants’ pupils dilated more for old faces (i.e. targets) 
than for new faces (i.e. lures), the average pupil dilation ratios (PDR) for targets and for 
lures was compared. Although the average PDR was larger for targets (M = 1.13, SD = .15) 
than for lures (M = 1.11, SD = .16), that difference was not significant, t(958) = 1.66, p 
= .09 (see Figure 2). What is of most interest in this experiment, however, is whether there 
is a difference in the average PDR for correctly recognized targets (i.e. hits) and for falsely 
recognized lures (i.e. false alarms). The average PDR for hits (M = 1.14, SD = .16) was 
greater than the average PDR for false alarms (M = 1.11, SD = .20), but that difference 
was also not significant, t(469) = 1.47, p = .14.  




Figure 2. Average pupil dilation ratios collapsed across target and lure items (A) 
and average pupil dilation ratios for every hits and false alarms (B). 
Pupil Dilations and Recognition Decisions 
Next, we compared the average PDR for faces that were recognized as old (M = 
1.14, SD = .16) with the average PDR for faces that were determined to be new (M = 1.11, 
SD = .13), and found that difference to be significant, t(958) = 3.05, p = .002 (see Figure 
3A). The PDR was then calculated for each level of confidence. When participants 
recognized a face as old (i.e. responses 4 – 6), the PDR increased as confidence increased 
(see Figure 3B). Specifically, the average PDR for faces recognized with high confidence 
(M = 1.17, SD = .19) was higher than the average PDR for faces recognized with medium 
confidence (M = 1.14, SD = .14) which, in turn, was higher than the average PDR for faces 
recognized with low confidence (M = 1.12, SD = .15). The average PDR for faces 
recognized with high confidence (i.e. 6 responses), medium confidence (i.e. 5 responses), 
and low confidence (i.e. 4 responses) were compared in a one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA, which showed a main effect of confidence response, F(2, 469) = 3.9, MSE = 
0.097, p = .02. Subsequent t-tests revealed that participants’ pupils dilated significantly 
more to faces recognized with high confidence (M = 1.17, SD = .19) than to faces 
recognized with low confidence (M = 1.12, SD = .15, t(283) = 2.56, p = .01). There was 
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also a trend for participants’ pupils to dilate more to faces recognized with high confidence 
(M = 1.17, SD = .15) than to faces recognized with medium confidence (M = 1.14, SD 
= .14; t(312) = 1.77, p = .08). Thus, participants’ pupils dilated more when participants 
recognized a face as old (i.e. responses 4 – 6) than when they determined a face to be new 
(i.e. responses 1 – 3), and the more certain they were, the larger their pupils dilated (i.e. 6 
responses elicited greater pupil dilations than 5 responses which elicited greater pupil 
dilations than 4 responses).  
 
Figure 3. Average pupil dilation ratios collapsed across present and absent 
decisions (A) and average pupil dilation ratios for every confidence response (B). 
General Discussion 
Judges and jurors often rely on eyewitness identifications to convict a suspect (e.g. 
Loftus, 1974). This is problematic when innocent suspects are convicted and later 
exonerated after their innocence has been established. Eyewitness identification 
researchers have explored several markers of eyewitness identification accuracy to help 
differentiate a correct ID from a false ID. These include the confidence the eyewitness 
reports in their identification decision (Wells & Murray, 1983), the time it takes for the 
eyewitness to make an identification (Sporer, 1992), and the accuracy of the eyewitnesses’ 
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description of the perpetrator (Pigott & Brigham, 1985). Of these three markers, the 
confidence the eyewitness reports at the time of their initial identification is arguably the 
best (Wixted et al., 2016). However, some research suggests that participants scan the face 
of an innocent suspect differently than how they scan the face of a perpetrator (Flowe & 
Cottrell, 2011). Research also suggests that participants’ pupils will dilate more when 
making a correct ID than when making a false ID. In this experiment, these three potential 
markers of eyewitness identification accuracy were explored and compared. 
Participants’ confidence in their recognition decision was found to be a strong 
predictor of the accuracy in their decision. If participants were highly confident in their 
recognition decision, then they were likely to be correct 88% of the time. If participants 
were less confident, then they were less likely to be correct. Meanwhile, there was no 
significant difference in the way participants scanned a face when making a hit or a false 
alarm, and there was no significant difference in participants’ pupil dilations when making 
a hit or a false alarm. Participants’ pupils did dilate more when participants believed the 
face was a target than when they believed the face was a lure, regardless of whether the 
face was, in fact, a target or a lure. The extent to which their pupils dilated reflected their 
certainty in that decision. These results are limited because the task used in this experiment 
was a standard old/new recognition task, rather than an eyewitness identification task. It 
may be the case that participants’ pupils dilate more when making a correct ID than a false 
ID from a lineup. Barring this limitation, these results suggest 1) there is little use in 
examining participants’ visual behavior and pupil dilations when making a suspect ID and, 
rather 2) it is extremely useful to measure participants’ confidence in their recognition 
decisions.   





Eyewitness identification researchers continue to have a growing impact on 
criminal justice systems throughout the world, most notably in the US, by consulting with 
policymakers or informing the court (i.e. judges and jurors) through expert testimony. 
Their efforts to shape public policy have mostly been directed at improving aspects of the 
identification process with the goal to implement procedures that maximize 
discriminability (e.g. Technical Working Group, 1999). However, eyewitness 
identification researchers have relied on poor measures of discriminability (i.e. the DR) 
and, because of this, have encouraged policymakers to adopt procedures that actually 
reduce discriminability (Gronlund et al., 2014; Gronlund, Wixted, Mickes, & Clark, 2015; 
Mickes et al., 2012; Wixted & Mickes, 2012). For example, the sequential lineup 
procedure, which has been repeatedly shown to yield worse discriminability than the 
traditional simultaneous lineup (e.g. Mickes et al., 2012), has been adopted by 
approximately 30% of police jurisdictions in the US (Police Executive Forum, 2013). In 
court, factors that reduce discriminability are believed by many experts to reduce the 
reliability of an eyewitness identification (Kassin et al., 1989; Kassin et al., 2001).  
However, factors that reduce discriminability may not necessarily reduce 
reliability. In fact, in some cases where discriminability has been reduced, reliability might 
actually improve (Mickes, 2015). Factors that are believed to reduce discriminability 
include the verbal overshadowing effect (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and the 
weapon focus effect (Loftus et al., 1987). I have re-examined these eyewitness phenomena 
using two analytic techniques recently introduced to the eyewitness identification field 
that measure discriminability and the reliability of a suspect identification: ROC analysis 
and CAC analysis, respectively. In total, this thesis consisted of eight empirical studies, 
each of which highlight the importance of using ROC analysis to measure discriminability 
and CAC analysis to measure reliability. Failing to measure discriminability and reliability 
properly could lead to poor public policy and poor trial outcomes, ultimately sending more 
innocent suspects to prison and more guilty suspects back to the streets. 




Experiment 1 and 2 
The United States and the United Kingdom have responded simlarly to reports of 
erroneous eyewitness identifications (e.g. Devlin, 1976; Technical Working Group, 1999). 
Both the US and the UK require a lineup to consist of one suspect, who may either be 
guilty or innocent, and several other fillers. However, the most common lineup procedure 
in the US is the simultaneous lineup procedure, which consists of six front-face photos 
presented to the eyewitness simultaneously (Police Executive Forum, 2013). Whereas, in 
England and Wales, the standard lineup procedure, dictated by the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE), consists of short video clips of nine lineup members presented to 
the eyewitness in sequence. That entire sequence is shown twice before an identification 
decision is made (PACE, 1984). Thus, there are several key differences between the US 
and UK lineup procedures and each of these differences may impact eyewitnesses’ 
discriminability and reliability. A direct comparison between the US lineup and the UK 
lineup was conducted in order to determine which lineup procedure yields greater 
discriminability and greater reliability. 
ROC Analysis 
Because the overall correct and false ID rates were lower for the UK lineup (and 
could, therefore, mean a shift in response bias, not a difference in discriminability), an 
analysis of the full ROC was conducted. The US lineup yielded a higher ROC and thus, 
greater discriminability, than the UK lineup. Because of the myriad of differences between 
the two lineup procedures, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly why discriminability was 
greater for the US lineup. I would argue that this finding is yet another example of the 
often replicated difference between sequential and simultaneous lineups, which often 
favors the latter (e.g. Carlson & Carlson, 2014; Dobolyi & Dodson, 2013; Gronlund et al., 
2012; Mickes et al., 2012).  




Reliability was assessed by conducting CAC analysis. The US lineup yielded a 
higher CAC than the UK lineup across low, medium, and high levels of confidence. CAC 
analysis showed that suspect IDs from the US lineup were more likely to be correct IDs 
than suspect IDs from the UK lineup, meaning that suspect IDs from the US lineup were 
more reliable. Again, it is not possible to pinpoint exactly why participants in the UK 
lineup were less reliable, but a possible explanation for this finding is that participants in 
the UK lineup failed to appreciate the difficulty in identifying the perpetrator from a 
sequential lineup presentation and were, thus, worse at determining their accuracy for their 
suspect IDs. A sequential lineup presentation is purposefully designed to limit the 
participant’s ability to compare lineup members. Wixted and Mickes (2014) argue that 
this limitation reduces discriminability, but participants may not realize that they are 
disadvantaged. Because participants are unaware of this disadvantage, their confidence 
judgments may be less reflective of their suspect ID accuracy. Whatever the reason for 
this difference, these results underscore the importance of conducting CAC analysis 
because these results are informative to triers of fact. 
Chapter 4 
Experiment 3 and 4 
An eyewitness to a crime often needs to provide an accurate and detailed 
description of the perpetrator in order for the police to locate and apprehend the guilty 
rather than an innocent suspect (Mickes, 2016). In a series of studies, Schooler and 
Engstler-Schooler (1990) showed that describing the perpetrator can cause a slight, but 
significant, reduction in the correct ID rate from a lineup. This effect is called “verbal 
overshadowing” and, although this effect has been replicated many times (Dodson et al., 
1997; Fallshore & Schooler, 1995; Ryan & Schooler, 1998; Schooler et al., 1996), many 
have not found an effect (e.g. Lovett et al., 1992; Memon & Bartlett, 2002; Yu & 
Geiselman, 1993). The first registered replication report (Alogna et al., 2014), a concerted 
effort of 31 independent laboratories, attempted to replicate the fourth experiment from 
Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990). Participants in this experiment watched a video 
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of a mock crime (a bank robbery) and, immediately after the video, either described the 
perpetrator or engaged in a control task. Participants then took part in a 20 minute 
distractor task before attempting to identify the perpetrator from a perpetrator-present 
lineup. A small, but significant verbal overshadowing effect was found. Afterwards, 22 of 
those laboratories attempted to replicate the first experiment from Schooler and Engstler-
Schooler (1990). This time, participants described the perpetrator (or completed a control 
task for the allotted time) immediately before viewing the lineup. The meta-analytic effect 
across the 22 studies was much larger (i.e. a much larger reduction in the correct ID rate).  
Despite replicating the original report (Alogna et al., 2014), because there was no 
way to measure false ID rates as the perpetrator was always present in the lineup, the effect 
verbalization has on identification performance remains unclear (Mickes & Wixted, 2015). 
That is, it is not clear whether describing the perpetrator impacts discriminability or 
response bias. To clarify this issue, we conducted a direct replication experiment that 
included perpetrator-absent lineups, which allows us to measure false ID rates. With both 
correct and false ID rates, ROC analysis can then be conducted.  
If verbal overshadowing reduces discriminability (producing a lower ROC) and 
not just a conservative shift in responding, Alogna et al. (2014) wrote that suspect IDs 
admitted as evidence in court “…should be weighted less if the witness had provided a 
description earlier” (p. 557). Mickes (2015) made the point that results from ROC analyses 
matter to some decision-makers (e.g., Police Chiefs and policymakers), but another 
analysis matters more to other decision-makers (e.g., judges and jurors). Because ROC 
analysis does not measure the reliability of a suspect ID, a more appropriate analysis for 
judges and jurors is CAC analysis. To test if confidence and accuracy are related at all 
levels of confidence for both verbal and control conditions, CAC analysis was also 
conducted.  
ROC Analysis 
ROC analysis showed that participants who had described the perpetrator were 
more conservative in making an identification decision than control participants. 
Lewandowsky (2004) made the point that, because of the noticeable difficulty participants 
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experience when attempting to describe the perpetrator, participants may believe that their 
memory for the perpetrator is poor. Participants may therefore require a stronger feeling 
of recognition in order to make an identification from the lineup. This causes participants 
to shift their response criteria in a conservative direction. ROC analysis also revealed no 
significant difference in discriminability between control participants and participants 
who had described the perpetrator immediately after watching the mock crime video (i.e. 
20 minutes before identification). However, there was a significant reduction in 
discriminability when participants described the perpetrator 20 minutes after watching the 
mock crime video (i.e. immediately before identification). This reduction in 
discriminability may have been caused by participants describing the perpetrator using 
non-diagnostic rather than diagnostic details and then relying on those non-diagnostic 
details to make an identification (Wixted & Mickes, 2014). A content analysis of the verbal 
descriptions in both experiments is consistent with this hypothesis. Participants who had 
described the perpetrator immediately after watching the mock crime video used 
significantly more diagnostic words in their description than participants who described 
the perpetrator 20 minutes later. These participants likely relied on those diagnostic details 
when making an identification, whereas participants who had described the perpetrator 20 
minutes after watching the mock crime video likely relied on non-diagnostic details to 
make an identification.  
CAC Analysis 
Reliability was compared for participants who had described the perpetrator and 
control participants by conducting CAC analysis. In both experiments, there was no 
difference in reliability for high confidence suspect IDs.  
Experiment 5  
Discriminability should improve when participants rely on diagnostic details to 
make an identification. This is because diagnostic details are unique to the perpetrator. On 
the other hand, relying on non-diagnostic details to make an identification should reduce 
discriminability, as non-diagnostic details are shared by the innocent and guilty suspect 
(i.e. they are not unique to the perpetrator). This experiment sought to manipulate the 
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amount of diagnostic details participants use in their description of the perpetrator. 
Participants either described the specific features of the perpetrator, the general features 
of the perpetrator, or described a set of unrelated items. Participants who describe the 
specific features of the perpetrator should yield greater discriminability than control 
participants, as they are describing features that are unique to the perpetrator. Participants 
who describe the general features of the perpetrator should yield worse discriminability 
than control participants, as they are describing features that are likely shared between the 
perpetrator and the innocent suspect. 
ROC Analysis 
The general feature condition and the specific feature condition yielded a higher 
ROC than the control condition, but there was no significant difference in discriminability 
among the three description groups. Participants in the control condition provided much 
longer descriptions than participants in the general feature and specific feature conditions. 
Although instructed to describe the specific and general features of the perpetrator, the 
relative lack of descriptive details that participants provided indicates that participants had 
difficulty describing these features. Participants in the control condition therefore had 
more description-related interference than participants in the other two conditions, which 
might explain why the general and specific feature condition ROCs are higher, though not 
significantly higher, than the control condition ROC. 
CAC Analysis 
As in the previous two experiments, participants who had described the perpetrator 
were just as reliable as participants who had not previously described the perpetrator. 
Although researchers have argued that suspect IDs should be given less weight in court if 
an eyewitness had previously described the perpetrator (e.g. Alogna et al., 2014), CAC 
results from these three experiments show that participants who had described the 
perpetrator can still provide reliable high confidence suspect IDs and are just as reliable 
as participants who had not previously described the perpetrator. In the US, triers of fact 
are mainly concerned with the reliability for high confidence suspect IDs as low 
confidence suspect IDs are less likely to be admitted as evidence in court. However, in the 
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UK, the confidence an eyewitness reports in their identification decision is not collected 
(PACE, 1984). When an eyewitness makes a low confidence suspect ID, they are 
essentially telling investigators that they are likely making an error (and they are indeed 
error prone at low levels of confidence). Neglecting this information may lead to many 
low confidence suspect IDs being admitted in court. 
Chapter 5 
Experiment 6 and 7 
If a perpetrator is armed during a crime, an eyewitness might focus on the weapon 
the perpetrator is holding at the expense of focusing on the perpetrator’s face (e.g. Loftus 
et al., 1987). This is called the “weapon focus” effect. An early meta-analysis showed that 
the presence of a weapon during a crime can cause a slight, but significant, reduction in 
the correct ID rate (Steblay, 1992). A subsequent meta-analysis (Fawcett et al., 2011) 
showed that the presence of a weapon causes a small, but significant, reduction in the 
proportion of correct responses. A reduction in the correct ID rate, or a reduction in 
proportion correct, do not indicate that the weapon caused a reduction in discriminability 
as it could be the case that the presence of a weapon caused participants to become more 
conservative in making an identification. To determine whether the presence of a weapon 
during a crime causes a reduction in discriminability or a conservative shift in response 
bias, the correct ID rate and the false ID rate must both be measured. 
There are ten studies which have measured both the correct and false ID rate. Of 
these ten studies, four have not found a significant difference in discriminability between 
the weapon present and weapon absent conditions (Carlson et al., 2016; Cutler & Penrod, 
1988; Cutler et al., 1987b; Cutler et al., 1986). Of the six that have found a significant 
difference in discriminability between weapon present and weapon absent conditions 
(Carlson & Carlson, 2012; 2014; Carlson et al., 2016; Cutler et al., 1987a; Erickson et al., 
2014; O’Rourke et al., 1989), two have used stimuli that display a larger and brighter 
image of the perpetrator’s face in the weapon absent video (Carlson & Carlson, 2012; 
2014). Still, a recent survey of eyewitness experts agree with the statement that “The 
presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitness’s ability to accurately identify the 
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perpetrator’s face” and 77% would be willing to testify to that effect in court (Kassin et 
al., 2001). We conducted two experiments which used a various set of crimes, perpetrators, 
and weapons in order to determine 1) whether the presence of a weapon during a crime 
causes a reduction in discriminability and 2) whether participants who had previously seen 
the perpetrator carrying a weapon are also less reliable.  
ROC Analysis 
A perceptual analysis found no significant difference in the size or brightness of 
the perpetrator’s face between the weapon absent and weapon present videos. Thus, the 
data from the eight weapon absent videos and the eight weapon present videos were 
collapsed into an overall weapon present and weapon absent condition. ROC analysis 
showed no significant difference in discriminability between the overall weapon present 
condition and the overall weapon absent condition. However, there appeared to be a trend 
towards a weapon focus effect in a few of the videos, meaning that discriminability was 
higher, although not significantly higher, in the weapon absent condition than in the 
weapon present condition. Perhaps, if more data were collected, this trend towards a 
weapon focus effect would become significant. Two videos which showed a trend towards 
a weapon focus effect were used as stimuli in Experiment 2. After recruiting more 
participants, ROC analysis, again, revealed no significant difference in discriminability 
between the weapon present condition and the weapon absent condition. 
CAC Analysis 
Next, we conducted CAC analysis to determine whether the presence of a weapon 
during a crime caused participants to become less reliable. Across both experiments, 
participants in the weapon present condition were just as reliable across medium and high 
levels of confidence as participants in the weapon absent condition. In both groups, as 
participants’ confidence increased so too did their accuracy in their suspect identification. 
Thus, despite what experts may testify in court about the deleterious effects a weapon may 
have on suspect identification accuracy, an eyewitness who identifies a suspect with high 
confidence is highly reliable, regardless of whether the perpetrator held a weapon during 
the crime. 





In court, triers of fact tend to place a great deal of faith in the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications (Loftus, 1974). However, even honest eyewitnesses may 
accidentally identify an innocent suspect. Eyewitness identification researchers have 
found several markers of suspect identification accuracy that distinguish, to some degree, 
correct IDs from false IDs. These include the eyewitnesses’ confidence in the 
identification decision (e.g. Mickes, 2015), the time it takes for an eyewitness to make an 
identification decision (e.g. Sporer, 1992), and the visual behavior used while scanning 
the faces of perpetrators and innocent suspects (e.g. Flowe & Cottrell, 2011). However, 
research from the basic recognition memory literature suggests that participants’ pupils 
may dilate more when they make a correct ID than when they make a false ID (e.g. Otero 
et al., 2011). This has previously been unexplored in an eyewitness identification task. In 
this experiment, participants studied and attempted to recognize a list of criminal faces 
while their pupils were being measured and their eyes were being tracked. Confidence in 
their recognition judgments were also recorded in order to conduct CAC analysis. 
Confidence has been shown to be a strong predictor of suspect ID accuracy (e.g. Mickes, 
2015). The purpose of this experiment is to compare which potential marker of suspect ID 
accuracy is best. 
CAC Analysis 
In order to determine whether confidence could serve as a marker of suspect ID 
accuracy, CAC analysis was conducted (Mickes, 2015). Participants who were highly 
confident in their recognition judgments were also highly accurate. Whereas, participants 
who were less confident in their recognition judgments were less accurate. This means 
that the confidence an eyewitness reports in their identification decision can serve as a 
strong predictor of their accuracy in their identification. However, there is still room for 
improvement. On a few occasions participants made a high confident false alarm. There 
may be other markers available that can better differentiate a hit from a false alarm.  




Previous studies have found that correctly identified targets received fewer 
fixations than falsely recognized lures (e.g. Flowe & Cottrell, 2011; Mansour et al., 2009). 
However, there was no significant difference in the number of fixations between hits and 
false alarms in this experiment. Previous studies have also found that correctly identified 
targets are first fixated on for a longer duration than falsely recognized lures (e.g. Flowe 
& Cottrell, 2011). Although hits were first fixated on for a longer duration than false 
alarms, there was no significant difference between the two decision outcomes.  
Pupil Dilations 
In the past decade, several recognition memory studies have found a pupil old/new 
effect, such that participants’ pupils dilate more for targets than for lures (e.g. Heaver & 
Hutton, 2011). Otero et al. (2011) found that when participants say that they recognize an 
item, participants’ pupils dilate more for hits than for false alarms. In a conceptually 
similar “memory-less” task, participants pupils dilated to the same extent for hits and for 
false alarms (de Gee et al., 2014). Thus, participants’ pupils seem to contain information 
about the accuracy of their memories as they dilate to a greater extent for hits than for 
false alarms. In this experiment, there was a trend towards a pupil old/new effect, but the 
difference in pupil dilation for targets and lures was not significant. Rather, participants’ 
pupils dilated more when they believed the item was previously studied, regardless of 
whether the item was a target or a lure. This finding however, is not useful as a marker of 
suspect ID accuracy. 
Limitations and Future Research 
There are two overarching limitations to the research conducted in this thesis. First, 
majority of the experiments were conducted online rather than in the confines of a 
laboratory. The purpose of conducting the experiments online rather than in a laboratory 
was to obtain thousands of participants in order to conduct ROC and CAC analyses. 
However, because the experiments were conducted online, it was difficult to control (or 
even know) participants’ environmental factors such as the background noise, lighting 
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conditions, viewing angle, and the amount of distractions in the environment. Each of 
these factors likely varied between participants and might have impacted their memory 
for the perpetrator. For instance, some participants could have participated in the 
experiment while a movie was playing in the background or while surfing the internet in 
another browser. Some could have participated in a dark room, making it harder to see the 
perpetrator’s face. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions, which means that 
these factors were likely spread evenly across conditions; but, because online experiments 
are less controlled than lab experiments, the data obtained from online experiments may 
be less valid than data obtained from lab experiments. This is an important limitation to 
address, but it is also important to note that several researchers have compared data 
obtained from online experiments and lab experiments and have found online-based data 
to be just as valid as lab-based data (e.g., Birnbaum, 2001; Buchanan & Smith 1999; 
Krantz, Ballard, & Scher, 1997; Reips, 2002). In fact, a somewhat recent survey by Musch 
and Reips (2000) has found that data from 18 online experiments were highly consistent 
with data from their twin lab experiments. This suggests that the findings in this thesis 
will likely replicate in a more controlled laboratory setting. Although, the only way to be 
sure is to conduct these experiments in the laboratory.  
A second limitation, that often plagues the extant eyewitness identification 
literature, is the realism (or lack thereof) of the mock crime videos. In these experiments, 
participants watched several third-person point of view videos of various mock crimes. 
The goal was to have participants feel as though they were witnessing an actual crime, but 
in what respect does viewing videotapes resemble witnessing a crime? According to 
Cooper et al. (2002), the events typically seen in the laboratory are not comparable to 
many actual criminal events. For instance, how often is an eyewitness asked to pay close 
attention when witnessing a crime, which is routine among experimenters conducting 
eyewitness identification experiments (e.g. Pickel, 1998; 1999)? Eyewitness identification 
researchers have conducted field studies to address the generally weak ecological validity 
of eyewitness laboratory experiments (e.g. Amendola & Wixted, 2015; Valentine, 
Pickering, & Darling, 2003; Wixted et al., 2016). In general, these field studies have been 
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useful in determining the validity of eyewitness memory effects and the extent to which 
those effects occur for actual eyewitnesses.  
Given these limitations, eyewitness identification researchers should 1) attempt to 
replicate the findings from these online experiments in the confines of a well-controlled 
laboratory and, if those results replicate, should 2) conduct these experiments in the field 
to determine whether these effects extend to the “real world”.  
Concluding Statement 
The research in this thesis sought to determine whether several popular eyewitness 
memory phenomena impact discriminability or reliability. I re-examined these effects by 
using two new statistical analyses which measure discriminability and reliability: receiver 
operating characteristic analysis and confidence-accuracy characteristic analysis, 
respectively. Altogether, this research has shown that discriminability and reliability are 
two separate measures of eyewitness identification “accuracy”. Understanding that 
distinction could help improve police procedures and could help inform triers of fact. 
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Chapter 3: ROC Analysis - Experiment 1 and 2 
The number of participants, correct ID rates, false ID rates, pAUC values, D values, and 
p values for Experiments 1 and 2.  
Experiment N Correct ID rate False ID rate pAUC D p 
UK Lineup 
Exp 1 452 .16 .07 .008 
.504 .56 
Exp 2 634 .23 .08 .011 
US Lineup 
Exp 1 509 .39 .09 .021 
.042 .97 
Exp 2 654 .39 .09 .021 
 Note:  Because the UK lineup and the US lineup did not yield significant differences in 
discriminability across Experiments 1 and 2, the data from both experiments were 
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Chapter 3: CAC Analysis – Experiment 1 and 2 
Suspect ID accuracy across low, medium, and high levels of confidence.  
Condition N Low Confidence Medium Confidence High Confidence 
UK Lineup  
Exp 1 452 .68 (.07) .81 (.05) .86 (.05) 
Exp 2 634 .68 (.08) .76 (.04) .83 (.05) 
US Lineup 
Exp 1 509 .78 (.03) .83 (.03) .95 (.03) 
Exp 2 654 .79 (.03) .83 (.03) .88 (.04) 
 Note:  Because the UK lineup and the US lineup did not yield significant differences in 
reliability across Experiments 1 and 2, the data from both experiments were combined and 
presented together in Chapter 3. Standard error bars are shown in parenthesis.  
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Chapter 3: ROC Analysis - Designated Innocent Suspect 
The lineup size, correct ID rates, false ID rates, and d′ values for Experiments 1 and 2  
Condition N Correct ID rate False ID rate pAUC D p 
Experiment 1 and 2 
UK Lineup 1086 .20 .15 .009 
2.99 .003** 
US Lineup 1163 .39 .06 .017 
 Note:  The most often identified filler was the designated innocent suspect. This is the 
other method of estimating the false ID rate (see Chapter 2). The conclusions are the same 
regardless of which method is used. Two ** denote a significant result at the .01 level. 
 
Chapter 3: CAC Analysis - Designated Innocent Suspect 
Suspect ID accuracy across low, medium, and high levels of confidence.  
Condition N Low Confidence Medium Confidence High Confidence 
Experiment 1 and 2 
UK Lineup 1086 .78 (.06) .79 (.05) .93 (.05) 
US Lineup 1163 .81 (.03) .81 (.03) .98 (.03) 
 Note:  The most often identified filler was the designated innocent suspect. This is the 
other method of estimating the false ID rate (see Chapter 2). The conclusions are the same 
regardless of which method is used. Standard error bars are shown in parenthesis. 
 
  




Chapter 4: ROC Analysis - Designated Innocent Suspect 
The number of participants, correct ID rates, false ID rates, pAUC values, D values, and 
p values for Experiments 1 and 2.  
Condition N Correct ID rate False ID rate pAUC D p 
Experiment 3 
Verbal 358 .51 .21 .069 
.27 .79 
Control 359 .49 .23 .065 
Experiment 4 
Verbal 395 .39 .15 .033 
2.08 .037* 
Control 375 .65 .17 .056 
 Note:  The most often identified filler was the designated innocent suspect. This is the 
other method of estimating the false ID rate (see Chapter 2). The conclusions are the same 
regardless of which method is used. A single * denotes a significant result. 
 
Chapter 4: CAC Analysis - Designated Innocent Suspect 
Suspect ID accuracy across low, medium, and high levels of confidence.  
Condition N Low Confidence Medium Confidence High Confidence 
Experiment 3 
Verbal  358 .56 (.13) .68 (.06) .86 (.05) 
Control 359 .52 (.09) .57 (.06) .90 (.05) 
Experiment 4 
Verbal 395 .70 (.15) .71 (.06) .82 (.06) 
Control 375 .77 (.12) .77 (.04) .86 (.05) 
 Note:  The most often identified filler was the designated innocent suspect. This is the 
other method of estimating the false ID rate (see Chapter 2). The conclusions are the same 
regardless of which method is used. Standard error bars are shown in parenthesis. 




Chapter 5: Perceptual Analysis – Size of the Perpetrators’ Faces 
The number of frames the perpetrator’s face occupied, the mean size of the perpetrators 
face, and the standard deviation, presented in parenthesis, are displayed for each video. 
Individual t tests were conducted to determine whether there was a significant difference 
in the size of the perpetrator’s face between weapon present and weapon absent videos.  
 Weapon Present  Weapon Absent   
Video # Frames M (SD)  # Frames M (SD) T value p value 
Video 1 101 .17 (.07)  75 .19 (.07) -2.7 p = .01** 
Video 2 213 .22 (.17)  139 .21 (.12) .50 p = .62 
Video 3 149 .08 (.05)  114 .10 (.05) -3.2 p < .001*** 
Video 4 230 .22 (.17)  223 .25 (.17) -1.5 p = .13 
Video 5 333 .15 (.09)  271 .18 (.10) -3.8 p < .001*** 
Video 6 126 .14 (.02)  129 .12 (.02) 13.4 p < .001*** 
Video 7 172 .21 (.13)  139 .23 (.17) -1.2 p = .25 
Video 8 192 .51 (.17)  178 .41 (.14) 5.9 p < .001*** 
 Note:  The mean proportion the perpetrator’s face occupied in every video is shown along 
with the standard deviation in parenthesis. A single * denotes a significant result, ** denote 
a significant result at the .01 level, and *** denote a significant result at the .001 level. 
Although several videos show a significant difference, it is important to note that the 
perpetrator’s face was larger in the weapon absent video than the weapon present video in 
three of these videos and still no weapon focus effect was found.  
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Chapter 5: Perceptual Analysis – Brightness of the Perpetrators’ Faces 
The number of frames the perpetrator’s face occupied, the mean brightness of the 
perpetrators face, and the standard deviation, presented in parenthesis, are displayed for 
each video. Individual t tests were conducted to determine whether there was a significant 
difference in the brightness of the perpetrator’s face between weapon present and weapon 
absent videos.  
 Weapon Present  Weapon Absent   
Video # Frames M (SD)  # Frames M (SD) T value p value 
Video 1 101 92.6 (15)  75 92.4 (11) -.10 p = .92 
Video 2 213 97.1 (27)  139 91.9 (27) -1.6 p = .12 
Video 3 149 137 (34)  114 119 (29) -5.0 p < .001*** 
Video 4 230 113 (69)  223 99.6 (61) -1.8 p = .07 
Video 5 333 131 (31)  271 134 (38) .94 p = .34 
Video 6 126 112 (16)  129 121 (21) 3.8 p < .001*** 
Video 7 172 76 (15)  139 99 (17) 11.2 p < .001*** 
Video 8 192 93 (18)  178 86 (15) -3.5 p < .001*** 
 Note:  The mean brightness of the perpetrator’s face occupied in every video is shown 
along with the standard deviation in parenthesis. A single * denotes a significant result, ** 
denote a significant result at the .01 level, and *** denote a significant result at the .001 
level. Although there was a significant difference in the brightness of the perpetrator’s 
face for four videos, it is important to note that in two of these videos, the perpetrator’s 
face was brighter in the weapon absent condition than the weapon present condition and 
still no significant weapon focus effect was found.  
 
